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This book examines three basic questions. First, what role did Adolf Hitler
play in bringing Francisco Franco to power in Spain? Second and third,
during the years of the Spanish upheaval, what gains did the Fuhrer of Nazi
Germany make in the European balance ofpower generally, and in Franco's
Spain specifically? In the decisive years of 1936-1939, Hitler made his
Spanish decisions in four interrelated areas: political, Inilitary, ideological,
and economic. This book traces the complex paths of development in each
of these areas.
Franco and Hitler both won the Spanish Civil War. Generalissimo
Franco's victory was a classic conquest. The Fuhrer's victory proved more
tenuous, although geographically broader. Despite, or perhaps because of,
his lesser commitment than his Axis cohort, Benito Mussolini, Hitler's
Spanish experiment succeeded spectacularly from July 1936 through March
1939.
Hitler was not a scientific experimenter; his mentality was essentially
that of a daring gambler. But in a figurative sense he was experimenting with
Spain, compared to his deep ideological commitments to territorial expan-
sion in Eastern Europe. As the events unfolded on a day-to-day basis, the
Nazis as a whole during 1936-39 were mostly adventurers in Spain, relative
to the more serious demands they were making elsewhere. On the other
hand, Hitler's Spanish venture was calculated in the sense that General
Hermann Goring, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, an~ merchant Johannes
Bernhardt efficiently implemented Hitler's more lllnited commitments.
They, like Hitler himself, had come out of World War I restless, ven-
turesome. When other Great Powers shifted their attention to eastern Europe
in March 1939, Hitler's use of Spain ran into increasing difficulties. That
issue will be the focus of another work.
My archival research has concentrated on politics, economics, ide-
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ology, and military strategy. My understanding of military tactics, on the
other hand, is based largely on secondary sourc~s. Over the years I have tried
to keep up with Spanish and German secondary accounts, as well as those in
English. See the bibliographical note for more details.
My sincere thanks go to the many people who have aided me. Archivists
who have helped with access to significant unpublished records include, at
the National U.S. Archives, Patricia Dowling, Daniel Goggin, Meyer
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Brausch, Robert Endras, and Hans Maierhofer; of the staffs of the Archivo
Hist6rico Nacional and the Servicio Hist6rico Militar, Jose Martinez Bande,
in Madrid; and at the British Public Record Office, particularly Albert
Harrington and C.P. Chalmers.
Thanks to the Library of Congress, especially Arnold Price; and the
libraries ofColumbia University, Harvard University (Widener), the Univer-
sity of Michigan, New York Public Library, Ohio State University, Ohio
University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California at
San Diego; the Hemeroteca Municipal and Hemeroteca Nacional in Madrid;
the London School of Economics, the British Historical Institute and the
British Museum; and the Kiel Weltwirtschaftsinstitut.
Thanks to the following people who aided my research in Spain: Miguel
Santiago and Maria Jose Cosaga of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; at the
Joint American-Spanish Committee for Cultural and Educational Affairs,
Ram6n Bela, Thomas Middleton, and Ana Maria Mingote; Francisco
Gadea-Oltra of tQe Ministry of Culture; and historians Victor Morales
Lezcano and Angel Vinas.
'IWo Germans who were active participants in the events described in
this book granted oral interviews: Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat and State Secretary
of the Air Force Erhard Milch (both now dead).
I ackno~ledge gratefully the chairman of my doctoral committee at the
University of Michigan, Professor Howard Ehnnann, and Charles Chatfield
at Wittenberg University (Ohio).
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of the City University of New York; Bradley F. Smith of Cabrillo State
University, California; and Harry R. Stevens of Ohio University, special
thanks for reading the entire manuscript at different times and making
interpretive comments. Thanks to Herbert R. Southworth for suggestions
about tile bibliographical note and for copies of German records unavailable
Preface ix
in the archives. Willard C. Frank of Virginia Commonwealth University,
Norfolk, read chapters 3 and 5; and Arno 1. Mayer of Princeton read parts of
chapters 1 and 2; to them, I am also indebted.
My sincere appreciation to my wife, Lois, and to Louise Allin, James
Alsbrook, and John F. Cady of Ohio University, and Verbena Pastor and
Anita Tuchrello for criticizing and proofreading. I acknowledge the finan-
cial aid of Ohio University's Research Committee and paid professional
leave program, and the financial assistance of the Joint American-Spanish
Committee for Cultural and Educational Affairs in 1977-78.
For language assistance, thanks to Martha Felstein; Tatiana Fotitch;
Thomas Franz; Francisco Gadea and his wife, Maria; Helen Gawthrop; Paul
Hehn; Joseph Ipacs; Barbara Kob; Joseph Roggenbauer; Kurt Rosenbaum;
Franz Schwanauer; Karin Wright; and Julitta Young.
Finally, thanks to patient typists over the years: Betty Sue Empey, Paul
T. Evans, Heather Evarts, Lisbeth Huntsman, Suzanne Prichard, David




toward Spain: July 1936
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War marked a major turning point in the
European balance ofpower. Adolf Hitler, the Fuhrer ofGermany, and Benito
Mussolini, the Duce of Italy, aided the Spanish military rebellion in a
cooperation that paved the way for their political understanding in October
1936--the Axis. On the other side of the barricades, the Soviet Union
supported the Spanish Republicans, and substantial unofficial aid flowed
from France to the Loyalists, though the French and British governments
officially avoided confronting the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships.
The principal purpose of this volume is to document how Hitler used the
Spanish crisis to strengthen the Third Reich. The civil war in Spain provided
Hitler with a great opportunity. This "last great cause" drew all eyes to
western Europe, divided the British and especially the French internally, and
shifted the overall European balance of power. Thus Hitler could pursue
territorial gains in eastern Europe.
The civil war that broke out in July 1936 had long roots in the troubled
politics of Spain. Municipal elections in April 1931 repudiated King Alfon-
so XIII and the military dictatorship he had encouraged since 1923. Eco-
nomic depression had further encouraged disillusionment with the old
regime. Lawyers, journalists, and educators sympathetic to republicanism
had for over a century complained of Spain's backwardness relative to
France and Britain. They demanded a new democratic-republican constitu-
tion. Alfonso abdicated, and the royal family left Spain; thus was born the
Second Spanish Republic.
The new government was a coalition of liberal-progressives and demo-
cratic socialists who immediately prepared a new constitution. They were
supported in the streets and the countryside by labor unions and the here-
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tofore illegal anarchist movement, the largest in Europe. Small groups of
Stalinists and Trotskyites added their few, but loud, voices. The new consti-
tution provided for proportional representation and a multiparty system
modeled in spirit after the French Third Republic.
Among the goals of the first Republican leaders were to disestablish the
Roman Catholic Church, cut down the overstaffed army officer corps, and
recognize collective bargaining. Land reform was discussed, but little was
actually accomplished. Regional autonomy was granted to the Basques ana
the Catalans, angering proponents of strong central government. Army
officers attempted a coup in August 1932, but it was unsuccessful. The
November 1933 elections brought a right-wing government to power.
The fundamental problem with Spanish politics from 1931 to 1936 was
intolerance on all sides. This set the stage for partisan conflict, leading
eventually to civil war. The Anarchists, Trotskyites, and some of the
Socialists and Communists pressed for further peasant and working-class
revolution. The church leaders, professional army officers, and landlords
were bitter about their loss of privilege. Small property holders were
frightened by the "red" rhetoric of the Left. Youth from the property-holding
classes were drawn to fascist movements, the most important being the
Falange Espanola, founded in 1933. Others supported the reactionary tradi-
tionalists known as Carlists, who called for the return of a monarchy, but not
of Alfonso's house. Many business leaders backed the Alfonsoist monar-
chists, the army, and the church. Together with capitalists from Britain,
America, and France, well-to-do Spaniards feared a revolution in Spain
similar to the 1917 upheaval in Russia.
From November 1933 to the end of 1935, rightist coalitions of church-
men and monarchist sympathizers dominated the right-wing governments,
after the first group of leftist reformers (1931-1933) was out of office. In the
fall of 1934, a violent strike took place in Asturias. The conservative
government finally collapsed in December 1935 over a question of taxes and
gambling scandals.
On February 16, 1936, a close election brought to power a coalition of
liberals, Socialists, Communists, Trotskyites, and Anarchists formed into a
left-wing alliance of parties known as the Popular Front. The major issue
uniting the group was amnesty for the strikers of 1934. Although antifascist
in ideology, the Popular Front had little interest in foreign affairs because
Spain for over a century had assumed a neutral stance toward the affairs of
Europe.
The great failure of the newly elected leftist government was not coming
together after the election and uniting behind a minimum program. The
progressive liberals were divided into at least three parties on the basis of
personali~ The Socialists were divided between reformist and revolution-
ary wings. The Anarchists only voted for the Popular Front to avoid rule by
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the Right, but Anarchists were dedicated to further revolution. The Commu-
nists were too few to do much in parliament, but they influenced important
socialist and liberal journalists. The Basques and Catalans were anxious to
maintain their independence from Madrid.
From a foreign point of view, Britain, France, and the United States (in
that order) had the most interest in Spain because of invested capital and
markets. The Spanish parliamentary Left looked to those nations as models.
Karl Marx had higher prestige with the revolutionary Left than Joseph Stalin
had. Strategically, Spain was important to both the French and the Germans
in their historic rivalry. Italy and Britain also had an interest in the gateway to
the Mediterranean.
In the months following the February elections, confusion and sporadic
violence escalated in Spain. The Spanish Civil War began on July 17, 1936,
with an insurrection of army officers at Melilla in Spanish Morocco. Within
hours, most of the right-wing officer corps throughout Spain had risen
against the leftist Popular Front government of the Second Spanish Repub-
lic. Liberals, Socialists, Communists, leftists, Basques, and Catalans-a
majority of the people in the major cities and more than half the coun-
tryside-rallied around the government, putting up stiffer resistance than
the rebels had expected. Although the planned coup d'etat failed, it did
succeed to the extent that the government found it impossible to suppress the
insurgents, and Spain was engulfed in civil war. Each camp--Republican
and Nationalist--eonsisted of a variety of classes, parties, and factions.
The rebel officers on the mainland needed the disciplined Moroccan
forces commanded by General Francisco Franco to cross the Straits of
Gibraltar and to give immediate help in conquering areas held by the
Popular Front. This provided the opportunity for German and Italian leaders
to intervene in Spain, thus helping. tum the Spanish Civil War into a
preliminary round of the great conflict known as World War 11. 1
Germany Expands Its Spanish Interests before July
When Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, Britain, France, and the United
States were more important as traders and investors in Spain than was
Germany. 2 To the relatively weak Spanish economy, however, considerable
German economic and military pressure was applied in the early thirties. 3
Germany by 1935 was recovering from the depression faster than France
was, and the Third Reich was beginning to assert itself economically. Spain
purchased 120.3 million4 gold pesetas (14.8 million gold dollars) worth of
goods in Germany in 1935, particularly chemicals and electric appliances,5
while Germans chiefly bought from Spain iron ore, pyrites, skins, fruits,
and vegetables.
In addition to foreign trade and capital, numbers of foreign technical
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personnel help determine economic influence from abroad upon a relatively
underdeveloped country. 6 In one sense the most important foreigners living
in Spain were the Germans, because they formed the largest group of
employed aliens. It is true that fewer Germans than Portuguese lived in
Spain, and that total salaries and positions of Germans were lower than the
French, the British, and the Americans; yet a much larger proportion of the
resident Germans were employed.7 Eight thousand of the total twelve to
fifteen thousand8 Germans living in Spain before the civil war resided in
Barcelona, and about 260 German-owned or German-operated firms lo-
cated their headquarters in the Catalan capital. 9
Politically, many of the Germans in Spain were organized in the Nazi
party's foreign branch, the Auslandsorganisation, or AO. During the course
of the civil war, Nazi Germany would greatly increase its economic influ-
ence in Nationalist Spain and would participate generally in revolutionizing
the Spanish picture.
As for military ambitions, since 1922 the Germans had been interested
in building war vessels prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles. In 1925 King
Alfonso XIII had offered the services of Spanish industry. 10 The Spaniards
were interested in cash and in asserting some independence from French and
British sea power; therefore, they agreed to tap German technical knowledge
about submarines for the development of the Spanish arms industry and
navy. In response, the German navy sent Captain Wilhelm Canaris, a career
officer and a specialist on Spain, to arrange for submarine construction. As a
young naval lieutenant during World War I, Canaris had served in Spain as
an espionage agent against Britain and France. 11 Between 1915 and 1930
Canaris had traveled about a dozen times to Spain,12 most of these trips
arising out of the 1925 contract with private shipbuilder and arms manufac-
turer Horacio Echevarietta of Cadiz. The contract called for the building of
twelve V-boats and one thousand torpedoes for Germany. 13 A key Canaris
contact was Admiral Antonio Magaz, Alfonso's minister of navy in the
1920s who, during the civil war, was to become Nationalist ambassador in
Berlin. The project ended after the fall of the Spanish monarchy in 1931,14
although as late as 1933 the German" navy still extended credits to the
shipbuilder because Manuel Azafia, the Spanish prime minister, hesitated to
repudiate the contract 15
The major objective of the German navy from 1919 to the outbreak of
the civil war in Spain was preparation for a naval war with France and
Poland. 16 The Germans assumed that, in any such war, the United States and
Great Britain would remain neutral but potentially hostile. Spain's neutrality
might be benevolent, so Canaris joined other planners in naval war games in
which Spanish sea bases were scheduled to play a role against France. 17
Between 1933 and June 1936, Canaris visited Spain at least twice.
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Whom he saw and what he discussed remain matters ofdispute, though in all
likelihood he was working on setting up a secret organization to supply food
and fuel to German vessels in the event of war with France. By the time
Canaris became vice admiral and head of the German military intelligence
(Abwehr) in January 1935, he knew more about Spanish affairs than any
other high-ranking German official in Berlin.
In political terms, Spain had little place in Germany's plans before
1936. At least, Hitler's program for Europe as set forth in 1925 in Mein
Kampjdid not deal with it at all. But in "the secret book," written in 1928
and discovered after World War II, Hitler not only stated that Britain and
Italy could serve Germany as allies but added that Spain and Hungary had
the same aversion to France that Germany had. I8 Hitler, therefore, saw
Spain as potentially weakening France, although he did not elaborate upon
any possible Spanish-German alignment.
Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, head of the fascist-inspired Spanish
Falange, did visit Berlin in 1934,19 where he discussed Nazi-Catholic
relations with Nazi party ideologist Alfred Rosenberg. Subsequently Rosen-
berg forbade the translation of the Fiihrer's anti-Catholic tracts into Spanish
because avoidance of unnecessary offense to the dominant Spanish religion
served Nazi political interests in Spain. 20 Jose Antonio spent only five
minutes with the Fiihrer,21 and no follow-up seems to have succeeded the
interview, because Spain was too remote from Hitler's more pressing prob-
lems. Hitler seems to have ignored Spain until the decisive days of July
1936.
Hitler Intervenes in the Civil War
When civil war broke out on July 17, 1936, the supreme authority in the
rebel camp was in confusion. The acknowledged leader of the conspirators,
General Jose Sanjurjo, died trying to return to Spain from Portuguese exile,
and generals in the major cities ofMadrid and Barcelona were overwhelmed
by the Popular Front. The four most powerful insurgent commanders in the
field were Emilio Mola in Burgos, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in Andalusia,
Antonio Aranda in Asturias, and Francisco Franco, who did not become
Nationalist chief of state until October (see map 2).
From the beginning, the generals knew the rank-and-file Spanish infan-
try could not be counted on to support the uprising. Moreover, the adherence
of most of the Spanish fleet and air force to the government isolated the
insurgents in Morocco from those on the mainland. The rebels had to find a
way for Franco's Spanish Foreign Legion to reach the Army of the North,
headquartered at Burgos under Mala, the primary leader of the military
conspiracy in mainland Spain. It was to foreign powers that the self-
6Map 2. Nationalist Territory, July 1936
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Source: Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939
(Princeton, N.J., 1965),270.
proclaimed nationalists turned for aid, and it was those foreign powers who
would help Franco emerge as chief of state.
Because of the diviqed leadership at the beginning of the rebellion,
Mola22 and Franco23 acted independently in seeking air support. Between
July 19 and 21, Franco sent two journalist agents to Rome in a bid for Italian
support; Mola asked the conservative monarchist landowner Antonio
Goic~echea to request Italian transport planes.
Franco also made a personal appeal to Hitler for planes and arms.
Having served as chief of the Spanish general staff in 1935, Franco was
better known in Germany than was Mola; Count Johannes von Welczeck,
who served for ten years as German ambassador in Madrid, had hoped in
1934-1935 that Franco would be appointed minister of war. Although
Franco was not officially the leader of the Nationalist movement in July
1936, Hitler chose from the start to deal exclusively with him.
The request for German aid was carried by four emis,saries-two
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Spanish officers and two Nazi-connected businessmen living in Spanish
Morocco, Johannes Bernhardt and Adolf P. Langenheim.24 They flew in a
confiscated Lufthansa tri-motor Junkers transport plane that landed in
Seville on July 23 and reached Berlin two days later. 25 Bernhardt and
Langenheim talked first with Ernst Bohle, head of the AO, and with the
Fuhrer's deputy, Rudolf Hess. 26 From Berlin, the businessmen continued on
to Bavaria to confer with Hitler, who was attending the Wagner festival at
Bayreuth. When they met for three hours late in the evening of July 25, from
about 10:30 P.M. to 1:30 A.M.,27 the Fuhrer asked them about Franco's
chances of winning the war. Bernhardt apparently presented favorable
prospects for victory, even convincing the Fuhrer of the need to set up an
economic organization in Spain to demonstrate that the Germans would not
try to run the show from afar. 28 Hitler then decided to send Franco twenty tri-
motor Junkers transports, together with six escort fighters. 29
Among Hitler's advisors present in Bayreuth was General Hermann
Goring, head of the Luftwaffe. On the afternoon of July 26, Goring ordered
the creation of a special staff, the Sonderstab W[ilberg], borrowing officers
from army, navy, and air, to administer the military aid sent to Franco.30 The
next day, Erhard Milch, state secretary for air, and General Hellmuth
Wilberg began the formation of this interservice organization. 31 Wilberg,
who had developed a reputation as one of the best pilots in Germany and
who had been Milch's commanding officer in World War I, headed the
Sonderstab W for almost two years. 32 Although it did keep track of supplies
and services, its chief mission was to provide and command a secret German
unit in Spain. 33 The complex duties of the staff required army, navy, and air
force personnel to man the operations.
Wilberg immediately contacted German commercial and industrial
organizations to secure goods for the Spanish operation. On the orders of
Sonderstab W, the commander of the Naval Shipping Administration Sec-
tion of the naval Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM) negotiated a
contract with the Matthias Rohde freight-contracting company of Hamburg,
to provide for secret shipment of supplies to Spain.34
Early in the morning of July 28, Franco's emissaries took off on the
return flight to Tetuan, Spanish Morocco, Franco's base. 35 The following
day, flights began by German planes transporting Moroccan troops between
Africa and Spain. 36 Shortly thereafter, on the night of July 31, the S.S.
Usaramo , chartered by the Rohde shippers, slipped out of Hamburg.
Aboard were eighty-five Germans commanded by Major Alexander von
Scheele, a World War I veteran who had fought in Africa and in the South
American Chaco War in 1935; these men soon set up bases near Tetuan and
Seville to service the Ju 52 planes. 37 Thus began Hitler's first Spanish
military venture, Operation Feuerzauber,38 named by the Fuhrer for the
Wagnerian operatic theme, the "Magic Fire."
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Hitler's decision at Bayreuth set off a chain of events that led to
continued German military intervention in Spain. After the expected speedy
Nationalist victory failed to materialize, Hitler made a second basic commit-
ment on August 28, when he authorized the German fighter pilots in the
original contingent to engage in combat. 39 By late September, Hitler again
expanded his intervention with Operation Otto, which supplied twenty-four
tanks, flak, and radio equipment.40 In addition, Scheele converted the Ju 52
transports into bombers, and Berlin transferred fifteen additional fighters to
his command. By mid-October the Germans probably had 600 to 800 men
in Spain.41 Later that month Hitler decided on the biggest escalation of
German participation in the war. The Legion Condor, with an initial strength
of 3,786 men, 37 officers, and 92 all-new planes, joined the Spanish
conflict in November 1936.42 This legion, with replacements, was destined
to fight for Franco until the surrender of Madrid and the end of the civil war.
Not until May 26, 1939, would Hitler bring it home.
In summary, Hitler's military intervention escalated in at least three
stages: Operation Feuerzauber in July 1936 providing air transportation to
Franco; the August decision to join active combat against the Republicans,
together with the subsequent expanded aid of Operation Otto,43 decided on
September 19; and the Legion Condor's dispatch in October-November
1936-called Luftubung Rugen by the air force and Winteriibung Hansa by
the navy.44 For the following two and one-half years, Hitler basically
maintained the troops he had already sent and did not further escalate
German participation. He was, however, clearly violating the August 1936
Non-Intervention Agreement, designed by France and Britain to limit the
Spanish Civil War. '
Why did Hitler originally decide to intervene in Spain, even though
seemingly he had only the slightest previous interest in the country? Or did
the Fuhrer of the Third Reich have a hand in the Spanish conspiracy before
the civil war broke out?
Intriguing reports have been published that Sanjurjo, the original head
of the military conspiracy, visited Hitler in Berlin early in 1936.45 The
Soviet paper Pravda stated on March 11, 1936, that Sanjurjo and a small
entourage stayed at the Hotel Kaiserhof, the haunt of "big industrialists."
Pravda's Berlin correspondent speculated that a counterrevolution against
the Popular Front government in Spain was being planned, and added that
Sanjurjo had made an attempt to secure German military supplies.46 Late in
the civil war, one German general claimed that Sanjurjo had "conducted
negotiations in Berlin," and that his death was a blow to Germany because
Portugal drew closer to Britain.47 However, unless further documentation on
Sanjurjo's visit to Berlin is found, questions will remain about its signifi-
cance. Nor did pre-rebellion contacts in 1934 between Jose Antonio and the
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Germans cause the uprising or give the Falangists positions of influence in
July 1936. Neither Spaniard held a decisive position when Hitler was called
on for aid; Primo de Rivera was in jail and Sanjurjo was dead. Instead,
Franco proved to be most crucial for German policy.
Similarly, although the long war did eventually provide the German
military with an opportunity to train men and test equipment,48 Hitler did
not originally intervene for those reasons. In July, no one anticipated a long
war because both rebels and Nazis hoped for a quick victory. Testing and
training became important factors only at a later stage of Hitler's interven-
tion, when a great variety of equipment was sent. Although some people
were talking of a second world war emerging in 1937 and 1938, "Tryout in
Spain" did not become a major theme in historiography and propaganda
until after the outbreak of Anglo-German war in September 1939.
Hitler's gains from the Spanish Civil War were to be more diplomatic
than military, and he intervened in Spain from the outset with his eyes
focused on the reactions of Rome and Paris to the Spanish crisis.
Hitler Backs Mussolini's Intervention
Since the end of World War I, Hitler and Mussolini had been ideological
twins in their detestation of democracy, liberalisln, socialism, and commu-
nism. During the Weimar Republic in the twenties, Italy's Mussolini, the
first,-fascist dictator to come to power, generally had supported Britain and
France, the other two Versailles victors, against the possibility of a resurgent
German~ Hitler, for his part, in Mein Kampf projected a bilateral alliance
between Italy and Germany.49
Despite their ideological similarities, Hitler and Mussolini did not ally
quickly after the Fuhrer took over in Germany in 1933; conflicting ambi-
tions for Austria stood in their wa~ The Duce attempted to improve relations
with the German dictator by a first meeting at Venice in June 1934, but
Hitler spumed the overture by increasing German pressure on Austria. The
attempted coup of Austrian Nazis against pro-Italian Chancellor Engelbert
Dollfuss brought Italian troops to the Brenner Pass in July 1934. At that
time, Mussolini's territorial interest in maintaining a buffer state on the Alps
outweighed his ideological predilections.
Nevertheless, the Duce soon began reorienting his foreign policy away
from Britain and France and toward Germany, mainly because Hitler cau-
tiously supported Mussolini's fight to conquer Ethiopia from October 1935
to May 1936.50 Similarities of domestic ideology also exerted a powerful
pull. Beginning in 1935 the Duce once again took the initiative and
approached the Fuhrer several times, seeking closer cooperation.51 Again
Hitler did not commit himself to any major agreement with a weak Italy,
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then in trouble with France and Britain over Abyssinia.52 However, Hitler
did offer Italy benevolent neutrality,53 economic cooperation, words of
assurance that he respected Austrian independence,54 and an agreement that
attacks on each other in their controlled presses would cease. 55 In the
following months, Italian and German fascism increasingly joined in de-
nouncing both democracy and communism. Hitler's gradual rapprochement
with the profascist Austrian government culminated in the German-Austrian
Treaty of Friendship of July 11, 1936, a move that had Mussolini's blessing.
This diplomatic about-face was, in part, a result of the firm stand that
Britain and France took against Italy in the Ethiopian War. The Anglo-
French-sponsored League of Nations sanctions against Italian aggression,
and the collapse of the pro-Italian Laval government in France further
alienated the Duce from Britain and France. Mussolini, therefore, assured
Hitler at the end of February 1936 that Italy would not fight for the
enforcement of the Locamo Treaties of 1925 or the Versailles Treaty of
1919, both of which guaranteed the German-French border if Germany
were to march into the demilitarized Rhineland. 56 The Duce's assurance
came as welcome news inasmuch as Hitler had already resolved to take this
action against France. The Fuhrer naturally encouraged the Italian dictator
to maintain his belligerent stand against France and Britain.
At this time, Hitler informed Mussolini of his concern about the
weakening of "anti-communist forces" in Romania, Czechoslovakia,
France, and Spain. Later in the spring of 1936, Mussolini let Hitler know
that he too was deeply concerned about the future of Spain.57 Meanwhile,
for both political and ideological reasons, the two fascist dictators, acting
independently, were verbally attacking the Popular Front governments that
came to power in the Spanish elections of February and the French elections
ofMa~
The growing strength of fascism in the mid 1930s had frightened the
Soviet Union into the "popular front" strategy. Soviet propaganda services
sometimes supported, sometimes led, and frequently attempted to control
the diverse associations and committees that comprised the various national
popular front movements. Fascist exaggeration of the role of the Communist
element in the Popular Front distorted both French and Spanish realities.
Actually, the general fascist attack on "communism" extended to liberals
and socialists as well as to partisans of the Communist Third International,
or Comintern, founded in 1919.
In any case, foreign policy alignments in 1936 served to intensify the
ideological agreement that Hitler and Mussolini had long shared. Although
Hitler and Mussolini made no specific deal concerning Spain, they followed
parallel foreign policies for nearly six months preceding the outbreak of the
civil war, especially toward, the Spanish Popular Front and the Ethiopian
War.
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Aside from his "anti-communist" stand, Hitler had little stake in inter-
nal Spanish politics; but, as a factor in Italo-French diplomatic rivalry, Spain
became important to him. With Mussolini, matters were different. The Duce
had long entertained ambitious plans for the western end of what he called
"our Mediterranean. " For at least ten years he had been supporting conspir-
acies against various Spanish governments that were friendly toward France.
In 1926, for example, the Duce had aided the separatist movement of
Colonel Francisco Macia-a prominent leader of Catalan nationalism and
somewhat of a leftist-against the monarchist dictatorship of General
Miguel Primo de Rivera, the father of Falange chiefJose Antonio. 58 In 1932
the Duce, ever the ideological opportunist, had supported the reactionary
monarchist Lieutenant General Emilio Barrera, along with the Jesuits and
other right-wing Spaniards, against the leftist Republican government. 59 In
March 1934, Mussolini had promised to supply Barrera and his con-
federates with weapons. 60 Among the signers of this agreement was monar-
chist conspirator Antonio Goicoechea, later to play a role in Italian
intervention in the civil war. The Carlist group again visited Mussolini in
April 1935.61 By ~arly 1935, the Duce had a branch office of the Italian
military intelligence agency, the Servizio Informazione Militare (SIM), in
Barcelona gathering information. 62 As of June 1936, Italian submarines
were visiting Spanish waters. 63
On the ideological front, Mussolini had met in 1928 with one of the
founders of the Spanish Falange,64 the party often regarded as the Spanish
version of fascism. 65 To advance the Fascist cause, Mussolini subsidized the
Falangist press for at least a year prior to the 1936 uprising. 66 From June
1935 to February 1936, the Italians gave the Falange chief, Jose Antonio
Primo de Rivera, 50,000 lire (more than $4,000) monthly. The Duce
reduced the payment to $2,000 per month between February and July
1936,67 perhaps because the Italians were short of foreign currency follow-
ing economic sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italian
aggression in Ethiopia. This subsidy did Mussolini little good, however,
because Jose Antonio was imprisoned by the Popular Front in March. He
continued to be held through the early stage of the rebellion and was
executed in November.
Mussolini certainly had maintained more serious contacts with Spanish
rightists before the civil war than had Hitler; yet, in spite of the intelligence
missions and involvement in earlier plots, the sequence of events in July
caught Mussolini unprepared. From March 1934 to July 1936, Mussolini's
main contact in Spain was Goicoechea, the banker, landowner, and reaction-
ary member ofRenovaci6n Espanola, the major monarchist party advocating
the return of Alfonso XIII. On June 23, 1936, Goicoechea contacted the
Italian army and the Italian foreign minister, to inform them of Spanish
rightist plans for a counterrevolution. The Duce was alerted, but he was
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preoccupied with cleaning up in Ethiopia. The Alfonsoist made a second
appeal to the Italian army and minister of foreign affairs on July 12 and 13,
and again his plea met with a negative reply. 68
On July 13, Goicoechea also tried to send word to Mussolini through an
Italian agent in Barcelona that the date for the uprising would be the
eighteenth.69 But revolutionaries in a labor union militia killed the Italian
agent, and the message never got through. Goicoechea left Madrid on the
night of the seventeenth and escaped to Burgos, where he made contact with
Mola on July 22.70 Goicoechea and educator/historian Pedro Sainz Rod-
riquez flew to Rome the next day to plead for aid on Mola's behalf.
Meanwhile, a member of the Spanish army representing Franco in-
formed an Italian air attache on July 15 in Madrid that the plot was set for
8:00 A.M. on the eighteenth in Morocco, but the Italian ambassador quashed
the attache's enthusiasm for Italian involvement. 71 Despite all the advance
information given to the Italians on the Spanish officers' plotting against the
Popular Front,72 Mussolini hesitated to back the coup when it did occur.
Later, Franco sent his own messengers, journalists Luis Bolin and Marques
Luca de Tena, to Rome on July 21.73
Mussolini, who did not know Franco personally, was confused about
the relative authority and strengths of Generals Mola and Franco. Mola had
been planning the conspiracy since early spring 1936, while Franco had
remained noncommittal until at least June and possibly as late as July 13.74
However, the death of Sanjurjo and the course of military events from July
19 to 21 gave Franco new importance. He was the man with the disciplined
Spanish troops in Morocco, ready for airlift to the mainland. After sending
his personal emissaries to the Duce, Franco made a second appeal through
the Italian military attache in Tangier. 75 He notified Mussolini that he had
appealed to Hitler and implied that if Hitler answered the appeal, the
Germans rather than the Italians would gain greater influence in Nationalist
Spain. This possibility the Duce could prevent by sending a dozen planes.
Franco also told Mussolini that the French were sending planes to the
Republicans.
Still, the Duce hesitated because of opposition from his war and foreign
ministries76-and because of money. Unlike Hitler, Mussolini was demand-
ing hard foreign currency for war supplies. Here, Spanish millionaire Juan
March, already in exile in Rome, played a key role. As the chief financial
backer of the revolt, March put up one million pounds ($4.9 million) for the
first twelve planes, Savoia 81s and Caproni bomber-transports. 77 Even so,
Mussolini received at least five separate appeals from Spain before he
finally agreed to send planes, presumably on July 25 or 26.78
Did the Fuhrer and the Duce confer by telephone or courier about
sending aid? Milch, the Luftwaffe general, says they did;79 and, in the
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Fuhrer's later speech on the occasion of the 1939 return of the Legion
Condor, Hitler said that his decision to aid Franco had been made "in
complete agreement with Italy. "80 The diplomatic climate was right for
close cooperation. On July 25, just hours before Hitler met Franco's emis-
saries in Bayreuth, Germany's ambassador, Ulrich von Hassell, called on
Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's foreign minister. 81 After extending German
de facto recognition of the Italian empire in Abyssinia, Hassell mentioned
his concern about French Popular Front assistance to the Spanish Popular
Front. Ciano replied that this also worried him, and he offered to have Italian
ships protect German nationals in Spain until the German fleet arrived. The
two promised to keep each other informed about future developments.
It should be remembered, however, that Hitler and Mussolini sent
planes to Franco not only because the planes were needed to transport troops
to the mainland but also because Franco's base in North Africa was easier to
reach than Mola's. Nine of the twelve Italian planes and the first of the
twenty-six German planes arrived in Spanish Morocco almost simul-
taneously on July 30.82 But, from surviving flight records of the Franco
forces, the Junkers initially aided the rebel movement more than did the
Italian planes. 83 Three of the Savoias actually crash-landed in French North
Africa after running out of gasoline, an event that caused an immediate
international incident.
The German navy also was first to make its presence felt in Nationalist
waters. The Italians, like the Americans and the British, sent vessels to
rescue their refugee nationals from Republican territory. The Germans,
however, sent a different kind of naval mission. On August 2, the pocket
battleship Deutschland made a widely publicized visit to Ceuta, Spanish
Morocco. Admiral Rolf Carls met there with Franco, Colonel Juan Beig-
beder (one of the first leaders of the uprising in Morocco and a former
military attache in Berlin), and Nazi leaders Langenheim and Bernhardt,
who had just returned by air from Berlin and Bayreuth.84
Following the symbolic importance of the Deutschland mission, Italian
arms deliveries to Spain and the Balearics during the month of August
surpassed those made by Germany: The Duce had no desire to see the Fuhrer
really get ahead of him; he had done too much talking about the Mediterra-
nean being a "Roman sea" to allow that. By September 23, Italy had sent
200 men, 68 planes, and several hundred small arms. 85 In contrast, by the
end of August the Germans had dispatched only their 26-plane group, 86
men, and oil and replacement supplies. 86
Despite the possibility of a Hitler-Mussolini consultation on July 25,
there is no documentary evidence of their coordination on Spanish policy
before early August. Between August 3 and 7, Italy's propaganda chief
(minister of popular culture) Dino Alfieri traveled to Germany. There he
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discussed with his German counterpart, Joseph Paul Goebbels, a mutually
approved German-Italian press policy against "the bolshevik danger. "87
Alfieri also brought a personal message from the Duce, and he conferred
with Hitler for some twenty-five minutes. 88 Joint Italian-German military
cooperation in Spain definitely began on August 4 with a meeting in
northern Italy between the heads of the German and Italian secret services,
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and Colonel Mario Roatta. 89
The decisions in Berlin and Rome to send military supplies to Franco
rather than to Mola quickly proved decisive in Franco's rise to power. Mola
had taken the initiative in Spain from February to July 1936, but he had
counted on a quick coup, and its failure made him feel politically more
uncertain by August. 90 On the other hand, Franco's past experience of long
campaigns in Morocco better prepared him from the beginning for a long
war. On August 3, Mola agreed that Franco should have priority and manage
relations with the Germans and the Italians. 91 Any military supplies that
Mola needed for northern Spain would be handled in the future through
Franco.92
Seen from the international point of view, Germany and Italy continued
to follow independent, but parallel, policies after the civil war started.
Because of their common .antipathy to the League of Nations, to Britain and
France, to the Popular Front and to communism, Hitler and Mussolini had
been coming closer before the civil war. The appeal of Franco to both of
them reinforced their ties. The bonds forged by Italian-German cooperation
in Spain would have the gravest consequences for the traditional position of
France as a Great Power.
Anglo-French "Nonintervention" Aids Hitler
In 1936 French officials were worried less about Mussolini than about
Hitler, who in March had reoccupied the Rhineland. However, the Duce's
attempts to have Italy recognized as the foremost power in the Mediterra-
nean bothered both the British and the French. On the eve of the Spanish
Civil War, French-Italian relations were near an all-time low, partly because
of Italian resentment toward the Anglo-French League of Nations policy
during the Ethiopian War. (League sanctions were not lifted until May
1936.) Italian-French relations were further strained by the French electoral
victory of the anti-fascist coalition that created the Popular Front govern-
ment headed by Leon Blum, who was both a Jew and a democratic socialist.
On the one hand, the emerging Popular Front movement in France of
Communists, Socialists, and liberals challenged the ideological founda-
tions of fascism and nazism. On the other hand, the offensive of the Spanish
army officer corps, with their Falangist and reactionary monarchist allies,
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presented the French with the threat of a possibly pro-fascist, pro-Italian,
and pro-German government on their southern border. The Popular Front
government headed by Blum thus had both ideological and diplomatic
reasons to oppose the victory of the Spanish Right.
On July 21, 1936, the liberal Madrid government of Prime Minister
Jose Giral asked the French government for permission to purchase twenty
planes, plus arms and ammunition. With Blum's approval, the French air
minister at first agreed to dispatch the requested French aircraft. 93 But on the
evening of July 25, after Blum had visited London, the French cabinet
vetoed that decision, and further arms shipments to the Republicans were
officially prohibited by the French government.94 Ironically, this was the
same night that Hitler and Mussolini were deciding upon sending planes to
Franco. What caused this reversal by the French?
As chance would have it, before the eruption of the Spanish crisis Blum
and his foreign minister, Yvon Delbos, had already been scheduled for
meetings in London. On July 22-24, they met with Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Neville Chamberlain, and Under State Secretary in the War Office Duff
Cooper. 95 Officially, these discussions covered only the violation of the
Locarno pact by Hitler the previous March and the possibility of a new
Western Five-Power agreement with Germany on the Rhine. 96 Unofficially,
however, the Spanish situation came up for discussion, and the British hinted
that if the French got themselves entangled with the Spanish Popular Front
government, British support would not be forthcoming. According to Blum,
the foreign minister urged prudence but did not make a specific threat,97
while the prime minister told Blum not to expect any English help on
Spanish involvement.98
Meanwhile, British authorities also were having to deal with the ques-
tion of aid to the Spanish insurgents. The British Foreign Office was in-
formed on July 23 that private British interests had sold four Fokker planes
to the rebels, to be sent via Portugal. Eden personally disapproved of the
sale, but he concluded he had no legal power to prevent it. However, the
British Foreign Office drew up a general memorandum for an international
nonintervention policy in the Spanish strife. This was approved by Eden on
the twenty-fourth. 99
British Tory leaders generally were not as opposed to the Spanish in-
surgents as the French Popular Front leaders were. Early in the war Eden told
the German charge, Prince Otto von Bismarck, that Franco was pro-British,
that a Nationalist victory would not in any way weaken British dominance in
Spanish waters, and that the British accepted in good faith Italy's disclaimer
of territorial designs on Spain or the Balearics. 100 During July, the British
foreign secretary apparently paid no attention to the arrival of German and
16 Hitler and Spain
Italian planes in Spain, nor did he object to the prospect of a Nationalist
victory.
Other members to the British government seem to have been even more
sympathetic to the rebel cause. Baldwin supposedly told Eden on July 26
that "on no account, France or other, must [you] bring us in to fight on the
side of the Russians. "101 This comment, if accurately quoted, indicates that
Baldwin was both disturbed and misinformed. The Russians were not yet in
Spain, and Prime Minister Jose Giral's Madrid government was not even
socialist, much less communist. But the British Conservative party's ide-
ological bias tended to throw it on Franco's side out of fear of a spreading
social crisis in Europe.
Back in France, a bitter debate had raged in the press between the Right
and the Left from July 22 to July 25 on the question of exporting arms to the
Spanish Republic. This did not pass unnoticed by the Germans. On July 23,
the German Foreign Ministry voiced concern in London and Paris that the
French Popular Front government was planning to send planes to the
legitimate government in Madrid. 102 Consequently, the chief of the Spanish
desk in the German Foreign Ministry asked his London embassy to take up
with the British Foreign Office the French rightist press reports about
deliveries of French planes to the Spanish government. Meeting with Eden,
Bismarck mentioned the reports and affirmed that Germany had "absolutely
reliable information" that the stories were true. Eden's dry response was that
he, too, read a pro-German and right-wing paper, the Daily Mail. 103
The Germans also closely watched the British-French talks. The Ger-
man embassy in London obtained a secret report written by an anonymous
high official in the British government (or press) who had spoken to both
foreign ministers at the time of the July meeting in London. According to
this report, Eden said that the conference was held only at the insistence of
France, and he definitely urged Delbos to exercise strict nonalignment
between the two Spanish factions. 104
The crucial French decision not to send military aid to the Republic may
have resulted, in part, from fear that the class war then going on in Spain
would spread to France. lOS However, a second and more significant explana-
tion rests on British coolness toward French support for the Spanish govern-
ment. l06 Remember that it was immediately after the French delegation
returned to Paris that the cabinet, on the evening of July 25, decided against
export of arms officially to the Republic. The cabinet did, however, permit
the export to -Spain of the promised twenty Potez-54s through private
channels. 107 The French cabinet also agreed to send a top naval officer to
London to try to persuade the British navy to do nothing that might aid the
rebel faction.
In London in early August, Admiral Fran~ois Darlan met with the first
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sea lord, Admiral A.E.M. Chatfield, a Franco sympathizer and anti-Sovi-
et. 108 Darlan voiced France's concern that Italy might take the Balearics and
Germany the Canary Islands. Chatfield voiced some skepticism, but he
agreed with Darlan that the two fleets should jointly watch the islands for
German and Italian activity. Both men reaffirmed that the traditional princi-
ple of nonintervention should be maintained in Spanish politics. 109 In
contrast, Sir Samuel Hoare, first lord of the admiralty, concluded that French
fears did not warrant action, and that the British navy would withdraw from
Spanish waters after refugee rescue was completed. Although this viewpoint
did not prevail, it indicates the strength of British detachment from the
concerns of France. He added that Germany and Italy did not want a
confrontation in Spain; rather, they wanted a new "Locarno," or Western
Power Pact, and "that we should do nothing to help Communism in Spain,"
since "communism" (in other words, social and national revolution) threat-
ened the British Empire. 110 Only on August 8, after the completion of
Darlan's mission, did the Paris government take definite legal steps to
suspend permanently the export of private arms to Spain. 111
The British government, meanwhile, had already moved more vig-
orously against further export of weapons to Spain. Reversing the earlier
decision to permit the four privately sold Fokkers to fly to Portugal, Eden on
July 29 also turned down an official Portuguese government request for
arms. The Foreign Office suspected that they were actually intended for
Spain and began to press Portugal not to take sides in the Spanish con-
flict. 112
By the end ofJuly, the British government unilaterally was opposing the
export of arms to any party in Spain. The Foreign Office justified the new
policy with the argument that the Spanish battleground could grow into a
struggle of "world fascism against world communism." Acceptance of this
formula turned out to be a defeat for liberals everywhere, because it ignored
the political center and oversimplified the complexities of the Spanish
situation, forcing at least sixteen party viewpoints into starkly -"red" or
"black" molds. '-'World fascism against world communism" also became a
self-fulfilling prophecy that, for almost three years, was to guide the policy
of the British government and the fluctuating majorities of the badly divided
French government.
On August 2 came the official birth of the nonintervention policy when
a French-sponsored circular note was sent to other European governments,
requesting them to agree to an international arms embargo against both sides
in Spain. 113 Until the agreement was firm, the French reserved the right to
send arms to the Republic. 114 There was never any question of getting
British adherence, because the note reflected British policy, but those most
tempted to intervene-Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Portugal-
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delayed their answers. On August 28, when Italy, the last holdout, finally
agreed to the French proposal, an international Non-Intervention Agree-
ment came into effect, and a Non-Intervention Committee (NIC)-includ-
ing ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, the USSR, and Portugal-was
set up in London.
The NIC aimed originally at applying an international arms embargo
against both sides of Spain. Ostensibly the committee was trying to prevent
the civil war in Spain from expanding into a Great Power war in Europe.
After first working to prohibit the export of weapons, the NIC later took up
the transportation of men to fight for opposing sides in Sp-ain. Although it
was France that officially began the worldwide arms embargo effort in
August, Great Britain mainly kept the idea alive from September 1936 to the
end of the war. Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the USSR had no intention of
following the formula, and they secretly violated both the letter and the spirit
of the nonintervention obligation.
The French governments that went in and out of power during this
period were badly tom between their pro-BritiSh and pro-Soviet factions and
enforced the agreement sporadically. The French ambassador in London
reported in January 1937 that the British government believed itself es-
pecially authorized to make proposals because the NIC was sitting in
London. 115 Delbos, the French foreign minister, also told the Spanish
republican ambassador that, at the beginning of the war, "the French
government was obliged by England to take the initiative on Non-Interven-
tion" and that the British government wanted the triumph of Franco. 116
Recent researchers have concentrated their attention on the legal maneuvers
of August 1936 and have not looked much beyond that month. Therefore,
these historians tend to put maximum responsibility for the nonintervention
policy on the French government, although it was the British who most
strongly championed the cause. Be that as it may, the French decisions of
July 25, August 2, and August 8 (which became firm policy during the next
month) had considerable effect on the eventual outcome of the civil war.
While the German and Italian governments financed, recruited, an4 secretly
dispatched organized units to Spain, the French volunteers and arms mer-
chants, in cooperation with the Soviets, had to buck the official policy of
their government.
Although the Germans thought the French government was insincere in
its declaration of nonintervention, they were glad to see the French cabinet
on July 25 prohibit governmental exports of war material to the Loyalists.
Hitlermay have re,acted to the French indecision and squabbling about Spain
by determining on his own military intervention and by influencing the
Duce on July 25-26 toward deciding to send planes. However, the French
Popular Front cabinet of July 1936 held its own during the first phase of the
interventionist game. Into August, informal French supplies probably
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matched the German aid. In order to weaken the French tie with Britain,
Hitler increasingly denounced the "red"· tendencies of the. Popular Front
government in France and its links to the continuation of the Spanish Civil
War. 117 The unified German and Italian dictatorial governments were thus
willing to risk more than the various French cabinets from 1936 to 1939.
The Soviets Step in for the Republic
Early Soviet influence in Spain had been primarily ideological. 118 Commu-
nist Russia had developed little economic or strategic interest in the western
Mediterranean before the civil war. Yet, the Communist Third International
(Comintern) and the Russian Revolution of 1917 had strongly attracted parts
of the Spanish Left. Russian influence in Spain did not have to be subsidized
in order to flourish because the initiative for Marxist and Leninist propagan-
da had been taken on by many Spaniards themselves. 119
Since 1934 the Soviet Union had been urging socialists and liberals in
Spain-like those in Britain, France, and the United States-to create a
united "popular front" against the fascists. 120 Stalin had for the most part
abandoned the exportation of revolution in 1928 after the Chinese fiasco and
his repudiation of Trotsky, the prime Soviet proponent of world revolution.
The period 1928-1934 saw Stalin stressing a "united front from below,"
meaning destruction of the independent leftist, social democratic, and
Trotskyist groups in favor of a tightly controlled, conspiratorial party, avail-
able to serve Soviet national interests. From 1934, after Hitler's Non-
Aggression Pac~with Poland, to the 1936 outbreak of the civil war in Spain,
the Soviet dictator was interested mainly in protecting Soviet frontiers from a
feared Japanese or German armed invasion. Under these circumstances,
stimulating social revolution in other countries would have been of little help
to the Soviet Union. The Foreign Ministry, consequently, under the direction
of Maxim Litvinov, assumed a conservative, defensive reaction against
Hitler's Drang nach Osten. Georgi Dimitroff, secretary of the Comintern,
encouraged the development of a popular front in every country to stand up
to Hitler and to Mussolini as well. 121
The Spanish Communist party, from 1935 to July 17, 1936, was trying
to attract proletarian voters from the other parties. Therefore, the old Leninist
revolutionary rhetoric was maintained to some extent. At the same time, the
Communists made new appeals to the conservative petit bourgeoisie and
salariat to stand united in a Popular Front against a possible coup by pro-
fascist, reactionary, and nationalistic officers. The Soviet Union worked
hard with propaganda, 'and probably·money,122 to help get popular front
governments elected in both France and Spain in the spring of 1936. The
Spanish Communist party received only 3 percent of the vote in the election,
which translated into fifteen deputies in the Cortes. 123
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The Spanish insurgent officers, nevertheless, charged that the Soviet
Union deliberately precipitated the civil war by planning a social revolution
to occur between February and July 1936. These vague charges have since
been discounted by the major students of the subject. 124
Spain mayor may not have been on the verge of social revolution in the
months prior to July. 125 After the February Popular Front electoral victory
brought liberals to power, the Left continued agitation for social reform, the
president was impeached, many peasants squatted on large estates, strikes
were called, and churches were burned. On the Right, the Falangists and the
Carlists expanded their private militias. 126 Like Lenin from April to October
1917, Francisco Largo Caballero, leader of the socialist labor union, Union
General de Trabajadores (UGT), and the anarchist leaders were advocating
more radical revolution in their speeches. What was different from Russia of
November 1917, however, was a lack of specific plans by either the revolu-
tionary socialists or the Anarchists to carry out an armed coup. The Spanish
Left was too divided: into bickering liberals, Anarchists, revolutionary
Socialists, the small authoritarian Stalinist Communist party, and a group of
"Leninist-Trotskyites," the revolutionary Partido Obrero Unificacion Marx-
ista (POUM). How widespread the arson and murders were and who was
responsible are still controversial. 127 At the other end of the political
spectrum, the reactionary Carlists, the Alfonsoists, and the fascist Falang-
ists must share a measure of responsibility for the unrest and polarization of
Spanish society during those crucial months.
The major charge advanced after 1937 by liberals, Socialists, Anar-
chists, and the so-called Trotskyites was not that Stalin provoked revolution
in July 1936, but rather that he sabotaged a potentially revolutionary
situation for the diplomatic and domestic interests of his own reactionary
power in the USSR. 128
Actually, Russian military intervention in Spain, like that of the Ger-
mans, developed in stages. Following the outbreak of the civil war, the
USSR encouraged maximum aid to the Spanish Popular Front by rousing up
popular front activists throughout western Europe. Stalin presumably ac-
quiesced in the moves made by French Communists and by the Italian and
German exiles in Paris. At their head stood Willi Miinzenberg, the leading
popular front propagandist during the early 1930s and the founder of many
international communist front groups that sprang up in France, Belgium,
and elsewhere following the naming of Hitler as chancellor in 1933.
Miinzenberg took more interest in the fate of Spanish proletarian revolution
than did Stalin. 129 He helped spur western European popular front organiza-
tions to purchase secondhand weapons of various types from private sources
and to recruit volunteers to fight for the Spanish "democratic cause. "130
Although it is not clear exactly how and when the Soviet decision to in-
tervene militarily in Spain was made, it may have occurred at a Moscow
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meeting held as early as July 21. According to the conservative French
press, the Moscow discussion of Spain that day led to a joint meeting of
leaders of the Comintern and the Profintern (the Communist-led federation
of labor unions) held in Prague on July 26. 131 At that meeting, the lead-
ership allegedly planned to send aid indirectly to the Spanish Republicans.
Moscow would supply the money, while liberal and socialist groups in the
West would supply the arms and the men. A five-man committee selected to
administer the funds consisted of French Communist Maurice Thorez,
Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti ("Ercoli"), and three Spaniards-two
of them Communists-plus Largo Caballero, the Socialist. After the meet-
ing Ercoli allegedly proceeded to Paris to confer with the French Commu-
nist party. 132
However, this whole conservative scenario seems dubious. The Ger-
mans seem to have known nothing about these alleged moves. The date of
July 21, when Moscow supposedly held its first discussion about interven-
tion, corresponded with the date when Giral, the Spanish prime minister,
appealed for military aid from Blum's Paris government. The key meeting in
which Soviet aid was supposedly agreed upon (July 26) came after the
French government decided officially to go along with the British Foreign
Office and the French conservatives in limiting military aid shipments to the
Popular Front in Spain. The supposed Soviet decision of July 26 also
corresponds with the dates when Hitler decided at Bayreuth to send the
Junkers transports to Franco, and when Mussolini sent the Savoia bombers.
From the incomplete evidence available, it seems more likely that either
the USSR made no decision on July 21 or, at best, the Comintern may have
sent agents to find out what was going on in Spain. Actually, the Russians
were probably waiting to see what the French, Italians, and Germans were
going to do. World-renowned writer Andre Malraux, president of the French
branch of a Communist-front organization called the Committee against
War and Fascism, flew to Madrid about July 21 to serve as a private
volunteer. 133 He later returned to France to recruit some twenty planes and
pilots, which arrived on August 13 at Barajas, near Madrid, and began
operations a few days later. 134 Similarly, the Italian Communist Nino
Nanetti arrived in Barcelona from Toulouse135 on July 20. As early as
August 1, the French Communist party began collecting arms for shipment
to Spain. 136 On August 3, the Comintern quietly initiated a worldwide call
for communists to join the other international volunteers who were flocking
to Spain. 137 Foreign anarchists, socialists, and liberals, along with commu-
nists, had already been volunteering in small numbers in Barcelona. 138 The
Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia reported on August 6 that Moscow's
trade unions had collected 12.1 million rubles (two million dollars), ostensi-
bly for relief of the Spanish workers' militia. 139
As the war developed, in early September the Madrid government
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shifted further to the left. During that month Socialist Largo Caballero
replaced the liberal Giral as premier, and for the first time Communists
entered the Spanish cabinet. Also during September, the British and French
governments decided to enforce the nonintervention policy sponsored by the
London committee against the shipment of arms to the Republican govern-
ment of Spain. At the same time, Franco's forces were making important
military gains, marching east from Caceres to Toledo and Madrid.
The Soviets thereupon made a second crucial decision to send their own
arms and military advisors to direct the international volunteers. The Com-
munist International issued an invitation for noncommunist volunteers to
utilize its well-organized underground railway system to Spain. In executing
this project, the Soviet Union had the cooperation not only- of the French
Communist party but of some French officials as well. 140 As of September
12-14, it became official Soviet policy to send military aid to the Republican
government of Spain. 141 Shortly thereafter, on September 25-in violation
of the spirit of the Non-Intervention Agreement-the first of five Russian
ships, the Neva, arrived in Republican Spain with food, secret arms, and
munitions. 142 According to Italian intelligence reporting from Alicante, the
Neva unloaded 3,000 cases of rifles, 4,000 cases of munitions, and various
boxes of aviation equipment on September 29. 143
In September, as the Soviets gradually dispatched weapons, the Repub-
licans organized their gold reserves for shipment to the USSR. In mid-
September the Bank of Spain prepared to ship to Moscow some 510 tons of
gold, amounting to 72.6 percent of the country's large holdings of monetary
gold. 144 Throughout the war, the Republic was to spend a total of some $775
million in gold abroad, of which the Republicans spent $237 million directly
in capitalist markets. 145 Although gold worth $518 million was sent to
Moscow in the fall of 1936, most of that amount-at least $340 million-
was re-exported to the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord of
Paris. 146 The latter was spent gradually on International Brigades, by the
Republican war ministries, and by CAMPSA-Gentibus, a new Soviet-model
monopoly trading company that was supposed to centralize Republican
purchasing activities abroad. 147 Thus, private companies, French coopera-
tion, and the Communist International actually were more important than
the USSR in the day-to-day foreign economic operations that sustained the
Republican war effort from September 1936 to the war's end. Also, it
appears that only $131.5 million of the $178 million in Spanish gold spent
in Moscow during 1937 went for weapons, with perhaps an additional $85
million in Soviet-provided credit spent in 1938. 148 This relatively low figure
for direct Soviet participation reflects the indirect operations employed by
Comintern activities in western Europe. 149
One good way of measuring foreign intervention over the course of the
Spanish Civil War is to compare the money spent or loaned on both sides for
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military aid. As noted, the Soviets utilized some $518 million in Spanish
gold to pay what Russia charged the Republic for the services of the In-
ternational Brigades, plus an $85 million Soviet loan. Axis credit included
540 million German reichsmarks ($215 million) plus 6.8 billion Italian lire
($354 million),150-totaling $569 million. Actually, the Republic spent
about $237 million of the $518 million in France, while there was some $76
million in cash sales from the western democracies to the Nationalists. 151
Probably not included in these figures were the private contributions to the
Republicans from leftists in the democracies, and the Nationalists' pay-
ments to the Moroccan mercenaries.
After the Soviets secretly decided on September 14 to dispatch military
supplies on a cash basis, they continued their less obvious intervention by
recruiting international volunteers from other parts of the world. Russian
personnel ~ such did not, therefore, bulk large as a military factor on the
side of the Spanish Republic. An estimated total of 600 to 800 Russian
military advisors served in Loyalist Spain at any given time, while through-
out the war the total number of Russians never exceeded 2,000. 152 This was
about one-eighth of the number of German "advisors" whom Hitler sent to
Franco. Russian planes did not take to the air over Spain until the first week
of October 1936153-after Hitler's original Feuerzauber and Otto opera-
tions, but before his sending of the Legion Condor. A French historian says
that five Soviet pilots came at the end of August to Madrid in a French
fighter Dewoitine 371 as part of an advanced planning group. 154 Between
mid-September and October 23, the main body of 183 Soviet pilots was
flown to Albacete through France, utilizing a four-engined Fokker XXXVI.
The Soviet Union was more active in enlisting volunteers, mostly
through the NKVD (People's Commission for Internal Affairs) secret police
and the Communist parties of western Europe. From July to mid-October,
foreign Communist volunteers and other popular front personnel traveled to
Spain individually. The resulting International Brigades, volunteers from
some fifty-odd countries who fought for the Republic, were officially rec-
ognized by the Spanish government after October 23. They were supplied by
Moscow and its friends in Paris. The headquarters for recruits at Albacete
was directed by the French Communist Andre Marty, and the enlistees from
Germany, France, Italy, and Poland numbered more than 60 percent Com-
munist in membership. 155 Following a month or more of preparation, the
initial brigade charged into battle for the first time on October 23 .156 During
the course of the Spanish Civil War, perhaps as many as 59,400 men were to
serve as brigaders. 157 Because of the increased Comintern activity in Sep-
tember and October, Hitler and Mussolini felt justified in escalating their
own military units in November.
Thus, while the role of Soviet troops throughout the war was small, the
role of the Communist International, if one includes all the volunteers more
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or less under Moscow's influence, was large. The brigaders totaled about
two-thirds as many men as the combined German and Italian troops.
Compare the estimated maximum of 59,400 International Brigaders (only
35,000 ifone accepts a liberal's figure) 158 plus the 2,000 Russians, with the
ov~rall figures of 16,800 Germans and 80,000 Italians. 159 Ifone also counts
the 53,000 Moroccans160 who fought for Franco, then the foreign troops on
the rightist side constituted an overwhelming majority: In August 1937 the
International Brigades had an effective strength of 16,000161 who faced
5,000 Germans and 45,000 Italians. 162 Furthermore, technologically speak-
ing' the weaponry of the regular German and Italian military was more than
a match for the varied weapons and disorganized supply sources of the
Comintern.
Not only did the Nationalists get more aid on credit, but the Republicans
also spent more money on obsolete equipment and on indirect charges to
middlemen in their delivery system. Shipping rates to Popular Front ports,
for instance, were three times the rates to Nationalist ports. A second
advantage for the Nationalists was that, in contrast with the upstarts who
were necessary for Republican procurement, powerful and established Brit-
ish and American businessmen dealt directly with Franco's purchasing
agents. 163
Moreover, in time the Soviets cut down on their aid to the Republic,
while the Axis continued to extend strong support to Franco. After June
1938, the Soviet Union quietly retreated from its Spanish venture, partly
because the French put heavy restrictions on the transit of Soviet supplies
from France to Spain. 164 By September 1938, the Republican prime minis-
ter officially called for the withdrawal of the International Brigades. Addi-
tionally, the hopes of international support for the beleaguered Spanish
Republic were dashed by the Munich Conference. In September 1938,
France and Britain coerced Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to
Germany without offering resistance. Stalin, who already suspected Cham-
berlain and the French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, could have no
doubt that he had been isolated from the European concert.
By July 1938, the official press organ of the Wehrmacht had already
concluded that the USSR had written Spain off as lost,165 and that it
continued to support the Republicans only to save face. The Republic's
charge in Moscow concluded in April 1938 that "many Russians believe we
have lost the war," and he requested recall to Spain before the Soviets made
any declaration of withdrawal. 166 Mussolini and Hitler, on the other hand,
stuck closer to their Spanish nationalist allies until the end of the war.
One would have to be overimaginative to see the crisis of 1936 as a
consciously planned fulfillment of Hitler's 1928 dreams of using Spain
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against France. When opportunity knocked in 1936, however, Hitler seized
upon the Spanish generals' "movement" as an anti-French factor to help tip
the European balance of power in his favor.
The civil war in Spain was to have a profound effect upon European
diplomatic history. The war would strengthen Germany by weakening any
would-be alliance of its traditional enemy, France, with Britain and Soviet
Russia. France would move carefully to preserve its limited entente with
Britain, which would help to alienate the Soviet Union, thus turning the
1935 Soviet-French mutual assistance pact into a mere paper agreement.
The civil war also would bitterly divide opinion inside France; hence, it
would weaken the French at home and abroad. On the other side, Italy,
which recently had been isolated by the Ethiopian crisis, would be encour-
aged by war in Spain to continue its budding rapprochement with Germany.
Germany, whose relative diplomatic isolation since World War I had not
decreased substantially since Hitler's accession to power, would be able to
consolidate ties with Italy and Japan by invoking an "anticommunist
crusade."
With the intent of weakening France and the Soviet Union in early 1936,
Hitler was already beginning to perform in two rings-Rome and Tokyo--to
get others to dance to his tune. The Spanish arena was now added as a third
ring to provide even further distraction for London and Paris. In addition to
Franco, who would eventually win in Spain, Hitler would emerge as the
major European beneficiary of the civil war.
2
The Ideology of Anticommunism:
July 1936-March 1939
Hitler's Anticommunist Faith and Opportunism
Political propagandists of all persuasions utilize religion and ideology by
manipulating words and images that incite people to kill. Favorite tech-
niques appeal to patriotism and seek to dehumanize the enem~ In the
twentieth century people have fought over such abstractions as Christianity,
Islam, Huns, communists, fascists, aggressors, "the nation," and "the
enemy." Anticommunism, like the anti-Christ frOQl the Book of Revelation,
arises from a Manichean conct1pt of a dualistic world where people suppose
that good and evil can be clearly and readily differentiated. Nationalism and
anticommunism were two concepts that united Franco and Hitler.
Adolf Hitler exploited the slogan "anticommunism" to facilitate his
relations not only with other governments but also with corporate, eccle-
siastical, and press leaders. He teamed up with and manipulated those who
were outspoken in their opposition to Soviet foreign policy, to the activities
of the Communist International, to national liberation movements, to social
revolution, and even to social reform. He appointed as his special negotiator
a tireless advocate for an anticommunist foreign policy, the Nazi party's
foreign policy advisor, Joachim von Ribbentrop.
Hitler's anticommunist stand in Spain clearly affected Germany's rela-
tions not only in Europe but with Japan, a future ally on the other side of the
globe. Ribbentrop had approached the Japanese army about concluding an
anti-Comintern pact in 1935. At the beginning of July 1936, before the civil
war in Spain started, the German ambassador in Tokyo discussed the
alliance project in a visit with Hitler and Luftwaffe Chief Hermann Goring
at Berchtesgaden. 1 On July 22, Hitler included both Ribbentrop and his
assistant, Hans von Raumer, who ran the Nazi party's foreign office (Dienst-
The Ideology of Anticommunism 27
stelle Ribbentrop), in a meeting with the Japanese military attache, General
Hiroshi Oshima. Under discussion was a proposed anti-Comintern pact. 2
Hitler and Ribbentrop formulated the first draft between July 22 and 24,3
just before Nazi comrade Johannes Bernhardt delivered Franco's appeal for
airplanes. Thus, the Fuhrer clearly had anti-Soviet moves on his mind when
Franco brought the Spanish upheaval forcefully to his attention.
Ribbentrop continued talks with Oshima and with Japan's ambassador,
Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji, for the next three weeks, and the hesitant
Japanese eventually agreed upon a text on August 16.4 The purpose of the
pact was both diplomatic and propagandistic. It was a traditional entente, or
loose political understanding, between two imperialistic states, and it was
primarily directed against the Soviet Union. Yet, Hitler and Ribbentrop
phrased the treaty against the global Communist International (not syn-
onymous with the USSR) in such vague fashion that the terms gave the
Nazis and the Japanese military a pretext to intervene in the domestic affairs
of any nation that had a communist party or that experienced any kind of
revolution or disorder. From the international perspective, the aggressive
language threatened the status quo; yet, at the same time, the draft treaty
incorporated a conservative overtone. Its language was designed to appeal to
conservative and reactionary parties and bureaucracies throughout the
world, because it was not overtly directed against. them. They, too, were
anticommunist in sentiment, and sometimes not able to tell the difference
between traditional conservativism and Hitler's brand of fascist rhetoric.
The pact could and would provide a cover for the military adventures of
Japan in China and Germany in Spain.
The formal timing of the signature of the treaty and the question of
whether to publish the text were major items still left undecided in mid-
August. The problem was that the Japanese objected to making their
signature public. Because Germany had no frontier with the USSR, an anti-
Soviet pact would place most of any actual military burden on the borders of
Japan's recently established protectorate of Manchukuo.
The onset ofcivil war in Spain provided Hitler with a handy propaganda
a~set for bargaining with Japan. Within a few months civil war headlines in
Spain helped to persuade Japanese army leaders that Hitler was indeed
taking an active military stand against bolshevism. 5 The final, secret text of
the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact was signed on October 23,
1936,6 the very day on which the communist-supported International Bri-
gades took their first public action in Spain; also on that same day Hitler and
the Italian foreign minister concluded a protocol establishing a Rome-Berlin
entente that, before long, would be dubbed the Axis. The next week, Hitler
prepared the dispatch of the Legion Condor, thus escalating his Spanish
intervention. It was on November 19, the day after Hitler recognized the new
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government of Franco in Burgos, that the Japanese ambassador finally
authorized the Germans to make the Anti-Comintern Pact public. The text,
published six days later, opposed "communism" in general terms, while
secret military clauses were cautiously directed against the USSR.7 Hitler
thus achieved a major diplomatic victory with Japan, in part owing to
German activities in Spain.
In July 1936, Hitler was faced with much more pressing foreign prob-
lems than any "Russian threat." Whatever the German dictator may have
meant by "the communist danger," the term did not imply any direct military
threat from the USSR. Poland, as a buffer state, protected the USSR and
Germany from any direct confrontation with each other. At the time, Hitler
regarded Soviet military and industrial capacity with contempt8 and as a
justification of the policy of Lebensraum, or living space. Hitler, since the
early 1920s, had dreamed of conquering the Ukraine and resettling the area
with Germans, creating an empire he hoped would dominate the Eurasian
land mass. In Hitler's eyes, bolshevism under Stalin's leadership was mis-
managing the natural resources of the Soviet Union. The poor performance
of Russian-led brigades in Spain only increased his disrespect for the Soviet
milita~9 However, neighboring France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Aus-
tria were Hitler's immediate targets at the time when the civil war in Spain
suddenly presented an unforeseen opportunity for the Fiihrer.
Hitler and Mussolini viewed Franco's repression of Spanish social
revolution in different contexts. As early as August 1936, the Duce under-
took to justify his intervention in the civil war in terms of preventing a
communist takeover of Spain. 10 He reiterated repeatedly a standard defen-
sive diplomatic formula that sounded good in conservative Britain and in the
French Foreign Office: namely, that he was forced to send military aid in
order to prevent communist advances (Le., another 1917 Bolshevik revolu-
tion) in western Europe. Hitler, for various reasons, postponed open boast-
ing that German units were aiding the Spanish Nationalists until near the end
of the war. 11
Despite his violent anticommunist speeches throughout the civil war,
there is no hard evidence that Hitler sent planes to Franco in July 1936
because of fear and hatred of either Spanish social revolution or the alleged
designs of Russian foreign policy. His instructions to Goring and to Bern-
hardt, who returned to Spain to carry out the Fiihrer's mission, were to keep
out of Spanish politics and to pursue economic ends. 12
In fact, Hitler came to believe that "during the civil war, the idealism
was not on Franco's side; it was to be found among the Reds." He then
argued that the Catholic church was the main enemy oppressing the Spanish
people, that a reactionary crew surrounded Franco, and that, in the next civil
war, he, the Fiihrer, would support the Spanish "reds."13 This later comment
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sheds light on the distinction between Hitler's convictions and his use of
opportunistic slogans, and it also reflects his bitterness toward an ungrateful
postwar Franco.
Since the 1920s, Hitler had frequently proclaimed to both German and
foreign conservatives that he was a bulwark of European civilization against
communism. Whenever Hitler was looking for concessions from people
who believed in the social status quo, he emphasized his role as an anticom-
munist. 14 In September 1932, for example, he told one of his earliest
followers in the Nazi party, "I have got to play ball with capitalism and keep
the Versailles power[s] in line by holding aloft the bogy of Bolshevism-
make them believe that Nazi Germany is the last bulwark against the Red
flood. That's the only way to come through the danger period to get rid of
Versailles and rearm. I can talk peace and mean war.... [It is] easier to
overthrow Moscow with Capitalists on my side. . . . Capitalism would
rather have me than Stalin and will accept my terms.... We could force
John Bull to his knees."15
Hitler repeatedly used fear of communism as a political formula for
diplomatic maneuvering. Three instances from 1935 and early 1936 include
his conversation with the British foreign minister in March 1935,16 his
public speech on the occasion of German reoccupation of the Rhineland on
March 7, 1936,17 and his talks with the Japanese ambassador, Mushakoji,
on June 9, 1936. 18
Early in the civil war in Spain, Hitler effectively played the anticom-
munist card at least eight times. 19 Later, in November 1937, came his
conversation with the British privy seal, Lord Halifax, that helped to
convince a confused Halifax that Hitler was sincere in keeping communism
out ofGermany and blocking its passage west. 20 Even more pertinent, Hitler
told the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, at the Munich Con-
ference on September 30, 1938, that he had supported Generalissimo
Franco only because of his abhorrence of bolshevism. If he, the Fiihrer, had
failed to stop bolshevism in Spain, it could have spread (as if it were a
disease) to France, Holland, and Belgium. 21 Chamberlain replied that if a
second Spanish revolution were to break out, the four capitalist Great Powers
(Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) should respond jointly. Hitler then
backed away, replying that he would have to think about that. 22
Ribbentrop followed the standard Hitler line in late 1938 when he
asserted to Bonnet, the French foreign minister, that the Third Reich was
fighting in Spain against bolshevism and that France would not regret the
German action. The line had limited effect, however; Bonnet retorted that
the Spanish problem was solved, that he was hostile to disorder, and that
France was not complacent in the face of bolshevism. 23
A different Hitler-that of Mein Kampf-revealed himself in a Reichs-
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tag speech on January 30, 1937. Promoting the concept of National So-
cialism, he described its main plank as the abolition both of the liberal
concept of the individual and of the Marxist concept of humanity. These
were to be superseded by the Yolk community that was "rooted in the soil by
common blood." He reminded his audience sneeringly that Spain was a
"democratic model" of revolution in which 170,000 people had already
been slaughtered. For the benefit of conservative listeners, he characterized
bolshevism as a pestilence that had caused commerce to decline and was
turning Spain into a desert. Then Hitler claimed that bolshevism was only
the front for an (imaginary) anti-German "Jewish International." Unlike
Anthony Eden, who had decried the division of Europe into blocs, the
Fuhrer· insisted that Europe had already been divided between the Jewish
Communists and the National Socialists. His own National Socialism was
the German concept of a universal biological theory of race which all
countries should follow. 24
Hitler's anticommunist propaganda pulled the wool over the eyes of
many conservatives in Britain and France. He was truly both a madman and
a genius: mad in his objectives, a genius in his propaganda effectiveness.
The slow way in which the Spanish Civil War was fought and the intentional
propaganda evoked about its outcome contributed greatly to Hitler's public
relations machine by exploiting the widespread fear-shared by business,
government, and the clergy----of social revolution, atheism, loss of property,
and loss of nationhood.25
Still, Hitler's anticommunist professions were more than mere diplo-
matic tactics. In 1936 he was. indeed concerned about the German Commu-
nist party groups in exile in France, Czechoslovakia, the Lowlands, and
Denmark. 26 The long struggle against the German Communist party (KPD)
in the German streets from 1919 to the accession of the Fuhrer of the Nazi
party to the chancellorship in January 1933 created scars that Hitler could
never forget. The German Communists exiled in Paris and the French
Communist party could be conceived as being a threat to the Nazis, but only
a minor one. In no way did the Popular Front government in Spain, with its
small Communist party receiving only 3 percent of the vote, threaten
German interests or even Hitler's nationalist dreams. Spain was for Hitler a
question ofexperimental Re~lpolitik. His sincere fear and hatred of commu-
nism focused mainly on Jews and on the suspected secret activities of the
KPD and leftist emigres. Hitler hated the Soviet government in 1936, and, as
a young war veteran coached in nationalist propaganda in 1919, he had
loathed the pro-international German Spartakists and Social Democrats.
Ideology is a sincere faith of youth; most politicians learn the art of
propaganda and let their ideological convictions mellow. Although the
mature Fuhrer had developed his persuasive skills over the years, throughout
his life he remained a dedicated anti-Semite. By 1936 he could, however,
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subordinate on occasion his anticommunist sentiments to larger diplomatic
and economic objectives.
Hitler in 1936 reflected his youthful resentments and, at the same time,
exploited the symbolic "communism" in many ways: (1) to voice his
personal racial bias-"Communism is Jewish"; (2) to quiet German domes-
tic opposition to his rule by invoking the images of revolutionary Commu-
nist Karl Liebknecht or Ernst Thaelmann, and of the social, economic,
ideological, and constitutional unrest of 1919 and 1932; (3) to persuade
Christian churches to tolerate his claims, for he was denouncing atheistic
and godless Marxists; (4) to win alliances with Japan and Italy; (5) to
"blacken" (or "redden") the French in the eyes of rightists in eastern Europe
and Britain; (6) to get conservatives and reactionaries in France to abandon
their inactive alliance of 1935 with the USSR; (7) to subvert Czechoslovakia
and,Austria; (8) to mislead fearful British conservatives into thinking that he
cO!Jld aid in halting social revolution in Spain and thereby also discourage
revolution in the British Empire; (9) to cover his own military and economic
expansion in Spain; and (10) to denigrate the government of the USSR and
thereby prepare for eventual attack. The Fuhrer was·determined to provide
the Germans with more Lebensraum.
Not all Germans maintained Hitler's flexible view of Spanish commu-
nism. German Foreign Ministry officials serving in Spain entertained gen-
uine fear of a prospective social revolution from which they assumed the
Communist party would reap major benefits,27 but they were vague on
details. The former ambassador, Count Johannes Welczeck, had worried
about communist takeover as a threat to German property in Spain. Lack of
knowledge was reflected in a Madrid report to Berlin shortly after the
Popular Front victory: in April 1936, the German charge confessed that he
had no way of assessing the Spanish right-wing claim that the well-known
Hungarian revolutionary agent, Bela Kun, had arrived in Spain.28 The two
Comintern agents giving instructions to the Spanish Communist party at
that time apparently were an Argentine and a Pole,29 yet the German in-
telligence-gathering apparatus mentioned neither one. Another indication
of official ignorance of Communist party activities appears in a counselor's
report of the July 19 workers' revolution in Madrid. Describing this leftist
response to the Spanish officers' uprising, he labeled as "communist" the
well-known anarchist trade union, the CNT.3o
In the mid-1930s at least three German agencies were involved in
systematic anticommunist activity. One was the Internal Section, a special
branch of the Nazi Foreign Ministry created in September 1933 to study
ideological questions abroad. 31 Headed by Vico von Biilow-Schwante, the
Internal Section had been partly responsible for inviting the leader of the
Spanish Falangists to visit Germany in 1934.32 Biilow-Schwante's office,
however, concerned itself primarily with assisting the National Socialists
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and the Propaganda Ministry to project Nazi ideas outside Germany's
borders. In this connection the section studied foreign ideologies. It adver-
tised German "unity" for the benefit of foreigners; kept tabs on German
Communists, Social Democrats, and liberals; and tried to keep informed on
all foreign party movements. The amount of National Socialist propaganda
directed toward Spain was small in comparison with the propaganda aimed
at French and British right-wingers. Unlike the Soviet Communists, the
National Socialists had little interest in enlisting foreign converts to a
universal Nazi program. Anticommunist and pronationalist statements that
obscured Nazi expansionist designs at the time of the outbreak of the
Spanish war were considered sufficient. The Nazi party in 1936 could ally
with the native fascists or reactionaries in other countries because they
shared the belief that each nation could develop its own unique concepts of
fascism, although Nazi "leadership" was stressed by 1937.
A second systematically anticommunist unit was created in 1935, when
the German Propaganda Ministry initiated a special Anti-Comintern Section
to direct a war of words toward "fighting bolshevism." Its indirect approach
was to induce the world press to accept National Socialist and anti-bolshevik
publicity.33 Not until the spring of 1936 did the Anti-Comintern Section
become concerned with Spain. The first published article in German on the
Spanish communist movement was just one among the many attacks on
communism published in an anti-Comintern organ secretly subsidized by
Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry.34 Illustrating a new German Spanish
cultural concern in June 1936, the Spanish editor of a pro-clerical weekly,
Trabajo, visited the anti-Comintern propaganda section. 35
Nazi-inspired anticommunist journalistic ventures in Spain before the
civil war were few, primarily because Berlin regarded Spanish politics with
relative indifference. Even after Spain's civil war began, the German Propa-
ganda Ministry utilized stories ofSpanish leftist atrocities mainly to frighten
conservatives in London and Paris. The periodical Anti-Comintern pub-
lished far more articles written by English, French, and American anticom-
munist fanatics than by reactionary or fascist Spaniards. The chief of the
Ministry, Joseph Goebbels, personally preferred socialistic to capitalistic
principles,36 but because of Hitler's concern with diplomatic ends, the
agency subsidized and humored a variety of foreign anticommunists.
Hitler's major object was to isolate France from its friends and allies-the
Russians, the British, the Czechs-and anticommunist propaganda pro-
vided a major weapon for his arsenal.
In addition to the Internal Section and the Anti-Comintern Section, a
third German government office involved in anticommunist activity was the
Abwehr, or military intelligence, which assembled much secret information
on foreign Communists. It was headed after 1935 by Spanish expert Vice
Admiral Canaris. As far back as 1928, the Abwehr had received a Spanish
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offer for a bilateral German-Spanish police agreement against the travel of
Communist agents,37 but that particular project had been stillborn. In the
summer of 1933, Ambassador Welczeck had conferred with his new Fuhrer
about "the bolshevik danger" in Spain and had advocated increasing Ger-
man espionage activities against radical movements. 38 According to Wel-
czeck, Hitler met his proposals "only halfway" by agreeing to send Abwehr
agents, disguised as businessmen, to Spanish cities to observe communist-
anarchist activity. Unfortunately, these spies' reports have not been found. 39
In 1934 the German secret police, the Gestapo, had agreed with the
Hungarian and Polish police to share information concerning the activities
of Communists.4o However, the German Foreign Ministry, in the spring of
1935, had rejected as premature the offer of the right-wing Spanish Republi-
can government to a similar information exchange.41 The Germans gave
first priority to reaching an agreement with the Italian police, which was
concluded in April 1936. Then the Gestapo assigned agent Paul Winzer to
the Madrid embassy as an official "criminal commissar" to observe commu-
nist methods under the newly elected Popular Front.42 Arriving in Spain
only in May, Winzer had little time in June and July43 to discover anything
specific about the alleged communist takeover conspiracy.44 Nonetheless,
the Gestapo was not so ill-informed as the Foreign Ministry about Spanish
Communists in mid-1936. Keeping tabs on the Spanish Communist party
was not the same task as discovering broad information on the possibility of
a social revolution. Winzer accurately reported that the Spanish Socialists
were deeply split between a revolutionary faction and a more moderate
parliamentary faction, and he asserted that the situation afforded pos-
sibilities for Moscow to influence Spain.45 Actually, the information about
the socialist split could have been gleaned from the daily press.
From the German records it appears that Winzer's main concern was the
activities ofemigre German Marxists in Spain.46 On July 18, when the army
uprising occurred in mainland Spain, Winzer was in Barcelona watching
German emigre leftists participate in a counter-Olympic Games.47 (The
official worldwide Olympic events were being held in Germany, and the
Barcelona games amounted to an anti-German protest.) After viewing the
civil strife in Barcelona for a week, the Gestapo agent sailed on an Italian
steamship for Germany.48 After the civil war broke out, conservatives,
reactionaries, and fascists everywhere were looking for evidence of a great
communist plot in Spain. Winzer did not uncover such a plot; indeed, it was
never found.
Mussolini's Intensifying Anticommunism
Among the many people whom Hitler approached about communism in
1936, none was more important than Italy's Mussolini. Hitler's speeches on
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communism and the history ofGerman anticommunist activity from 1933 to
1936 provided a series of stepping stones to a German foreign policy that
more and more cooperated with Italy.
Italian fascism had preceded German nazism by a decade as an answer
to social revolution, both Leninist and other. Benito Mussolini, an ex-
socialist, prided himself on founding fascism, a system he believed superior
to communism, socialism, liberalism, or conservatism. Fascism, a reaction
to World War I, appealed both to the radicals in the streets and to conserva-
tives with property. Fascists appealed to patriotism, country, authority,
military glory, imperialist tradition, and a career open to talents. What
happened in Italy could best be called a manifestation of the radical right,
something that Germany in 1933 and Spain in 1936 were also to experience.
In 1936 the Duce had a certain authority with conservatives in the
democracies. To the American and British ambassadors, he often asserted in
1936-1937 that he had to fight in Spain to prevent a communist takeover.49
The two ambassadors, both conser:vative sympathizers with Italian fascism,
gained the impression that Mussolini wanted a conservative, capitalist, and
Catholic Spain. Privately, Mussolini was telling his son-in-law confidant,
Count Ciano, that British and French capitalists and their jackal press
annoyed him more than did Stalin's government in the Soviet Union.so
The fact is that Mussolini resented and coveted the wealth, power, and
empires of Britain and France in the Mediterranean and Africa. As a leader
of a have-not nation, Mussolini thought of himself as a revolutionary. The
Duce sought military victories in Spain as a means of gaining the respect of
the British and French for Italian fighting abili~ In short, Mussolini's
fascism manifested the contradictions inherent in his philosophy of the
"radical right"-radical demands made for reactionary goals. In his mind, a
communist Spain meant less a Spain manipulated by the USSR than a Spain
dominated by the leftist French Popular Front.
Insofar as nazism was anti-French, anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, and anti-
internationalist, the Nazis made good allies for the Duce. Both the Nazis and
the Fascists had a common interest in eliminating political opposition in
their own countries, especially that of the communist parties. The main
question facing the foreign policies of the two countries was how far the
Fascists and the Nazis would unite to work as an imperial force to operate in
other countries. From the general ideological positions of Hitler and Mus-
solini, they might have allied against international communism immediately
after Hitler came to power,S1 but practical politics, particularly on the
question of Austria, kept them apart at first.
Fascist-Nazi collaboration required agreement on their geographic
spheres of interest and on specific techniques of cooperation. Therefore, the
Nazi party, the Gestapo, the Internal Section of the Foreign Ministry, the
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Propaganda Ministry, and Military Intelligence had met on several occasions
with their Italian counterparts before the general Axis accord emerged in
1936.
The process began in April 1933 when Goring visited Rome to proclaim
to Mussolini the "affinity of thought and sentiments existing between
Fascism and National Socialism."52 The next month, Goebbels visited the
Duce to discuss ideological issues.53 Mussolini responded by creating, in
June 19~3, a new section in his Ministry ofCulture that preceded Goebbels's
Anti-Comintem Section and was also dedicated to voicing anticommunism
as part of the fascist campaign. Mussolini called his propaganda institute the
Comitato di Azione per Universalita di Roma (Action Committee for the
Universality of Rome). 54
Although both Hitler and Mussolini preached anticommunism, a dif-
ference in tone was evident in their propaganda. The Duce publicized the
fascist idea positively, rather than using the more generally negative anti-
communist approach of Goebbels. The proud Mussolini appeared more
interested in exporting his aggressive philosophy than in counteracting
liberal and Marxist-Leninist thinking.
Italian journalist Enrico Insabato went in May 1934 to Germany to see
Hitler's foreign policy advisor, prominent during the 1920s, Alfred Rosen-
berg, and his assistant, Georg Leibbrandt. He followed this trip with two
further visits in the spring and in November 1935.55 These initiatives bore
little fruit because the Fuhrer relegated Rosenberg to the sidelines of general
European foreign policy and told him to concentrate on the USSR as an
academic subject in May 1936.56 Specifically, he vetoed any role for
Rosenberg in dealing with Italians.
More important to Hitler was Ribbentrop. At the Numberg Party Day in
September 1935, Rudolf Likus of the semiprivate Nazi foreign office
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, and LUigi Barzini, a journalist representing Mus-
solini's newspaper the Popolo d'Italia, proclaimed a united front against
bolshevism. 57 Italian propaganda thereafter moved toward the German line;
anticommunism was easier to sell than profascism.
Despite their ideological similarities, the question of Austria prevented
greater cooperation for at least the first three years of Hitler's rule in Ger-
many. The Austrian question remained so sensitive that-from July 11,
1936, when the Fuhrer concluded a friendship treaty with Vienna, to March
1938, when he took it over-Austria would seldom be mentioned by the two
dictators. Rather, Hitler and Mussolini worked on other issues-particularly
Spain-so that by March 1938 the Duce was in no position to protest Hitler's
takeover.
The process of reconciliation had first begun over Ethiopia. During the
course of the crisis (which began brewing in the fall of 1934, and ended with
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defeat of the Ethiopians in May 1936), Mussolini shifted to working out a
broader agreement with Germany.58 Hence, the German and Italian chiefs of
military intelligence, Admiral Canaris and Colonel Mario Roatta, met near
Verona on September 16-17, 1935. Roatta suggested that Italy and Ger-
many work together in the field of military intelligence "against bolshe-
vism."59 Acting upon Gestapo suggestions in November 1935, the chief of
the Internal Section in the Nazi Foreign Ministry invited the Italians to
conclude a police agreement with Germany, aimed against communist and
masonic subversion. 60 The following spring the Duce authorized his police
chief and six others to go to Germany, where they visited Dachau. Between
March 29 and April 2, 1936, they were received by officials of the foreign
ministry: Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS and German police; his as-
sistant, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Gestapo; and Goring, the Reich air
minister.61 The discussions eventually led to the formulation of detailed
bilateral police agreements regarding codes, travel, exchange of informa-
tion, etc.-all of which were drawn up between October 15 and 22, 1936,
when Himmler, Heydrich, and others visited Rome. 62 These agreements
were aimed at all political opponents of the two regimes, whether commu-
nist or not. The two parties agreed to nothing specific in regard to either
Spain or the Soviet Union.
Although Hitler and Mussolini were concerned about Soviet activities
in Spain, their anticommunist relations also developed as a cover for their
own imperialism. Anticommunism served as a catalyst, bringing Mussolini
to support Hitler's ambitions on the Rhine, and bringing Hitler to support
Mussolini's grab of Ethiopia. As they worked together with parallel diplo-
matic policies, Hitler and Mussolini used the slogan of anticommunism to
create the Rome-Berlin entente. Cooperation toward this end had begun in
late 1935, had been nourished by the joint military units sent to assist Franco
in July 1936, and had been legalized by the protocol of October 23.63
Christened "the Axis" by Mussolini's Milan speech of November 1,1936,
news of the entente was coincidental with Hitler's secret dispatch of the
Legion Condor to Spain. After expanding Italian operations in Spain,
Mussolini reorganized his Ministry of Culture in February 1937, replacing
the older section for exporting fascist ideology with a new but more limited
Center of Anti-Communist Studies. The new organization paralleled more
closely Goebbels's Anti-Comintern .Section.64
In general, Hitler's decision to make a modest military intervention in
Spain proved helpful in his general anticommunist propaganda65 offensive
throughout the civil war. It enabled him to cite social crisis in Spain when
talking to Mussolini, Franco, Japanese military men, and conservatives in
Britain, France, and eastern Europe. The Spanish Civil War helped spawn
the Axis entente.
The Ideology of Anticommunism
Franco Proclaims the Anticommunist Faith
37
Historians know far more about Hitler's understanding of communism than
they do about Franco's.66 Before the outbreak of the civil war, Franco had
risen as a professional military man whose theory of politics was to remain
silent. Franco clearly held a conservative-reactionary position; he never
voted for the republic, and he never said "Viva la Republica!"67 Yet Franco
had served'various Spanish Republican ministers of war from 1931 to
February 1936, ending as chief of staff. Before being "exiled" to the Canary
Islands, he apparently believed that monarchy was not worth spilling blood
for. Although some other officers had begun talking secretly about a coup
from May 1931 on, Franco resisted committing himself until June or July
1936.68 Why did he then join the conspiracy? Franco's motives remain so
obscure that one of his capitalist and monarchist supporters frankly con-
cluded, "Franco doesn't know why he rebelled."69
What is clear is that after February 1936, Generals Mola and Sanjurjo
began secret talks with disgruntled leaders of the Falange, the Carlists, the
Alfonsists, the political Catholics (Jose Gil Robles, chief of the CEDA
party), and the church hierarchy, to plan a rebellion against the legally
elected Popular Front government.70 Between February and the first week in
July, various confusing plots and prospective juntas were being privately
discussed. Mola nominated himself as chief coordinator, while the cautious
Franco held back from any commitment. Mola's attitude toward Commu-
nists was clear. He regarded the Spanish Communist party as an instrument
of a foreign power, the Soviet Union, intent on weakening the Spanish army.
Mola had been against the Spanish Communist party, the peE, since 1930
on practical grounds, for it sponsored antimilitary and anticolonial propa-
ganda.7!
Members of Franco's family provide conflicting clues to his political
viewpoint before early 1936. His younger brother, aviator Ramon-as
famous in Spain as Charles Lindbergh in America-was at one time an
anarchist with possible contacts with the Soviet secret police, the GPU. 72
An enigmatic hint of Franco's attitude toward the Soviets was given in
January 1936 during his visit to London as chiefof staffduring the funeral of
King George V. On that occasion his cousin and private secretary com-
mented that the "Spanish military delegation" noticed that their uniforms
were shabby in comparison to those of the Soviet officers (probably the first
ones they had ever seen, for the Second Spanish Republic did not have
diplomatic relations with the USSR until after the civil war began); and that
the Russians "seemed more like representatives of a bourgeois state than a
proletarian state. . . ."73
Just after the election of the Popular Front, Franco told the conservative
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prime minister of the old government that the major problem of Spain was
public order. 74 As Franco came closer toward making a decision to join the
plotters, he gave the liberal minister of war a last warning t,<) heed dissatisfac-
tion among the officer corps. In a list of three grievances sent on June 23,75
Franco called for the reinstatement of army officers who had been court-
martialed for the repression of the Catalan rebellion of 1934, and he objected
to the arbitrary promotion of certain officers and the demotion or exile of
others (including, by implication, his own posting to the Canary Islands).
No specific charges were leveled at parties, not even the Communists.
Writing later, his cousin says Franco referred to the spring and summer of
1936 as the "hour of the communists,"76 but what he meant by this is not
clear. Did he fear dangermerely from the small Communist party, or from all
the "reds" of the political Left? At the time Spain had the largest anarchist
party in E~rope, and Franco had commanded the army operation that
suppressed the Asturian coal miners' rebellion (Socialists, Communists,
and Anarchists) in the fall of 1934.
One of the civilian conspirators of the July coup attempt, Catholic
historian and ideologue Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, sized up Franco in the
period April to July 17 as having no higher ambition than to become high
commissioner for Spanish Morocco. Writing after breaking with the gener-
alissimo, Sainz portrayed Franco as a short, insecure officer who was fearful
of assassination, surrounded by a ceremonially attired Moroccan body-
guard, and with a weak voice and a dislike of crowds. Sainz noted, however,
that Franco had absolutely no fear of death on the battlefield.77
Psychologically, Franco's personality was secretive-more like Stalin
than like the flamboyant Hitler or Mussolini. Certainly, Franco was neither
an ideologue nor a propagandist, like the two Axis dictators, and it was only
after July 1936 that he put on many demonstrations of Catholic piety.78
Noteworthy is how relatively late, April 1937, Franco and the church
hierarchy came to an agreement on the church's future.
In sum, Franco's anticommunism differed in character from Hitler's.
Their different social and national origins help explain the political dif-
ferences that would come to light in 1939-1940. While the civil war lasted,
however, their similar anticommunist propaganda misled many people.
The most important keys to Franco's thinking were the need for public
order and opposition to revolution-not Catholicism or opposition to Sta-
linism and the Soviet Union. In a strong, handwritten message of July 21,
1936, to a commander of the Civil Guards, Franco wrote that the enemy,
"the forces of revolution," lacked dis€ipline, while true Spaniards could win
, with confident troops. He signed it, "Viva Espafia!"79 Franco believed that
the liberal parties, which he assumed were controlled by the Masons, shared
responsibility for "the spirit of revolution. " They had weakened the army by
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crushing the first Sanjurjo rebellion in August 1932,80 and they had exiled
Franco to the Canary Islands in March 1936. One of Franco's first acts of
repression as commander of the expeditionary colonial army was to outlaw
the Masons,81 perceived by him as anti-Catholic, pro-liberal, and interna-
tionalist in the Enlightenment tradition. Franco trusted neither Masons nor
Communists because they supposedly followed foreign masters-in the
masonic case, English and French.
Ironically, in July 1936 tactical needs brought Franco to rely on foreign-
ers. To gain that support in his war against the Spanish Popular Front, Franco
labeled his Spanish enemies as Communists. His first appeals for aircraft to
Hitler and Mussolini were made on the basis of anticommunism,82 and
because Hitler and Mussolini were noted throughout Europe as anti-red,
couching these pleas this way made sense.
After securing aid from Mussolini and Hitler on the basis of anticom-
munism, Franco began to think about Britain. The half-English journalist
Luis Bolin, a longtime reporter in London for the monarchist newspaper
ABC, had already served the conspiracy in England. From July 5 to 11 Bolin
helped the mission of Juan March that procured a DeHaviland Dragon
Rapide, which flew Franco from the Canary Islands to Tetuan on July 19.
Upon returning from his mission to Rome with the first flight of Savoias on
July 30, Bolin became Franco's first press chief. 83 It may well have been he
who educated Franco on the use of the word communism to appeal to
foreign conservatives. 84 While there is no direct evidence of this, it is
possible because of Bolin's many contacts in England, especially with the
press. In an interview on July 29 with an English press agency Reuters
representative in Tangier, Franco linked together Britain, Germany, and
Italy, appealing to them to sympathize with his cause in order to drive out
communism. 85
In mid-August, the Marques Antonio Portago, who wanted to serve the
Nationalist cause in London, wrote to Franco's press advisor Bolin, suggest-
ing that more propaganda was needed. Portago drew up a sweeping press
release, claiming that Spain was the "stepping stone of World Revolution."
Spain could be "the Waterloo of World Bolshevism advocated by Moscow.
. . . Spain today is actually in the hands of the Communists ... [and unless
defeated] Moscow will open other branch offices abroad."86 The draft
editorial sent to Bolin was approved by Franco later that month for the
Hearst Press and the International News Service.
The reference to Moscow, however, was pure rhetoric. The main head-
quarters of the Nationalist foreign intelligence was in Biarritz. From there,
they sent agents to London, The Hague, Rotterdam, Brussels, Antwerp,
Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Zurich, and Geneva-but not to
Moscow. 87 The insurgents knew Moscow was too remote geographically
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from the military regime fighting to overthrow the Popular Front. Loyalist
Spain would survive or die depending more on French decisions than on
Soviet ones. The Spanish Right feared nearby Western leftists more than
distant Russians.
Franco himself tried his hand at anticommunist propaganda. He had a
friend in France, World War I hero Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, whom
Franco had met in the Rif Wars. Franco wrote in late July or early August to
Petain, and this is perhaps the earliest personal text historians have in which
Franco himself (as distinguished from hired journalists) defined his concept
of communism. In this' private message, Franco appealed to military honor
and comradeship in arms .while affirming that "the Spanish Army was
engaged in a decisive struggle for all of Europe and for civilization." His
enemy was "international communism headed by Russia," which was cur-
rently recruiting aid in France. He asked the marshal to ensure that the
French army would avoid supporting "Communist criminals." Franco con-
trasted militarily held cities in Spain, supposedly ruled with "order and
quiet," with the rival "Communist" government in Spain, spreading "anar..
chy, fire, and theft. "88 As far as is known, Petain did not respond; Franco
thereafter concentrated on military and governmental matters, leaving prop-
aganda to others.
It is easy to underestimate the political sophistication of the supposedly
strictly military Franco. However, from the general's prior contacts with
Englishmen and Frenchmen, particularly the French in Morocco, Franco
knew that anti...Russian, anticommunist views were widely held. In his first
speech after the July coup, Franco appealed for order and for the unity of the
Spanish nation. He also specifically claimed that the spirit of revolution was
being exploited by Soviet agents. 89 Whether he actually had evidence of
Comintern activities remains to be shown, but denouncing Soviet subver-
sion without specific evidence of their activities had long been a favorite
technique of the Right. On October 10, when Franco learned that five Rus-
sian ships with fifty tanks were proceeding to Spain, he said, "I not only face
a Red Spain, but also Russia. "90 The Soviet Union indeed was now one of
Franco's real enemies.
The question of leadership was a pressing internal problem in the early
weeks of the rebellion. Key to the destiny of Franco and Spain was the
insurgent generals' decision to proclaim Franco officially as chief of state
and generalissimo on October 1, 1936. Bernhardt, the major Nazi liaison
between Hitler and Franco, who had successfully carried Franco's request
for aid to Hitler the previous July, and Colonel Walter Warlimont of the
German Ministry of War encouraged the cautious, supposedly nonpolitical
Franco to take the vital step of becoming chief of state.91 The Nazi
ideologues, Hitler and Goring, were delighted at the news because they
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thought Franco's victory would assure future benefits to the Third Reich,
stemming from their investment in Nationalist Spain.
Franco's elevation to prime leadership in the rebel camp had been made
possible partly by his success in gaining foreign support by citing the
Communist menace. The Nationalist intelligence section clarified its at-
titude toward communism relatively late. This was on April 19, 1937, when
Franco forcibly unified the Carlists and the Falange parties into one total-
itarian party (the Falange Espafiola y Tradicionalista, or FET) headed by
himself as EI Caudillo. He created an Office of Investigation, composed of
three individuals, to collect all anti- and procommunist propaganda in
collaboration with Goebbels's anti-Comintern effort. The Spanish office
particularly suspected people who had connections with the Masons, the
League for the Rights of Man (Paris), the Friends of the Soviet Union, the
Red Aid International (a creation of Willi Miinzenberg, a leading German
Communist propagandist who had been in exile in Paris since 1933), the
League against Fascism, the League against War and Imperialism, and four
other leftist groups. 92
For purposes of foreign propaganda, it was profitable for Franco to lump
his assorted opposition under the labels "Communist" or "red." Fanaticism
bred by war always polarizes ideologies; it is no surprise that Franco began
to shout about "Russian wolves" even before the Soviets dispatched military
aid to the Republicans. As we have seen, for Franco the Spanish "reds"
included not only Communists but also Masons, Anarchists, "Spanish
Marxists" (Leninists or Trotskyites), both revolutionary and reform So-
cialists, the three liberal or Republican parties, and the separatists, both
Basque and Catalan.93 They were all what he called "anti-Spain," and
Franco's conception of his country as a Great Power was an ideal abstraction
like Philip II's glorious golden Spain.
Clearly a counterrevolutionary who longed for Spain's past glories,
Franco was also a professional military man who ventured into politics
cautiously, and he was more interested in social order than in the promotion
of political propaganda for expansionist purposes-unlike Hitler and Mus-
solini. Franco saw a more immediate red threat to the army in "the Spanish
Lenin," Socialist Largo Caballero, than in the Spanish Communist party or
the Soviet Union. Republican President Manuel Azafia, although himself
hostile to the Anarchists and to Largo Caballero's revolutionary rhetoric,
was in Franco's eyes synonymous with the rest of the "reds," because Azafia
was a Mason who threatened the army.
Historically, Franco saw Paris, where Azafia had been educated, as a
more important center of Spain's problem than Moscow; the election in May
1936 of the French Popular Front government had intensified fears among
the Spanish Right. Then, despite his differences in outlook from Hitler and
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Mussolini, Franco was pushed into closer ties with nazism and fascism by
events in Spain, while after September and October 1936 the Soviets became
real enemies because of their concrete military aid to the Republic. Like-
wise, events in Spain led the Popular Front in France to increase its
antifascist propaganda, identifying Franco with Hitler and Mussolini as just
another fascist. Thus the Spanish Civil War's dynamism quickly polarized
the political and diplomatic chessboard in Europe.
Indeed, with the establishment of a single party, the FET, in Burgos, the
reactionary g~neral moved closer to the fascist concepts of Hitler and
Mussolini. The Falange chief, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, who had been
shot by Republicans in November 1936 after months of imprisonment,
attained the status of martyred saint of the Falangist party. Falangists, whose
original members called themselves the national syndicalists, were rapidly
gaining in numbers among the Nationalists, partly because of recruitment of
frightened anticommunists, in the same way the Nazis had grown in Ger-
many in the crises of 1923 and 1929. In 1937 the effective leader of the
Falange became Ramon Serrano Suiier, Franco's brother-in-law. Serrano
Suiier, educated in law in Italy, had belonged to the Catholic CEDA and had
served in the Spanish parliament in the early 1930s. Imprisoned by the
Republicans in Madrid on July 18, 1936, he had managed to escape to
Burgos by late February 1937. By April, Franco had turned much of the
responsibility for anticommunist propaganda and party organization over to
Serrano Suiier. If fascism were to win in Spain, Serrano Suiier appeared to
be in a key position for the future. 94
The Spanish Civil War, as a whole, was a tactical measure for Hitler-
Spain was a pawn in his struggle with the Great Powers. Military aid was
given in such amounts as to ensure that Mussolini stayed in Spain while
incidentally providing Franco with an eventual victory over social revolution
in Spain. Hitler, however, wanted every penny to be repaid. This economic
policy calls in question the conservatives' praises for the "sincere saviors of
Western Civilization from the menace of communism."
Despite Hitler's indifference to the Spanish social structure, there were
some Nazis who truly promoted a "new" Spain, run by the Falange, that
would help the workers oust the old regime. Actually, the leftist Strasser
wing of National Socialism (1921-1934) had wanted not to defeat social
revolution but to control it, after stamping out the other parties. A similar
program attracted some Falangists in Spain. In 1936, however, Hitler was
not interested in replaying this old ideological type of 1920s politics in
Spain. Like any traditional conservative diplomat, he was anxious to keep
his military aid limited while pushing his ally Mussolini forward. After
some hesitation, Mussolini answered the call.
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At the time, conservatives in Britain and the rest of the capitalist world
misunderstood Hitler's anticommunism as some fixed ideology. Actually,
Franco, Mussolini, and particularly Hitler often used the term flexibly to
deceive opponents in a diplomatic struggle. Hitler's anticommunism in
Spain was part of a larger European experiment that allowed him to play in
the Italian, Japanese, and Spanish arenas. It kept Britain, France, and the
Soviet Union divided as well as splitting the popular fronts in Spain and
France. Ex-Socialist Mussolini's manipulation of the term was even more
conscious than that of Hitler. For Franco, anticommunism was a vital
counterrevolutionary program, but he also used the term to solidify alliances
with conservatives and fascists.
3
The Diplomacy of the
Anti-Comintem Bloc
Hitler Permits the Duce to Take the Lead,
The 1936 Spanish generals' coup attempt stimulated further cooperation
between Italy and Germany on several fronts. During the first week of
August 1936, propaganda ministers Goebbels and Alfieri worked out ajoint
German-Italian stand against the "bolshevik danger" in Spain. At the same
time Admiral Canaris, the German military intelligence chief, met at
Bolzano with his Italian counterpart, Roatta, to discuss secret military
aspects of the Spanish question. 1 Colonel Roatta confirmed that Mussolini
had sent nine planes, and that a shipload of ammunition and military
personnel was on the way. They also discussed Italian and German coopera-
tion on the issue of supplying oil to the Spanish military. The two agreed that
Roatta would fly in a German plane to meet Franco and afterwards would
inform Canaris of his observations in Spain.
Spanish rebel forces made swift strides during August. Transfer of
Franco's Spanish Foreign Legionnaires from Morocco to the mainland went
well, and the vital frontier with Portugal was secured by the fall of Badajoz
on the fourteenth. News and rumors about intervention were daily rocking
Europe, and warships still hovered about Spain even though most foreign
nationals had been evacuated.
About August 22 Hitler cast the die for further German cooperation
with Italy by sending Prince Phillip of Hesse as special liaison to Rome. 2
There Hesse began what would be a series of assurances to Mussolini that
the Fuhrer had no ambitions in the Mediterranean. Both dictators agreed at
the end of August to pursue a negative goal: prevention of a bolshevik
regime in Spain. 3
Meanwhile, concerned because most of his country's fleet was patrol-
The Diplomacy of the Anti-Comintern Bloc 45
ling Spanish waters, the German naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Erich
Raeder, insisted upon an urgent meeting with the foreign minister to discuss
the political and military implications of extended German involvement in
Spain. 4 Raeder recommended to the Fuhrer on August 22 that the Germans
either pull out of Spain altogether, or, if they really wanted a Nationalist
victory, dispatch substantial forces. Two days later Hitler decided to send a
military mission to Franco's headquarters to measure the rebels' supply
needs; additional military supplies for Franco's expanding war followed in
September, in Operation Otto.5
On August 25 Germany's war minister, Werner von Blomberg, told
Lieutenant Colonel Walter Warlimont (code name "Guido")-a mineral
expert then working on the army Economic Warfare staff-that the German
war in Spain was expanding. 6 Hitler was determined to give Franco addition-
al support in German weapons, if necessary, but he wanted to check to see
whether Italy was prepared to do the same. Warlimont and Admiral Canaris
accordingly flew to Rome to confer with the Italians before proceeding on to
Spain. 7
A series of cooperative efforts was proposed in Rome. On August 26,
Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, informed Roatta about the Mussolini-
Hitler agreement to send the joint mission to General Franco. 8 The Italians
and Germans were to survey the possibilities and proposals for supplying the
Spanish nationalists with war material and personnel, keep the Spanish
supreme command advised about carrying out military operations against
the "reds," and arrange guaranteed payment in Spanish raw materials to the
two aiding countries. On August 28 Canaris and Roatta worked out the
details of the several objectives. Three days later, a party of three Germans
and three Italians left for Spain via Tangier. 9
On September 6 the contingent conferred with Franco at his headquar-
ters in Caceres. 10 Although the rebel general had no previous knowledge of
the mission, he displayed no surprise and promptly asked for tanks, anti-
tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, and communications equipment. Roatta and
Canaris meanwhile agreed that Italy and Germany would, in the future,
exchange military technical data through their respective military at-
taches. 11 Although the mission took over a month to draw up a plan, by mid-
October Operation Otto was demonstrating a degree of consensus between
Italy and Germany about their roles in guaranteeing Franco's victory. 12
After the completion of Otto, Warlimont stayed on in Spain and did not
return to Germany until December. In Caceres he began by reorganizing
German personnel and building a general staff;13 by October 13 he com-
manded at least seven officers. Twice a week Warlimont, in civilian dress or
sometimes in an Italian uniform, accompanied Franco to observe the com-
bat performance of German, Italian, and Spanish tanks, planes, and men in
action. It was Franco who recommended that Germany expand its interven-
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tion, and by mid-October there may have been as many as 600 to 800
Germans fighting in Spain. 14 This laid the groundwork for Hitler's third
military decision-made at the end of October-to send the Legion Condor
to Spain.
Aside from the dispatch of the joint German-Italian mission to Franco
and the formulation of the Canaris-Roatta technical agreement, Mussolini
was pursuing his own independent Spanish policy, particularly in the Bal-
earics. His Balearic Island venture apparently began on August 13, when a
local Falangist chief made a proposition for further Italian support to Sainz
Rodriguez, then Franco's informal envoy in Rome. The Falangist had
deposited money with the Italian consul to pay for planes and had flat-
teringly signed his letter "Long live Italy! and long live the Duce!"15
Mussolini responded by sending him three Savoia seaplanes on August
15,16 which happened to be the same day the Germans landed four anti-
aircraft guns. 17 Four days later Italian fighters and an anti-aircraft battery
arrived in Mallorca, the largest island of the Balearics, and the original
Italian seaplanes began bombing Republican positions. Between August 29
and September 4,18 some 4,000 Spanish Falangists were reported to have
landed on the island. According to one Spanish socialist source, 500 Italian
pilots disguised in Spanish Nationalist uniforms accompanied them. 19
However, the Duce's files indicate this group actually consisted of only 50
Italians. 20 Although the Germans maintained a small presence on Mallorca,
the Italians built their own major base there. At 'Roatta's request, the Italian
Ministry ofMarine, which exercised jurisdiction over Italian activities in the
Balearics, secretly sent Captain Count Giovanni Remedio Ferretti to develop
an Italian naval base on the island. He used the pseudonym "Count Rossi,"21
a name also employed by the highly public leader of the Fascist militia of the
Balearic operation, General Arconovaldo Bonac(1orsi.22 The latter, a red-
headed lawyer from Bologna,23 landed on August 27.
As indicated by this confusing use of such pseudonyms,24 there was
much secrecy and mystery connected with the Italian invasion of the
Balearics, and the Italians left their German associates in the dark about
many of their actions. Roatta's mission also resulted in the dispatch to Spain
of an additional 176 Italians with 32 pieces of artillery, 10 tanks, and
listening devices on September 23. 25 In contrast, the Germans during
September sent only four men and one supply shipment. These were to
replenish the stocks consumed by the Junkers squadron sent as Operation
Feuerzauber, Hitler's first military venture into Spain. 26
Germany and Italy were cooperating in Spain, but underneath the air of
cooperation the Italians were jealous. The Italian ambassador in Spain (still
officially accredited to the Spanish Republic) explicitly recommended to
Foreign Minister Ciano that, if he wished to upstage the Germans, Italy
should be the more active party in aiding the rebels. 27
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Meanwhile, Hitler and Mussolini were taking further strides toward
general political consultation. On September 23, 1936, the day the Italian
reinforcements began steaming toward Spain, an important German-Italian
meeting took place in Rome. Hitler's private attorney, Hans Frank, a Reich
minister without portfolio, visited Mussolini and his son-in-law, Ciano.
Frank, an ex-Freikorps man and early Nazi party member, was a Munich
lawyer who had admired Italian fascism during the 1920s.28 Speaking as
Hitler's representative, he told the Duce and the count that "the Fuhrer
regards the Mediterranean as a purely Italian sea," and that the Baltic was
Germany's Mediterranean. 29 Frank added that Hitler had no interest in
Spanish territory, and that his only motive in Spain was to maintain the
common fascist front against bolshevism. Taking up suggestions Mussolini
had made during the Ethiopian War, Hitler now recommended that he and
the Duce forge closer ideological ties between the Fascist and National
Socialist parties. Ciano agreed wholeheartedly and added that Spain would
constitute the first trench against the Anglo-French entente, and that the
"tactical field on which we must execute the maneuver is that of anti-
Bolshevism."30
The details of Frank's Rome mission were probably concealed from
Hitler's foreign minister, the conservative Constantin von Neurath. As was
his practice, Hitler kept the strings of foreign policy in his hands by sending
his own negotiators-Hermann Goring, Wilhelm Canaris, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, and others-to confer with top-level foreign leaders. On this
occasion Frank brought a key personal message from the Fuhrer inviting the
Duce to Berlin. 31 The wary Duce, however, delayed his trip for almost a year.
Instead of going himself, Mussolini immediately sent Ciano. Along the
way, Ciano held an important conversation· with Goring in Budapest on
October 10.32 There the Italian reaffirmed the understanding derived from
the Hesse and Frank talks in Rome, that Italy could have a free hand in the
Mediterranean in exchange for Germany's free hand in the Baltic. Ciano
denied that Italy desired territory in Spain except for the Balearic Islands and
Ceuta. Goring thereupon disavowed any German desire for additional ter-
ritory whatsoever, and added that Germany's interest in Spain was econom-
ic. Ciano noted that he was concerned about the attitude of Britain, which he
described as acting mainly against Germany-an allegation Goring denied.
During the conversation, each seemed to be using Britain as a threatening
club to prove to the other that his own country would be needed as an ally.
After the meeting with Ciano in Budapest, Goring flew on to Rome
accompanied by his state secretary for the Luftwaffe, General Milch, and six
other officers. There they conferred with the Duce and Italian aviation
leaders from October 15 to 18.33
Meanwhile, Ciano arrived in Germany to conclude with Hitler the
series of political understandings that soon became known as the "Rome-
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Berlin Axis." They discussed almost a dozen topics, and they agreed on a
formal protocol to oppose the League of Nations and the Anglo-French-
sponsored revival of the Five-Power Pact of Locarno of 1925, reaffirming
the inviolability of the French-German frontier, which London was promot-
ing to unite the West and to perpetuate the status quo. Again the two fascist
dictators agreed that Italians and Germans would form a common front
against bolshevism.34 On Spanish policy they reached three agreements: to
carry out German-Italian military efforts jointly; to recognize Franco as
head of the government of Spain as soon as he captured Madrid (which they
expected to happen in a few days); and to prevent the creation of any rival
Catalan state by the French.
Perhaps the most significant provision of this Axis entente was an
accompanying oral agreement in which Hitler once again recognized that
"the Mediterranean is an Italian sea," and that "any future modification of
the Mediterranean balance of power must be in Italy's favor." In exchange,
the Axis agreement declared that "Germany must have liberty of action
toward the East and the Baltic."35 The vagueness of the term "East" left
room for some later misunderstanding as to whether or not this included
Austria or was limited to the Baltic, as Frank had mentioned in September.
One year later, in September 1937, when the Duce visited Berlin for the first
time, the formula, although still vague, would become a little clearer. Hitler
and Mussolini then would agree that "the interests and potentialities of Italy
will have due preference here [Spain] and, quite generally, Italy will not be
impeded by Germany in the Mediterranean, whereas, on the other hand, the
special German interests in Austria will not be impaired by Italy. "36
According to Ciano, this meant that the Duce favored "a thorough-going
nazification" of Austria,37 but that it did not accord Hitler a free hand. 38
When the Axis protocol was concluded in late October 1936, Hitler and
Blomberg, his minister of war, were pressing Franco fo~ an early military
conclusion of the civil war,39 and Franco's prospects looked good. Hitler
promised Ciano that more air units would be sent to aid Franco's victory.40
Plans for helping Franco's forces-including the joint operations Luftubung
Rugen (air) and Winteriibung Hansa (naval) to establish a new German
unit-were drawn up at the end of the month to take effect on November 4.41
General Hugo Sperrle, first commander of the newly created unit, left
Germany for Spain via Rome on October 31.42
Sperrle had no Nazi political affiliations but had a record of military
experience in Russia in 1934.43 His chief of staff was Baron Wolfram von
Richthofen, cousin of the "Red Baron" who had commanded the famous
World War I Richthofen Squadron in which Goring had served. Moreover,
Wolfram von Richthofen had served in Rome in 1929-1931 as an "informal"
air attache in violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty. 44
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Not only did he know Italy, but he had a good understanding of the Spanish
language and of Franco's needs. This aggressive chief of staff eventually
succeeded Sperrie, a relatively lazy infantryman, as commander.45 Even
during Sperrle's command, however, Goring regarded Richthofen as his man
for military affairs in Spain.
As Germany expanded its military aid, some dispute arose about what
nation commanded the military personnel in the newly designated unit.
Spain's Moroccan army had its own foreign legion, similar to the French.
The few hundred Italians and Germans who had arrived before mid-October
were, as a legal cover, part of the Spanish Foreign Legion from Franco's
point of view.46 These included the eighty-six men in Operation Feuer-
zauber, plus the four or five tank instructors47 who arrived with twenty-four
to thirty tanks48 under Operation Otto.49
During the push to take the capital in late October and early November,
Franco put out a call to Rome and Berlin for additional volunteers. Having
rolled to the very gates of Madrid, Franco's forces were being held offby the
Loyalists, now strengthened by the communist-supported International Bri-
gades and Soviet military aid. Franco's original idea had been to expand the
Spanish Foreign Legion under his command, with its composition to be one-
quarter each Italians, Germans, Spaniards, and Portuguese.50 Hitler and
Canaris, however, preferred to arrange for a separate German regiment,51
and accordingly they sent two intelligence officers to Franco's headquarters
to discuss the matter.52 These officers refused Franco's suggestion of
placing additional Germans in the Spanish legion: so, in order to receive
more German aid, Franco had to allow establishment of the independent
unit.
This Legion Condor, as it soon came to be called by the Spaniards,
served directly under the command of Sperrle and of General Wilberg from
Berlin, not under Franco. It was in no way connected to the Spanish Foreign
Legion, as the German legionnaires had been before the arrival of Sperrle's
men. 53
The name Condor for the unit also connected the past with the present.
For some time the German Lufthansa A.G. had been flying civilian trans-
port planes from Spain to the Canary Islands and on to South America.
These Iu 52 planes were called the Condor Lufthansa after the giant birds of
the South American Andes.54
Somebody in the Legion Condor wrote a song for the regiment as early
as November 11 :55
Die Jungfrau Maria ist unsere Legion
Franco tiber Azana.
Arriba Espana. . . .
(The Virgin Mary is our Legion.
Franco over Azana.
Upward Spain....
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Figure 1. The Emblem of the Legion Condor
LEGION CONDOR
Source: Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler's
Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (West-
port, Conn., 1982).
Es ist so schoen
in der Condor A.G.
Jetze sind wir Legionare
RLM ade ("good-bye"). . . .
Es kommt kein Feind uns in die Quer
Wo unser Banner weht
Wir sind die Condor Legion
Der niemand wiedersteht.
It is so beautiful
in the Condor Company.
Now we are Legionnaires
Reich Air Ministry Goodbye. . . .
We will meet no enemy on the square
where our banner flies.
We are the Condor Legion
that no man can hold back.)
Between November 6 and November 18,92 planes and more than 3,800
men and officers on 6 vessels were dispatched to Spain. Thus began
Operation Winteriibung Hansa, the code name for the delivery of the main
force of the Legion Condor by the navy.56 Several artillery units, signal
battalions, and units for the training of Spaniards joined the air squadrons
that formed the bulk of the German troops. Thirty-three of the multi-engine
aircraft were flown in via Italy as part of the air Operation Luftiibung
RUgen. 57
U-boat warfare also became a consideration for both Italy and Germany
in October. Under pressure from Franco, Italy sent two submarines to
Spanish waters about October 21, and in November came two more. 58 On
October 24 Hitler informed the Duce that the Germans would also send two
submarines to Spanish waters. This Operation Ursula was part of a plan to
attack Republican vessels.
Soon a joint German-Italian policy on submarines was needed, and on
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November 17 Lieutenant Commander Hellmuth Heye of the OKM Opera-
tions Section and Commander Werner Lange, naval attache in Rome, signed
for the Third Reich a naval agreement with Italy, dividing responsibility in
Spanish waters. The Italians who signed this accord were Admiral
Vladimiro Pini and Rear Admiral Oscar Giamberardino.59 The Axis wanted
to avoid confusion since Spanish republican submarines were in the area.
The Italians, suspicious also of German submarines in the Mediterranean,
put in the requirement that the area north and east of Cabo de Gata (near
Almeria) would be reserved for Italian submarines, while Germans were
accorded supremacy over the waters west of that point. 60 (See Map 1.)
This Heye-Pini agreement meant that Italy took jurisdiction over the sea
near the ports where the heaviest shipping to the Republic occurred. After
briefly considering competing with the Italians, the Germans suddenly
canceled Operation Ursula;61 the Duce, on the other hand, soon increased
his patrols to seven submarines.62 During the rest of the war the Germans
limited their submarine action largely to observing merchantmen and assist-
ing with minelaying. While at the outset the Italian and German submarine
efforts were nearly equal, the Italians soon took the lead; in 1937 they were
to sink many merchantmen bound for Loyalist ports.
On land, the· Duce at first had not been eager to expand his Spanish
commitment. When Madrid did not fall as hoped in October, the two fascist
states decided to recognize Pranco anyway. On November 18, 1936, at
Hitler's insistence and probably to impress the Japanese, Germany and Italy
both assigned charges d'affaires to Franco's headquarters, by then moved to
Salamanca. Hitler selected as his choice retired Lieutenant General Wilhelm
Faupel, head of the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut (and formerly a member
of a Freikorps) and possessor of ten years' experience in Argentina and
Peru. 63
Any prestige conferred by overt Axis recognition could not, however,
tum the tide of battle by itself. The Nationalists needed more trained m{(n
equipped with modem weapons. Perhaps because the Duce was surprised to
see how large the German Legion Condor actually was, and certainly be-
cause of the growing size of the International Brigades, he decided upon a
larger Italian venture in Spain.
Compared to the speedy and thorough planning that led to the creation
of the Legion Condor, Mussolini's technical plans were slower to mature.
His first move, after watching the Germans, had .been to escalate naval
operations. It was apparently not until November 20 that he conceived the
idea of sending an independent Italian division, rather than more inqividual
Italians, to join Franco's legions. 64 This idea developed concurrently with
key political and diplomatic maneuvers.
Conscious to some extent of Italy's technological weakness, the Duce
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was making overtures to Japan and Britain as well as to Germany. On
November 28 Mussolini hinted to the Japanese that he was ready to join the
German-Japanese Anti-Comintem Pact.65 The Japanese, however, delayed
accepting the Italian proposal until 1937, when they felt the need for support
because of their invasion of China.
In any case, Britain was more important to the Duce than was Japan. On
November 1, when Mussolini made his famous speech in Milan announcing
the formation of the pro-German Axis, he had also included phrases to open
the door for an understanding with Britain at the expense of France. The
activity of the Italian military and naval forces in the Balearics had increased
concern in London. In September and October, Foreign Minister Eden had
proposed a mild protest to the Italians, and, after considerable discussion,
the British cabinet had approved this mild warning that turned into a treaty
offer: "Any alteration of the status quo in the Western Mediterranean must
be a matter of closest concern to His Majesty's Government."66 Afterward,
following lengthy negotiations, the British and Italians signed and an-
nounced publicly a gentlemen's agreement to maintain Spain's territorial
integrity,67 and to recognize the territorial status quo in the Mediterranean
generally. This was proclaimed to the world on January 2, 1937.68 Most
members'-, of the Tory party, the Foreign Office, and the cabinet took the
agreement seriously as a pressure that would maintain European peace.
Privately, however, the ambitious Duce not only was thinking of staying in
the Balearics but already was speculating about a sudden attack on British
Malta.'69
From November 1936, when Mussolini made offers to deal with both
Berlin and London, to March 1939, the end of the Spanish Civil War, the
four Great Powers of western Europe would experiment with various types of
alliances, alignments, and ententes.70 The largely secret Rome-Berlin Axis
proved in the end to be the strongest, and the public London-Rome gen-
tlemen's agreement was one of the frailest.
While London and Rome were negotiating the gentlemen's agreement,
the Duce sent Fillipo Anfuso, Ciano's chef de cabinet, to Spain. Anfuso
returned to Rome from his visit with Franco at the end of November 1936
with a draft treaty71 against communism that also granted the Italians
political and economic concessions in Spain. This document provided more
concrete gains to the Duce than did his vague agreement with the British.
On November 28 Franco signed with Italy the "anticommunist treaty:"
The document abandoned Article Sixteen, the enforcement and sanctions
clause of the League of Nations Covenant; it prohibited transit of French
troops across Spain in the event of an Italian-French war; and it also
guaranteed Spanish benevolent neutrality toward Italy in case ofgeneral war.
Spain further agreed "to assure it [Italy] all the supplies which it might need,
The Diplomacy of the Anti-Comintern Bloc 53
as well as all facilities for the use of harbors, airlines, railroads, transit
routes, and trans-shipment."72 Mussolini in tum promised orally to provide
three to four thousand infantrymen to help Franco's land army achieve
victory. 73
Nationalist Spain's unofficial ambassador to Italy and to the Vatican,
Admiral Antonio Magaz, had been in Rome since late July or early August
1936;74 in November, he sought permission to recruit Italians for the
Spanish Foreign Legion. 75 At first Mussolini agreed. 76 Then, in light of
Hitler's dispatch of the Legion Condor and of Anfuso's anticommunist
agreement, the Duce set out on a new strategy: General Roatta was sent back
to Franco to discuss the formation of two Italian tank companies and the
sending of a section of anti-tank guns, flak, and mortars.77 On December 7
Roatta was appointed by Mussolini as commander of all Italians in Spain for
both the newly planned all-Italian units and the mixed brigades.78 Militarily
at this point, the Duce was still second to the Fuhrer; but politically and
ideologically he had already put himself out in front, and further military
commitment was soon to follow.
In contrast to the new Italian-Spanish anticommunist treaty providing
rewards for Italy to be paid by Franco's Spain, the Germans had asked
relatively little in political concessions from the insurgent generals. Hitler's
political fruits were to be reaped not in the Iberian Peninsula per se but from
the deterioration of the general European situation, caused in part by the
Spanish Civil War. After expanding the civil war by sending the Legion
Condor, the Fuhrer came to realize by December that it was better not to
escalate the war further. For one thing, under the Axis agreements, Hitler
gave Mussolini priority in Spain, once the Duce had sent in his own troops.
For another, the War Ministry and the commander in chief, Colonel
General Werner von Fritsch, were particularly opposed to increasing Ger-
man participation in the war because it worsened Germany's relations with
Britain and France.79 Caution also was recommended by the Foreign Minis-
try, especially Ernst von Weizsacker, the political director,80 and to a lesser
extent by the conservative foreign minister, Constantin von Neurath. 81 They
argued that the Anfuso-Franco agreement of late November gave Italy such
substantial new political gains that it would be useless for Germany to make
further military escalation in Spain, even if Hitler should desire it. The
Foreign Ministry also argued that Germany's goal in Spain should in the
future be confined to obtaining greater economic concessions. The Fuhrer
was swayed by the views of the old Weimar conservatives still left in the
regime, who contended that, since Italy's stake in the Nationalist victory in
Spain was greater, Italy should also supply the bulk of the military forces.
Mussolini soon was to learn of the German reluctance to escalate
military aid. When he wanted larger German ground troop support for
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Franco, he appealed to Hitler to assign a military man. to attend a highly
important conference in Rome on December 6. 82 Before the conference
met, however, Hitler decided that henceforth the Italians should take the
principal role. 83 Abwehr Chief Canaris was dispatched to Rome, where he
informed the resident German ambassador that Hitler intended to reduce
German military participation in Spain as compared with Italian participa-
tion. 84 At the December 6 conference with Italian military leaders, Canaris
assumed. an observer role, which understandably displeased Mussolini. 85
The Abwehr chief also indicated Germany's unwillingness to send divisions
to Spain, an attitude that made the Duce briefly postpone his own decision
on sending expanded aid to Franco.
Another appeal for more German forces came from Faupel, Hitler's new
charge in Salamanca, who had arrived in Spain on November 28. Faupel
owed his appointment to the influence of Nazi Reichsleiters Rudolf Hess
and Ernst Bohle,86 who had originally arranged for Franco's appeal to reach
Hitler in July. Faupel had been designated over the objections of Foreign
Ministry leaders and the commander-in-chief of the army, none of whom
had a high opinion of him, despite his years as a Latin American military
advisor. A week after first meeting with Franco (whom the charge thought
unprepared to rule an army and a nation), Faupel appealed directly to Hitler
for a German division to be sent in support of the Spanish crusade. 87 The
anti-bolshevik Faupel also immediately thought of including Spain in the
Anti-Comintern Pact, just after Germany and Japan had signed.
Following initial talks in Spain, General Faupel returned to Berlin to
report on December 17 concerning the Spanish situation. On· the morning of
December 22, Hitler held a very important meeting for German policy.
Present in the Reich Chancellery were Goring, Blomberg, General Werner
von Fritsch (head of the Wehrmacht), Faupel, Colonel Warlimont (returned
from helping to organize Operation Otto and the Legion Condor), and
Colonel Friedrich. Hossbach, Hitler's adjutant for military affairs. The
opinions of all except Faupel were to limit aid. In response, Hitler decided
that Germany would send no more men to Spain except as replacements for
Legion Condor personnel and a small SS unit to train Spanish police
officers. 88 This meeting and its outcome leaked out and were discussed in
the world press, giving Faupel his only page-one coverage in the New York
Times (December 24, 1936).
Hitler explained to his entourage his ideas on the Spanish Civil War in
these terms: "If the attention of the European powers could further be
directed to Spain, this would entail considerable advantages for German
policy in Europe.... Germany's interests, which alone should be consid-
ered, were therefore not so deeply involved in an early conclusion of the
Spanish Civil War as to risk a limitation of its own rearmament. On the
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contrary, German policy would be advanced if the Spanish question con-
tinued for a time to occupy Europe's attention and therefore diverted it from
Germany. "89
These ideas were hardly original with Hitler. They are also found in a
dispatch written by Ambassador Hassell in Rome covering the long-term
development of German-Italian relations. In it, Hassell argued that Mus-
solini had warmed up to Hitler's Reich in January 1936 as a result of the
Abyssinian crisis. Currently the Spanish Civil War was having the same
effect, namely, preventing Italy from being drawn into the Anglo-French net.
Italy, consequently, would have no choice but to turn to Germany.90
A few days before Hitler's Reich Chancellery conference, Italy had
begun a major escalation of forces in Spain. Thousands of regular army units
and Black Shirt militia were embarking for the Spanish arena. 91 The new
Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV) was born between December 7, when
Mussolini appointed Roatta, and December 18, when the first three thou-
sand men embarked for Cadiz. Mussolini kept the form of his military
organization secret from Franco, who had been expecting Italian troops to
join his legion rather than independent units. 92 Mussolini was confident that
Britain would not object, because their gentlemen's agreement, then ready
for final signatures, provided that the territorial status quo in Spain would
not be altered, regardless of the outcome of the civil war.
Thus, by the end of the autumn of 1936, divergent policies toward Spain
had developed on the parts of Hitler and Mussolini. Italian intervention had
expanded, beginning with the decision in late August to increase arms
deliveries to the Balearics. In early November the Germans had begun
sending the Legion Condor. By mid-December, after the Anfuso-Pranco
"anticommunist treaty" of November 28, large numbers of Italian regular
army troops were being dispatched to fight in Spain.
His commitment to Franco going far beyond that of Hitler, Mussolini
once again asked Berlin in January to send more military aid to the Nation-
alists. This time the reply came via General Goring, who visited Italy on
January 15: Germany would only maintain the current strength of the Legion
Condor in Spain,93 and the Duce should provide any additional foreign
troops needed to ensure Franco's victory. It was also agreed that Franco
would choose the proportion of German and Italian supplies for his cam-
paign.94 Goring and Mussolini covered a broad agenda for the future of the
Axis operations in Spain, including propaganda, a joint blockade, intel-
ligence, and a renewed invitation to the Duce to visit Hitler in Berlin.95
From November 1936 to January 1937, the ad hoc decisions of the two
Axis dictators had definitely shifted the German-Italian balance in Spain to
Italy. The Fuhrer gave up military parity and, later, superiority to the Italians,
despite the dispatch of the Legion Condor. Hitler's basic policy became one
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of limited commitment, concentrating on extracting economic returns and
maximum political benefits from the exertions of others.
Mussolini Expands and Withdraws from Spain, 1937-1939
Following Mussolini's decision of December 1936 to expand Italian mili-
tary forces in Spain beyond Germany's commitments, he became the victim
of his own propaganda. On January 18, 1937, the Duce had 17,422 ground
troops fighting in Spain, and by January 30 there were 28,700. 96 The
number escalated to a maximum of 44,648 by May 1937.97 By August
1938, Hitler had 5,600 troops secretly fighting in Spain, while Mussolini
maintained 37,400-45,000 fighting men there, "gloriously" visible. 98 By
the end of the war, Hitler was to spend $215 million on Franco, compared to
Mussolini's $354 million.99 By sending more men and war materiel to
Spain, the Duce lost the diplomatic flexibility he had once enjoyed. In the
eyes of the world, the Italian divisions in Spain confirmed Mussolini's role
as Franco's major supporter. Fascist newspapers boasted openly of the
Duce's anticommunist military campaigns. 100
Hitler, in contrast, maintained strict secrecy on German military ac-
tivities in Spaip; the Gestapo and the Abwehr saw to that. Thus, morale
became a major problem of the Legion Condor. The German troops and
many Nazis, especially Ambassador Faupel, 101 could not understand the
limited war, and they objected behind the scenes. Complaints were heard
that the Legion Condor-with its bombers, fighters, tanks, and signal
units-sat passively outside Madrid for six weeks during November and
December 1936. Military information from Spain was sent back to Berlin in
a leisurely manner, with no publicity given to the deeds of the unknown
legion, and with no reinforcements forthcoming. 102 Furthermore, in
Faupel's view, the troops were rotated too infrequently in early 1936.
This tactic, incidentally, indicates that training and testing in Spain were
not Hitler's original motive. He did not at first exact the maximum military
experience for his armed services, because too much turnover in personnel
would have led to security leaks. Later, in 1937 and 1938 when the Fuhrer
felt more confident in face of the irresolution of Britain and France, rotation
became frequent. By the end of 1937, 9,278 men had been sent, and 3,615
had been rotated home. In 1938 the numbers returning equalled the numbers
sent. 103
Not until November 5, 1937, did Hitler clearly enunciate to his subordi-
nates his Mediterranean poli~y in the now famous Reich Chancellery speech
reported by adjutant Hossbach. 104 With the dream ofLebensraum lurking in
the back of his mind, the Fuhrer pointed out that Germany would strengthen
Italy's rear; if Italy got into a war with Britain and France,. the Germans
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could support the Italians with raw materials. It would, therefore, be wise for
Germany to let the Spanish war drag on and to encourage Italy to hang onto
Mallorca. Meanwhile, Germany would make use of the persistence of the
war to "settle" the Austrian and Czech problems. The fanatic German
nationalists would not be satisfied until the German-speaking Austrians and
Sudentenlanders (and even those "inferior" Bohemians and Moravians)
were incorporated into a Greater Reich; Hitler then could put pressure on
Poland and Russia. Mussolini's navy helped in these great ambitions by
opposing France and Britain in Spanish waters.
In contrast to Hitler's Machiavellian view of Spain, Mussolini boldly
vowed to Franco, the British, the French, and the Germans that he would
continue to supply the Nationalists until their victory had been won. 105 The
Italian military rout suffered at Guadalajara in March 1937-when thou-
sands of Italians surrendered to the Spanish "reds"-was a blow to Mus-
solini's military prestige, and it stiffened his resolve to commit more men
and material to the war. This defeat enraged the Duce, while the Fuhrer only
laughed in private. 106
On occasion Mussolini resented Hitler's "brutal friendship." In June
1937 he complained to one of Chamberlain's confidants that the Fuhrer
egged him on in Spain while using the civil war as a smoke screen to obscure
Nazi moves. The dictator privately told the British diplomats that, as a result,
his own relations with the Germans had worsened, and that he actually
wanted his troops out of the civil war. IO? But the imperalist Mussolini could
not bring himself to abandon Franco publicly, partly because Italy's fighting
men would lose more face in light of the Guadalajara humiliation. He would
be ridiculed in the major capitals of the world as the man who ran away. So,
despite occasional doubts, the Duce pushed himself further into the Spanish
imbroglio, while repeatedly asserting that he was fighting in Spain only to
"stop communism."
In July 1937, the Sonderstab W convinced the Spanish military to re-
deploy the German reconnaissance squadron, AS/88, a 110-man unit of the
Legion Condor, from Cadiz to Pollensa on the island of Mallorca. 108 From
their respective bases on Mallorca, the Italian air force bombed the area
from Cartagena to Tarragona, and the Germans bombed from Tarragona to
the French frontier. 109 Thus, the Legion Condor and the CTV worked out an
air jurisdiction similar to the Heye-Pini naval agreement of November 1936.
Mussolini also continued to expand naval operations throughout the
Mediterranean. A personal appeal from Franco in August 1937 led Mus-
solini to commit a larger portion of his navy to the Spanish cause. IIO
Ignoring the spirit and the letter of the 1936 Non-Intervention Agreement,
four Italian submarines were stationed outside the Republican ports of
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Soviet and Spanish Republican flags by day as well as on British and French
flags by night. III Two additional submarines watched the Dardanelles,
while two destroyers watched over the Straits of Messina. Other submarines
and destroyers patrolled the Sicilian Channel; friendly German, Japanese,
and Portuguese merchantmen were warned not to use this passageway. In the
western Mediterranean, the so-called Spanish white fleet was stationed
between Melilla and the Balearics, while Italian ships watched the area from
the Balearics to Sardinia (see map 3).
In total, the Italians used fifty-two submarines and forty-one cruisers
and destroyers in their Mediterranean force. 112 A dozen vessels were at-
tacked between August 11 and 31. 113 The Non-Intervention Committee,
acting at the insistence of Britain and France, labeled this illegal maritime
warfare "piracy." London and Paris sought to maintain the traditional
principle of the freedom of the seas; but, because Chamberlain did not want
to alienate Mussolini, Italy was not specifically condemned. The Anglo-
French entente nevertheless protested strongly and called a conference at
Nyon, September 10-12, 1937, to take measures against the "pirate" subs in
the Mediterranean. 114 Mussolini called off his submarines but launched a
quieter operation. In this one, submarines under the command of Nationalist
Spaniards confined operations to the Balearic Island region from September
17 to February 5, 1938. 115
The Duce finally visited Berlin in September 1937, where the Fuhrer
dazzled him with exhibitions of teutonic efficiency and flattered him as the
founder of international fascism. The Duce's Berlin speech identified the
Italian Fascist revolution and the German National Socialist revolution as a
joint crusade against the Comintern, the League of Nations, and senile
democratic capitalism; thus, Italian "volunteers" in Spain were saving
European culture. 116 Hitler mocked the Duce in private but flattered him in
public, and the Fuhrer concluded after the visit that Mussolini had bound
himself to Germany forever. 117
Following his Berlin visit, Mussolini finally acceded to the Anti-
Comintem Pact. liS Negotiations had begun in February to convince Italy to
join the ideological-political pact. 119 Negotiator Ribbentrop, who at this
point officially held the post of ambassador in London, flew to Rome on
November 6, 1937, to obtain the Duce's signature. A few weeks later Italy
withdrew from the League ofNations. On November 25 the Anti-Comintem
Pact became trilateral, and military talks followed, directed mainly against
the Anglo-French "entente." Ostensibly the Soviet Union was the prime
target of the pact, but the defensive democracies, especially France, became
the more important objects of fascist contempt. Indeed, Mussolini main-
tained correct relations with the Soviet Union, and an Italian construction
firm assisted the Soviets in building warships. 120 On the other hand, the
60 Hitler and Spain
Duce denounced Blum, the French Popular Front leader, as backed by
international Jewry. 121 On October 31, 1937, the Italian ambassador was
withdrawn from Paris as a protest against relations that had been worsening
for more than a year. The old career diplomat, trying to paint a realistic
picture of the Parisian situation, told Mussolini that France regarded Italy as
its number-one enemy. Mussolini retorted: "A great honor. I want to be
feared and hated rather than tolerated or protected."122
To the chiefof staffof the Sonderstab W, which was administering aid to
the Spanish insurgents, Hitler put his Machiavellian objectives graphically.
The Fuhrer surprised Colonel Erwin Jaenecke by commenting, just after a
Franco victory at Teruel in the winter of 1937-1938, that he, Hitler, would
like to see a "red" Catalonia. Since a "red" Catalonia would have to be
protected by France, Franco and France would then become rivals. Besides,
Franco would tend to blame Britain for the situation. Moreover, industrial
Catalonia would be cut off from the rest of Spain's cheap raw materials,
which then would be available to aid German industry. As for Mussolini, "a
red Catalonia would be like a thick, fat bone before the Italian dog kennel,
and Mussolini could stand around gnawing at it, while he does not trouble
himself worrying about other things in Europe, which he couldn't do
anything about anyway."123
Hitler followed his words by making one of his rare interventions into
the Spanish tactical situation. He told the shocked Jaenecke to encourage
Franco to move south toward the Almaden mercury mines and to leave
Catalonia alone. Apparently Franco accepted for a while the advice about
turning south. Having reached the Mediterranean in April 1938 at Vinaroz,
the next logical move would have been to press north toward Barcelona.
Instead, on April 20 the generalissimo turned west toward Teruel and south
toward Valencia. 124 Franco did, however, concentrate on Catalonia in the
summer and fall of 1938.
In the course of 1938 two token Anglo-Italian agreements were pressed
upon the Duce by the appeasing Chamberlain in an effort to get withdrawal
ofItali~n troops from Spain. The Italian dictator finally agreed on November
16, 1938, to withdraw 10,000 of his 40,000 fighting men, but Cham-
berlain's hope of weaning Mussolini from Hitler and turning him toward
France and a stable Europe run by the four Great Powers was an illusion. In
describing his contempt for the "bourgeoisie," Mussolini told his son-in-
law, Foreign Minister Ciano: "When Spain is finished I will think of
something else. The character of the Italian people must be moulded by
fighting. "125 For the time being, the Spanish military situation attracted his
attention. But the passion for glory, which prompted him to demand victory
for Franco, also welded him to Hitler and to the ideology of anticom-
munism.
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During the course of 1937 and 1938 the civil war dragged on, with the
Nationalists gradually gaining territory. Franco's men, with Axis support,
took Malaga in January, the Basque country in midyear, and Asturias in the
fall of 1937. In the spring of 1938 they broke out to the Mediterranean,
splitting Valencia from Catalonia. In July-August 1938 the Nationalists
opened the offensive on the Ebro to wipe out the leftists of Catalonia. After
the Anglo-French retreat of September 1938 at Munich, when a democratic
Czechoslovakia was forced to surrender the Sudetenland (a process in which
Stalin was excluded from Chamberlain's four-power concert), Mussolini felt
so confident that in November his Fascist party began demanding that
France make concessions to Italy in Corsica and Tunis. 126
Thus, the Duce continued to follow perfectly the Hitler-backed strategy
of "Italian leadership in the Mediterranean." Only after Franco's victory at
Barcelona on January 26, 1939, achieved with the assistance of the CTV,
(Corpo Truppe Volontarie), did the Duce feel satisfied. Proclaiming that
"Spain is now completely liberated from the infamy of the Reds,"127 he
thereby regained his flexibility in dealing with Germans on questions of
anticommunist propaganda. Commenting in January on the German text for
a new Anti-Comintern Pact, foreign minister Ciano noted, "In one paragraph
was mentioned 'the threat of Bolshevist dissolution' as the aim of the pact. In
reality, where is this threat? And even if such a threat existed, though not to
our countries, why should we be concerned about it? We should not. Every
possibility of dissolution and breakdown of other peoples should be encour-
aged and favored by us at the proper moment."128
Not until Hitler decided to march on Prague in March 1939 did the Duce
suddenly grasp that he had been acting as a cat's-paw for Hitler's eastern
aims. By this time Hitler's Italian-Mediterranean strategy seemed about to
die a natural death. By March 15, the Spanish flames had died down to mere
embers; everybody expected that the Spanish war would be over in a few
days.
The Duce's March 14 reaction to the message that Germany would soon
incorporate Bohemia was not unfavorable. 129 When the event actually
occurred the next day, however, Mussolini shouted out his annoyance. He
resented not so much the extinction of Czechoslovakia as the fact that Hitler
accomplished it in one day, while his own Black Shirts had been bogged
down in Spain for two and a half years and had gained little or no tangible
reward. In his own words, "The Italians woul~ laugh at me; every time Hitler
occupies a country he sends me a message!"130
After agonizing hours, even days, ofreevaluation, the Duce designed a
trick to rival those of Hitler. On April 7 Italy swooped down on Albania
without giving the Germans more than a few hours' notice. 13 ! After the
collapse of Albania, the rapidity of which surprised even Mussolini, the
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Duce gave the word on April 11 or 12 to withdraw his troops from Spain. 132
The Italian dictator felt satisfied that Albania compensated for Bohemia. He
had expected more outcry from Anglo-French circles, and the small Italian
contingents sent to Spain in the last week of March had served as reas-
surance and a deco~ Mussolini, for the first time in two years, saw Spain the
way Hitler had seen it: as a diversionary tactic to cover his ambitions
elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.
Germany Works to Develop Direct Ties with Spain
After July 1936, through the National Socialist party and the foreign
ministry, Hitler persistently instructed German civilians in Spain to avoid
political questions and to concentrate on economic relations. 133 Although
Hitler rejected the notion of direct political ties with Spain during the early
months of the intervention, this picture underwent gradual change as civil
war continued. Because of the war's length and the growing tension in
Germany's relations with other Great Powers, a second strand of complex
events evolved in Spanish-German relations.
During the early days of the war, Franco had striven for solidarity with
Hitler. In November 1936, for instance, Franco's chief of police, General
Severiano Martinez Anido, requested that the SS send a German delegation
to Spain to help build up the Spanish police force. 134 The Sonderstab W sent
as advisor Hermann Goring's cousin, Count Wolf von Helldorf. 135
Pressure carne from another quarter. In January 1937, a representative
of the Polish military asked the Spanish Nationalists for permission to
examine captured Russian equipment. Franco refused the request on the
basis that the Germans would not like it: Poland was allied to France, and the
French government would inform the USSR. 136 On the other hand, when
the Japanese military attache asked for the same privilege at about the same
time, he was recommended by the Germans, and permission was granted. 137
Propaganda also helped solidify Burgos-Berlin relations. On November
18, 1936, the day Hitler recognized the Burgos regime, he met with his
foreign minister, Neurath, and the newly appointed charge d'affaires to
Spain, Faupel, who had strong links to the Nazi party Auslandsorganisa-
tion. Earlier, while heading the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, Faupel had
thought and written on the positive role of the AO in protecting German
interests abroad and strengthening German expatriate ties with the Fa-
therland. 138 Hitler subsequently wanted Faupel to take with him to Spain a
specialist on propaganda and another for organization of the Falange; Hess,
the Fuhrer's deputy, was to be consulted in the naming of these men. While
Faupel was not to concern himself with military matters, it was expected he
would need to be informed about everything by the military. His task was
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defined as advising the generalissimo upon request, representing German
interests with Franco, and reporting to Berlin about Spanish develop-
ments. 139
Even without adding an economic expert (commercial attache Richard
Enge was already in Spain), Faupel traveled with a large entourage. The
group included Hans Kroeger, delegate of the Nazi party and the Ministry of
Propaganda; Willi Kohn of the SS, later consul general; Hans Stille, later
secretary of the legation; and Gestapo agent Paul Winzer, who had been in
Barcelona when the uprising failed there in July. 140
The War Ministry had reservations about Faupel from the first. Ambas-
sador von Ribbentrop's "spy" in Berlin, Rudolf Likus, reported to his chief
in London that Faupel had terrible relations with the War Ministry, and that
his appoi~tment was opposed by Fritsch, the ministry's chief of staff. 141
Once in Spain, Faupel's relations with the military were to go from bad to
worse, for he delivered opinions and recommendations the Legion Condor
command did not like.
It has been noted that Faupel's December call for greatly increased
numbers of German troops was denied. He also immediately turned his
attention to the training of the military and the Falange. In his first report
from Spain, Faupel specifically requested sending as trainers three Spanish-
speaking retired military men, like himself veterans of South America. By
late winter this training was under way. In mid-April he heard with satisfac-
tion Franco's account that the first group of Spaniards trained by a man
recommended by Faupel was ready for action. 142
Faupel also requested the naming of a certain officer of the brown-
shirted stormtroops (Sturmabteilung or SA) to the post of liaison officer in
the field. 143 The war minister, Blomberg, to say nothing of the Legion
Condor commander, Sperrle, must have been affronted by Faupel's assess-
ment: "There is urgent need of a senior officer who gets along well with
Spaniards and can speak the language, to function as liaison officer with the
divisions at the front." Faupel ingenuously added: "I may perhaps be
accused of meddling in things which are outside of my present sphere of
activity. . . . Whenever and wherever I intervene, it is done in such a way
that the work of Sperrle, Funck, [military attache] etc., is not interfered
with, but rather supported. . . . Any friction between us is out of the
question. "144
In early January 1937, Faupel was looking forward to the arrival in
Spain of some fifty German instructors within six weeks. Many of them
were German businessmen with military experience who formerly had been
active in Spain. By the end of January, Faupel was backing as "absolutely
necessary" a plan for a joint German-Italian general staff. Ignoring the
Germans currently serving with Franco, Faupel suggested as the German
head of this joint staff one Colonel Hans Knauer (retired). A veteran of
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World War I, Knauer had advised Chileans until 1935 and was the father of a
flier for Franco. 145 This plan was rejected in Berlin. As a result of such
meddling, Faupel soon was barely on speaking terms with Sperrle.
Despite difficulties with the Legion Condor, however, Faupel had some
success in the diplomatic field. On February 8, after the Nationalists
succeeded in taking Malaga, Hitler and Mussolini announced the naming of
ambassadors to Salamanca, thereby increasing Faupel's status. The
Wilhelmstrasse took its first important political step toward tying Spain to
itself when it secured Franco's pledge of neutrality in any future war by the
secret protocol of March 20, 1937, which Faupel signed. 146 By its terms,
Franco agreed not to participate in treaties with third powers directed against
Germany and to avoid "everything that might serve to the advantage of the
attacker or to the disadvantage of the attacked." This bilateral agreement
notably obtained less for the Third Reich on paper than the Anfuso-Franco
agreement had accorded to Italy four months earlier. For example, the
League of Nations, the Balearic Islands, and the transshipment of foreign
troops were not specifically mentioned in the German trea~ The Germans
. were informed of the existence of the Anfuso agreement, and they quoted it
to Mussolini when the question arose of further supplying Franco's military
needs. The Duce, however, seems to have been uninformed of the German-
Spanish neutrality protocol of March 1937.
Faupel's modest success with the protocol did not assure good relations
with Franco. In March, when Faupel presented his credentials as ambas-
sador to the generalissimo, Ramon Serrano Suner, Franco's brother-in-law,
thought it curious that the old general showed up in academic robes and
mortarboard. 147 More than questions of style were involved, however. The
retired general's attempted interference in Spanish military matters and
domestic politics eventually made him persona non grata with the Spanish
chief of state.
According to Serrano Suner-Franco's adviser on Falangist party mat-
ters and subsequently his minister of the interior-Faupel encouraged
radical elements in the Falange. Like many Nazis, Faupel's notions of the
need for social reform in Spain were more revolutionary than were the views
held by Franco and most of his military associates. Whereas Franco's
crusade was a counterrevolution, the arrogant Faupel associated the Falange
with the "revolutionary" doctrines of National Socialism. He sought to
provide Spain's poor with an alternative to "Jewish intemationlist Marxist-
Leniriism." Although, in the eyes of liberals or democratic socialists, the
Falangists and the Nazis were reactionary and counterrevolutionary, the old-
fashioned Alfonsists and Carlists who surrounded Franco viewed the
Falangists as classless troublemakers.
In April 1937, when the Spanish chief of state forced the unification of
The Diplomacy of the Anti-Comintern Bloc 65
the reactionary tradicionalistas and the radical Falangists into a single party,
the FET, he ousted Manuel Hedilla as Falange chief. Faupel spoke up for
Hedilla in early June, possibly saving him from execution, but not doing the
German ambassador any good with Franco. Still, Faupel pressed on and
personally arranged for visits of Spaniards to Germany-such as the leaders
of the feminine section of the Falange in July 1937, including Pilar Primo de
Rivera, sister of the martyred Jose Antonio. 148 Faupel also annoyed Franco
by taking up the economic causes of certain Germans who were already a
source of irritation. 149
Meanwhile, Faupel's relations with the Legion Condor were worsening.
The party leader (Gauleiter) for Schleswig-Holstein visited Spain in May
and noted later that the German military hated Faupel so much they would
not fill his car with army gasoline. 150 Commander Sperrle spoke no Span-
ish-a black mark against him in Faupel's eyes-and Sperrle grumbled
pessimistically in the hearing of German-speaking S.panish officers about
the stalemated military situation. (Although they despised each other,
Sperrle and Faupel did agree in disliking Franco's slow and cautious cam-
paigning.) After the fall of the last of the Basque provinces in June, the
smoldering dispute between the two flared into the open. Sperrle snubbed an
attempt by Faupel to make up and complained about Faupel's behavior to his
superiors. 151 For his part, Faupel told of Sperrle's defeatism and of his
opposition to the economic maneuverings by other Germans in Spain, who
passed the complaints on to Berlin. 152
In July, Sperrle and Faupel brought their disagreements before Hitler,
but the Fuhrer refused to heed complaints about the slow war in Spain. 153 As
a rigid Nazi and a hispanophile, Faupel took the crusade against bolshevism
seriously. He just could not understand Hitler's Europeanwide diplomatic
strategy of allowing Italy to assume the political leadership and military
burdens of Spain. Looking for glory on the Spanish battlefields, and
oblivious to Franco's opposition to much foreign intervention, ~aupel want-
ed a 'speedy military victory. Because the old general either did not, or could
not, understand the Fuhrer's use of Spain to further Hitler's ambitions in the
East, he was forced to resign as ambassador in late August 1937. "Ill health"
was cited for his resignation.
Faupel was replaced by Eberhard von Stohrer, the Foreign Ministry's
original choice for charge d'affaires in Spain in the fall of 1936. He had been
bypassed in favor of Faupel, the Nazi party's nominee. Stohrer was an
aristocratic career diplomat who had served in Spain during World War I. 154
Originally he had been named ambassador to the Spanish Republic in July
1936, but he had not proceeded to the post because of the civil war's
outbreak. ISS In contrast to Faupel, Stohrer got along far better in Spain;
according to Franco's minister of interior, Serrano Sufter, Stohrer better
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understood the problems facing the Franco government. 156 Despite his non-
Nazi background, the old, patriotic, aristocratic Stohrer, as a careerist,
spoke up vigorously in Spain for the German Foreign Ministry--even after
Hitler's echo, the upstart Ribbentrop, became foreign minister in February
1938. Since 1933, Stohrer, like most career men, had resented the Nazi
foreign policy advisor, but new foreign opportunities provided by Hitler
dragged those with private reservations along in the New Reich.
While overcoming Faupel's reputation for meddling, Stohrer continued
to encourage political ties between Spain and Germany as originally spon-
sored by Faupel. On the Spanish side, Dionisio Ridruejo, one of the leading
pro-German propagandists within the Falange, went to Germany in June
1937 to observe an international congress of Kraft durch Freude; there he
met Hitler. 15? Serrano Sulier, who had assured Faupel that he admired
Germany, though from afar, went to the 1937 fall Nazi party rally at
Niirnberg along with Franco's brother Nicolas, Franco's adjutant general,
Jose Varela, and four others. The chief Falangists saw Hitler only from a
distance. 158 In an extended return visit, eight members of the Hitler Youth,
invited by the Falange, entered Spain via Lisbon. They toured the major
Nationalist cities-Badajoz, Seville, Malaga, Jerez, Leon, Oviedo, San-
tander, Bilbao, Irun, Zaragoza, Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Toledo-
and the Madrid front between October 28 and November 17. 159 In 1938 the
Franco government spent 150,000 RM ($60,000) to import seventy German
films. 160 According to Ridruejo, Franco and most of the Spanish army
leaders increasingly came to admire Germany over the course of the war. 161
Thus, Hitler had plenty of opportunities to exploit closer relations with the
Spaniards, had he chosen to do so.
By 1938 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was ready to push for a formal
Hispano-German treaty despite Hitler's lack of interest. Ribbentrop's chief
ambition, from 1935 to May 1937, had been to get British adherence to an
anti-Comintern pact (the intent being to weaken the French-Soviet-Czecho-
slovak pacts of 1935), but Britain had failed to fulfill his hopes. 162 The
German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936, however, had
been expanded by the accession of Italy in the fall of 1937. Inclusion of
Franco's government in the anticommunist agreement would provide Rib-
bentrop with an additional possibility for developing closer political ties
between Germany and Spain, at the expense of Britain and France. Indeed,
Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, after discussing the treaty with Rib-
bentrop, soon began to think ofa place for Spain in the expanded multilateral
anti-Comintern bloc. Just after Italy's November 1937 decision to adhere to
the pact, Ciano made the following notation: "We must not go about asking
little states to join-it must remain a pact of giants. But three countries
interest me: Spain, representing the prolongation of the Axis to the Atlantic;
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Brazil, in order to shake the whole democratic system in South America;
and Poland, as a line of defense against Russia. For Spain we must wait. "163
Once Italy had been officially included in the Anti-Comintern Pact,
Ambassador Stohrer revived Faupel's and Ribbentrop's suggestion of sign-
ing up Spain as well. 164 Stohrer also concluded a secret German-Spanish
police agreement on November 25, 1937, whereby Franco's chief of police
would send Spaniards to Berlin in order to learn from the Gestapo. 165
On the basis of Faupel's experience with Hitler, Stohrer knew he had to
wait for a suitable moment to suggest a broader public Spanish adhesion to
the Anti-Comintem Pact. The problem was how to interest a basically
disinterested Hitler in closer political ties with Spain. Inasmuch as the
Foreign Ministry assumed that Franco was going to win the war, it wanted to
use the "New Spain" along with Italy as factors antagonistic to the Anglo-
French entente. In contrast, Hitler saw little need to tie Spain to the Axis
because he still entertained the hope that Britain would remain neutral in
continental affairs. Hitler still thought Britain could be separated from
France, especially on eastern European matters, and he also did not want to
infringe on Mussolini's right to take such initiatives with Spain.
In December 1937 Stohrer promised Ernst von Weizsacker, the state
secretary and chief assistant of the German foreign minister, that he would
propose long-term plans for future German relations with Spain. 166 Stohrer
sent his proposal, which was finished in mid-February 1938, to Berlin on
March 1. 167 The German ambassador claimed that the March 1937 secret
proposal guaranteeing Spain's neutrality was not sufficient compensation to
justify continued sacrifices of German troops in the civil war. Stohrer
suggested that Germany not only get Spain to join the Anti-Comintem Pact
but also that Germany enter more actively into Spanish officer training. The
two measures would act as master counterweights to French and British
Mediterranean and North African interests.
The now anti-British Ribbentrop had become foreign minister on Feb-
ruary 4, 1938, and he brought the Stohrer-Weizsacker proposals for a
Spanish-German political tie to the forefront. Ribbentrop also had learned of
plans for Italy to lead Spain into the Anti-Comintern Pact as a check against
the democratic bloc, which included the United States. 168 With this infor-
mation from Spain and Italy, the new foreign minister prepared a case for
Hitler; the center of anti-Comintern initiatives, he argued, must remain in
Berlin, not Rome.
Early in April 1938, when it appeared that Franco would soon win the
war, the Wilhelmstrasse drew up a draft treaty, 169 based largely on the year-
old secret protocol and on Stohrer's recent suggestions. Inasmuch as Hitler
had executed the Austrian Anschluss in March without the Duce balking,
Ribbentrop recommended to Hitler a new bilateral Treaty of Friendship as a
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way of assuring the benefits of a Spanish-German military alliance without
assuming its obligations. Significantly, the foreign minister felt that the
treaty would "bind Franco closely to the Berlin-Rome Axis and assure us
that Spain would not be used by France and England as an area for military
operations or transit of troops. "170
Future political relations between Spain and Germany, and the place of
Italy in those relations, were outlined in the first four of nine articles in the
draft treaty. Articles One and Two provided that Germany and Spain would
"constantly maintain contact and consult" with each other on problems
arising out of the Communist International. Article Three provided that if
either were threatened by a third power, the other would grant it "political
and diplomatic support" to eliminate such a threat. Article Four sought to
assure the collaboration of the Italians.
On April 6 Ribbentrop submitted his draft to Hitler, who put a question
mark on the word "political" in Article Three and another question mark
beside Article Seven, which incorporated Stohrer's suggestions on officer
training. 171 After Hitler and Ribbentrop met, the only change made in the
text was to leave out the word political in Article Three. The Fuhrer also
declared that he considered a commercial treaty better than this project,
which was of little practical value (althoug~ Article Nine did provide for the
"intensification of economic relations"). He thought articles Five and Six
were useful, but they merely reinforced the benevolent neutrality obligations
of Spain under the March 1937 protocol. Hitler's verbal objections must not
have been strenuous, however, because the Foreign Ministry draft, including
Article Seven on officer training, remained basically unchanged.
In May 1938 the German embassy in San Sebastian presented the
Ribbentrop-Stohrer friendship treaty to Franco. He responded by approving
the treaty in principle but saying he had to wait until the end of the civil war
to avoid arousing British suspicions. 172 Ribbentrop did not wish to appear
eager-particularly since the Nationalist military situation had deteriorated
again-and he agreed to the delay, 173 which turned out to last almost a year.
While the deal hung fire, Hitler's preoccupation with eastern European
policy and his tendency to ignore Spain created suspicion in the Nationalist
camp. As early as March 12, 1938, after Hitler annexed Austria, the
Nationalist Foreign Ministry at Burgos drew up a policy statement on the
necessity of strict neutrality if general war broke out between the Axis and
the Anglo-French entente. 174
Hitler affronted Franco by failing to consider the dangers posed to the
Nationalists as the Czech crisis deepened. 175 From April to Septenlber, as
the matter of the Sudentenland was increasingly preoccupying Europe,
Hitler was planning Operation Green, a military conquest of Czechoslo-
vakia. At the same time, the British intervened to see if Prague's voluntary
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cession of the Sudentenland might not satisfy Hitler. The French stalled, and
Stalin vociferously recommended resistance, although militarily he hid
behind the French. A German-French war could reverse the French govern-
ment's nonintervention policy and lead to all-out backing of the Spanish
Republicans. The generalissimo claimed he had absolute knowledge of
French general staffplanning, and that, in the event ofall-out war, the French
planned to attack Spanish Morocco and perhaps Cadiz. Franco assumed that
the French would use Czechoslovakia as a pretext to take the offensive in the
Mediterranean, while the British could put pressure on Portugal and cut off
his oil. 176
Led by these considerations, Franco in tum annoyed Hitler by declaring
to French diplomats in September 1938 that Spain would be neutral if
Germany were involved in war with Britain and France. 177 This brief
Franco-Hitler rift soon disappeared, however. Both dictators won by the
September Munich Conference because it completed the isolation of the
Soviet Union. Already in the process of withdrawing its support of the
Spanish Republicans, Moscow had little further motive after Munich for
delaying Franco's victory.
Two months after the Munich meeting, Stohrer again reminded the
Spanish foreign minister, Gomez-Jordana, that Spain's adherence to the two
draft treaties-the Anti-Comintem Pact and the bilateral Treaty of Friend-
ship-would be desirable. 178 At the time, the German embassy had nearly
completed three more documents: a treaty formalizing cultural ties between
Germany and Spain; a more extensive police agreement; and, finally, a work
permit agreement for German nationals in Spain. 179 On the day of the
opening of a new offensive by Franco against Catalonia, December 23,
1938, the Spanish ambassador in Berlin informed Weizsacker, the state
secretary, that the Spanish government "was prepared to go beyond" the
March 1937 secret neutrality protocol. 180
January 1939 was the decisive month for the end of the Spanish Civil
War. The success of Franco's all-out invasion of Catalonia, his last major
offensive, caused Barcelona to fall on January 26. The time was ripe for EI
Caudillo to honor his earlier pledge to sign the two major draft treaties, in
addition to the neutrality treaty already in effect.
In anticipation of the ultimate victory, Hitler began to contemplate
bringing home the Legion Condor, and officials at the Wilhelmstrasse held a
policy meeting on January 4 with Ambassador Stohrer, who was in Berlin
for political consultations. 181 In it, the Foreign Ministry decided to endorse
Stohrer's view that the Ribbentrop-Stohrer draft of the Treaty of Friendship
should be taken out of the files, where it had remained since May 1938, and
presented anew to the Spaniards.
During the next two months, while the Germans pressured the hesitant
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Spaniards to sign the bilateral friendship treaty, efforts also were made to get
Franco's signature to the multilateral Anti-Comintern Pact. Although it had
originally been designed by Germany, the Foreign Ministry now let the
Italians take the initiative on the multilateral treaty. On January 31, the
Italian diplomatic representative San Sebastian received instructions to
proceed with getting Spain's adherence. 182 The next day Berlin authorized
Stohrer to back his Italian colleague in a joint demarche with the foot-
dragging Franco. 183
At the close of the war, on March 27, Gomez-Jordana, the Spanish
foreign minister, finally signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. 184 Four days later
in Burgos he also signed the German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship. 185 The
article in the friendship treaty aimed against "international communism"
presumably reassured Franco. 186 As it turned out, it was a past fear for
Spain, not a future threat, but Franco's "red" phobia seemed to give Hitler a
promising diplomatic lever.
This chapter has detailed the development of Hitler's interest in the
outcome of the Spanish Civil War and the turning of a liberal-capitalist
Spain-a potential friend of France and Britain-into a reactionary...fascist
Spain, a potential enemy. In part, the Spanish people, whose actions were
limited by geography and lack of economic development, served Hitler as
pawns on a bigger board. Hitler skillfully babied an egotistical Mussolini
from July 1936 to the end of the civil war to solidify the vague Axis
agreements. The Anglo-French entente, intended to counter Hitler, might be
regarded as another experiment. The term entente is a shorthand designation
for British-French relations as seen by the Axis from November 1936 to
1939. Mussolini and Hitler assumed the existence of a London-Paris tie, and
both worked to split the democracies. Yet after June 1937187 Hitler gradu-
ally relinquished hope of winning Britain to the Anti-Comintern Pact or of
splitting Paris and London.
The civil war in Spain was solidifying a divided Europe into blocs, yet
Britain resisted the trend and pressed for a renewed Western pact dubbed the
"second Locarno. "188 Mussolini in November 1936 probably saw himself as
balancing between London and Berlin while trying to isolate Paris. In
reality, Mussolini's own commitment to Franco's victory in Spain and
London's tie to Paris throughout the next two years pushed the Duce further
toward Hitler.
In Europe as a whole, the effect of the war in Spain on the balance of
power was to tip the scale more and more toward the Third Reich. Despite
limited military effort and political attention in Spain, Hitler had gained
much in Europe since July 1936. While the Spanish Civil War dragged on,
German foreign policy was able to achieve new successes in Austria and
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Czechoslovakia. Hitler's power increased in part due to political-ideological
confusion on the parts of the other Great Powers, whose politicians were
distracted by Spain's war of classes and ideologies. The British and French
governments also were paralyzed by the "communist specter," while the
Soviet Union suspected Anglo-French complicity with Axis expansion.
Hence, five Great Powers were fundamentally divided on what to do about
this diplomatic sore spot. During the Spanish Civil War, German solidarity
grew with Italy and Japan, while basic German relations with Britain
gradually deteriorated, despite British Prime Minister Chamberlain's efforts
to avoid the coming showdown. After the fall of Prague to the Nazis in the
spring of 1939, all eyes focused on Poland, where Hitler announced new
demands, and where Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, the French prime
minister, promised new support.
For player Hitler, Rome remained his first ring throughout the civil war,
while Tokyo and Spain functioned as secondary rings. By adhesion to the
Anti-Comintem Pact on March 27, 1939, and by the signed (but not yet
ratified) bilateral friendship treaty with Germany, Franco's Spain had
seemingly thrown her lot in with the Axis.
4
The Development of German
Economic Interests
German Influence Builds with HISMA, ROWAK, and SOFINDUS
In July 1936, at the start of German aid to Franco, Hitler expressly ordered
Goring to secure economic rewards. Thus, economic, rather than political or
ideological, means were used to create institutions in Spain that could, in the
long run, help Germany. The Germans immediately established a civilian
economic agency in Spain to serve as a cover-up for the German military
intervention and to begin arranging for payments by the rebels. These tasks
were undertaken by Johannes Bernhardt, one of the two German busi-
nessmen in Morocco who had carried Franco's· original appeal to Hitler.
Bernhardt owed his sudden rise to prominence primarily to the ascen...
dancy of the Nazis. Since 1933, Bernhardt had been active in the Nazi
party's foreign branch, the Auslandsorganisation, in Spanish Morocco.
After meeting with Hitler in Bayreuth, Bernhardt, who then had a modest
economic status, became in effect an employee of Goring's in Spain. 1 In
July 1936, Goring held top economic and military posts in Germany;
besides being air force chief, he was commissioner for raw materials and
foreign exchange. Bernhardt returned immediately via plane to Spanish
Morocco to set up the business end of the Moroccan transportation enter-
prise.
Not only did Bernhardt have good contacts with the Nazis in Berlin~; he
also had good relations with the rebels. In 1929 Bernhardt, with earlier
business experience in Hamburg and South America, had become a sales-
man in the firm of H. & O. Wilmer, a trading agency in Tetuan for German-
made telephones, radios, and arms, including Junkers aircraft. 2 Apparently
Bernhardt met Franco for the first time on July 21, 1936, when Franco
decided to send a personal emissary to appeal for help from Hitler. 3 Al-
though no Bernhardt-Franco ties seem to have existed prior to the revolt, the
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relatively obscure salesman did know some of Franco's rebel military
associates who had served in Africa--especially, Generals Queipo de Llano
and Aranda, and Colonel Juan Yagiie.4 Bernhardt also may have had
knowledge of the conspiracy in the spring. In any case, his access to top-
level German and Spanish military, political, and economic circles was to
serve him well in the development of a new Spanish-German trading
company.
On July 31, 1936, Bernhardt, then thirty-nine years old, and Fernando
Carranza, age sixty-t~ree, organized in Tetuan the Sociedad Hispano-Mar-
roquf de Transportes (HISMA), a trust incorporated under Spanish law and
controlled by the two men on a fifty-fifty basis. 5 Carranza's role was to give
the firm "owning" the troop transport planes legality in the eyes of the rebels.
Carranza-a retired naval officer born in EI Ferrol (Franco's birthplace), but
whose family home before the war was located in Cadiz-had been devoting
his leisure years to writing about Moroccans when the civil war broke out.
As an old friend, he was selected by Franco in July to be the silent Spanish
partner of the new joint Spanish-German company: 6 The liaison was to be a
tense one, however. Eight months later, in March 1937, the Carlist Carranza
would send a protest to Franco, disassociating himself from Bernhardt,
whom he labeled as beneath his class. Carranza accused his Nazi upstart
partner of taking pesetas out of Carranza's original share of the investment. 7
From the overall standpoint of the war this personal quarrel meant little, and
the elderly Carranza was later noted as one of the big three caciques of Cadiz
and the owner of a fishing fleet. 8 However, the protest suggests one reason
the Spaniards would come to keep Nazis at arm's length. Carranza was not
replaced, and, since he did not contribute capital or management skills to the
company, he remained a straw man in any case.
During the civil war Bernhardt built an economic empire for himself
and Nazi Germany. HISMA was originally a transportation company exer-
cising legal control over the Luftwaffe's Junker transports; under Bern-
hardt's active management, however, the company also immediately began
arranging for shipments of Spanish goods to Germany in partial payment for
the planes and the German services.
The whole question ofpayment for German arms by the rebel Spaniards
was a complicated one. At the time Franco requested aid, the insurgents
were embarrassed for funds; they had the backing of millionaires, yet the
Republican government in Madrid controlled Spain's gold reserves. Then, as
the speedy victory anticipated by Franco and the Germans failed to mate-
rialize and the Francoists increased their demands for more German eco-
nomic and military aid, the problem of mounting debts became pressing.
Credit and loans could postpone the day of payment. The alternative was
"pay as you go" by maximizing exports from Nationalist territory to Ger-
many, or by paying the Germans in "blocked" pesetas. The latter could be
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spent only in Spain and thus would commit Germany to invest in Spain's
future. 9
The Germans, however, were particular about what they would accept.
Under Hjalmar Schacht, the economics minister, they had been drastically
limiting their imports for some time. Germany also lacked gold reserves,
and the mark, fixed at an artificial value by Schacht, had little value in the
international markets dominated by the Versailles victors.
Bernhardt hoped to convince Franco to pay with some of Spain's small
amount of foreigfr exchange ("hard currency"--dollars and pounds ster-
ling), which could be used by Berlin to import vital commodities such as
petroleum from the dollar-sterling bloc .10 This method of payment was used
to some extent. For instance, Bernhardt received a cheque for £500
($2,485), which he paid to a German account in the Midland Bank of
London as early as August 14, as partial payment for the first Ju 52s. 11 Later
an employee of HISMA negotiated in Zaragoza a contract to sell nine He 51
fighters on October 17, 1936. 12 Ten percent of the purchase price was to be
paid in pounds sterling to a London bank.
From Spain itself, Goring and the Reich War Ministry mainly desired
raw materials to strengthen the Third Reich's war potential. For example,
Germany's mushrooming armed forces had to be clothed and shod; so wool,
skins, and hides were soon traveling to Germany from Spain under the
auspices of HISMA. But developed and undeveloped mines and their ores
proved to be the Spanish assets that most interested the Germans. Bernhardt
quickly made contracts with Spanish and British mining companies operat-
ing in territory held by the Spanish generals. The earliest contracts provided
for the sale of ore to HISMA in exchange for transport services for Franco's
armies. Thus, the SS Usaramo-the very ship that had carried Major
Alexander von Scheele's contingent to Spain to service the first German
planes-returned to Germany in August 1936 with a cargo of Spanish or
Moroccan copper ore. 13
With the nationalists interested in utilizing all possible means for pay-
ment, even marginal mining operations took on a new importance. On the
July trip to Bayreuth, Bernhardt had been accompanied by the Nazi AO
chief in Spanish Morocco, a mining engineer named Adolf P. Langenheim.
The AO chief had made his home in Morocco for over thirty years and had
fruitlessly attempted in the past to get certain iron mining claims recognized
by the German and Spanish governments. 14 Apparently small claims such
as Langenheim's helped account for some of the ore export from Spain to
Germany that suddenly began flourishing after July 1936.
However, the bulk of the shipments stemmed from larger and longer-
established mining complexes. The Junta de Defensa Nacional seized all
minerals in Spain as of August 28, 1936. 15 The four biggest assets pos-
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sessed thereafter by Franco's armed forces were the Compania Espanola de
Minas del Rif-iron mines in Morocco-and three British companies on the
peninsula which mined iron and copper pyrites. On October 31, 1936,
HISMA signed a contract with Rif iron mines, agreeing to take 840,000 tons
through December 31, 1937. HISMA also took over the rights of the old
contract between Altos Homos, an Urquijo company equivalent to Spain's
United States Steel Company, Bilbao, and Germany's Rohstoftbandel der
Vereinigten Stahlwerke of Dortmund. 16
Germany was very much interested in pyrite ores because they furnished
not only iron or copper but also a raw material fundamental to the nation's
vital chemical industry. This is especially significant in that German chem-
ists were one of the key explanations for the rise of Germany as a military
and commercial power from the nineteenth centulJT. Pyrites are the main
commercial source of sulfur dioxide, the basic ingredient of sulfuric acid.
Sulfuric acid is to the chemical industry what iron is to metallurgy, because
chemists use this acid in making all other acids and a great variety of other
chemical compounds. Thus, pyrites were vitally important to the German
synthetic, munition, and fertilizer industries.
In the late 1930s, nearly 90 percent of the mines producing Spanish
pyrites were in the hands of British firms. The three biggest were Rio Tinto,
employing 7,000 to 8,500 workers 17 and representing an investment of£5.5
million,18 and the Tharsis and Orconera mining companies, with pyrite
mines located mostly in Huelva Province. During the civil war, the British
management of the three pyrite complexes continued production of the ore
as usual, but the companies' earnings could not be taken out of Nationalist
Spain. 19 In May 1937, as part of its economic war against its enemies, the
Franco regime prohibited the sale of pyrites to France.20 Rio Tinto sold
instead to HISMA, because Bernhardt was behind this decree against
France. He pointed out to Franco that prewar contracts should be cancelled,
and he reminded the generalissimo that the French government was aiding
the Spanish Left, and that the French mining companies were under Jewish
influence. 21 HISMA provided the Nationalist regime with statistics show-
ing Rio Tinto deliveries to chemical plants in France, Belgium, and Czecho-
slovakia. 22 Franco, heavily dependent on HISMA's provision of German
arms, was not in a position to argue the point. British interests could not
repatriate profits to London and had to wait until after the war for repayment.
Current production was redirected to Germany. Thus Franco's decrees, in
effect, forced the British companies to grant credits enabling the Nationalist
government to buy German arms. From July 1936 to July 1938, Rio Tinto
furnished ore worth £2 million ($9.9 million) to the Nationalist authorities,
and in 1937 the company lost £300,000 ($1.5 million) on its Spanish
branch.23
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For his part, Bernhardt offered the three major British pyrite companies
"friendly" contracts and blamed their Spanish troubles on the Franco
government. 24 HISMA even tried to persuade Rio Tinto to take German
surplus coal, instead of that which normally came from Britain, as payment
for pyrites. 25
This pyrite ore and some other Spanish raw materials were purchased by
Bernhardt with notes that were then sent to the Sonderstab W account
section in Berlin for cancellation against shipments of arms and additional
goods and services. 26 Lieutenant Colonel Warlimont, who headed the
military mission to Franco from September to December 1936, originally
came from the economic staffof the Reich War Ministry. After observing the
military situation, Warlimont decided within two weeks to abandon any
economic role of the ministry, turning the economic functions of his mission
over to Bernhardt. 27 According to Bernhardt, the war ministry dropped its
economic interest after he and Warlimont went on a special mission on
September 28 to Goring's hunting lodge in East Prussia. 28 Hitler and Goring
were delighted at the news of Franco becoming chief of state; they thought
Franco's victory would assure future benefits to the Third Reich stemming
from their investment in Nationalist Spain.
Because German chemical firms could use all the pyrites HISMA could
procure, Bernhardt's profits grew. He enjoyed the middle position of supply-
ing both raw materials to German industry and Franco's needs for German
military and civilian goods.
By September and October 1936, Franco was calling for more German
credits to support the civilian. economy.29 The Nationalists needed coal
because the Asturian coal fields were controlled by the Popular Front.
Moreover, factory machinery in the insurgent zone needed replacing, and.
Franco wanted more arms supplied directly to him.
There were some attempts to bypass Bernhardt. On October 9, former
monarchist and Republican ambassador in Berlin Francisco Agramonte, a
career man, approached Hans Clodius of the economic department in the
German Foreign Ministry. Without mentioning Bernhardt, Agrarnonte
stated that the junta, now headquartered at Burgos, was concluding pyrites
contracts with Germany's number-one chemical manufacturer, I.G. Farben
at Frankfurt, and the ambassador requested that the Germans send an
economic delegation to the Nationalist Headquarters. Clodius, on behalf of
the legalistic Foreign Ministry, declined to make any agreement with a man
who represented a rebel government still not officially recognized by Hitler.
He told Agramonte that the Wilhelmstrasse first required a basic political
decision by the Fuhrer about the recognition of the junta. 30 That nod came
on November 18, partly because of the economic pressure exerted by
Bernhardt, Goring, and Franco, but the normalization of economic relations
brought up by Agramonte did not take place.
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Goring had been pushing forward the economic planning for Spain,
even before Hitler decided upon the political recognition of Burgos. Con-
ferences in October among Goring, the war minister, and the Finance
Ministry determined that the war and foreign ministries would avoid further
involvement in the Spanish project. Because of his political clout, the
problem of organizing the administration of additional Nazi economic and
military aid to Spain was handed over to Goring. 31
About this time Goring, because of German economic conditions in
general, was increasing his responsibilities in the whole field of economics.
In April 1936 he had presided over a conference of about twenty top
Germans in the economic sphere, including Schacht, the economics minis-
ter and Reichsbank president, Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, the finance
minister, and Colonel Georg Thomas of the Economic Warfare staff, among
others. These meetings continued, and out of them had come the Reich
marshal's appointment as commissioner for foreign exchange and raw
materials. 32
During July and August, Hitler himself had been thinking about broad-
ening central economic planning. He had in mind both his ideological
preference for autarky (economic self-sufficiency) and his general foreign
policy goals. 33 Richard Walther Darre, minister of food and agriculture, also
pressed for expansion of Goring's jurisdiction. After a long dispute with
Schacht, backer of big industry and traditional private capitalism, Darre
wrote Hitler on September 5 that Germany could no longer tolerate liberal
economic principles. Darre argued that Hitler should create a disciplined
"general staff' under party leader Goring in order to make Germany self-
sufficient and to establish comprehensive priorities in the economic sec-
tor. 34 Schacht, Reichsbank president since 1925, had, from Darre's point of
view, too many ties with Anglo-American finance. Hitler's solution was
labeled the Four-Year Plan, and Goring was named as its commissioner.
Ironically enough, the plan was announced publicly during an energetic
denunciation of bolshevism at the Niirnberg Party Day on September 9.
Formal implementation of the anti-liberal plan came on October 18, 1936,
as the culmination of a lengthy economic debate in Nazi inner circles.
Economically, nazism meant a partially planned economy with the
maintenance of private ownership of industry. That industry, however, was
compelled to serve party ends by preparing to fight. Commenting on
Germany's shortages of raw materials and foreign exchange, and the mean-
ing of the Four-Year Plan, Hitler said, "We are already in a state of war,
although the guns have not gone off. "35 Thus Hitler's Four-Year Plan
intensified the development of a war economy. Partly as a result of Hitler's
intervention in Spain, Germany mobilized its economy before the laissez-
faire advocates in Britain and France. The civil war in Spain speeded up the
gradual move toward autarky inherent in Hitler's economic philosophy.
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With his key positions, Goring had the ability to step into either a
"private" deal, a party operation, a military situation, or a traditional
interstate fiscal clearing problem. The fluid state of the Third Reich's
military-industrial complex, however, was causing repercussions in Spain.
The military Operation Otto, conceived first in the war ministry, took from
August 24 to September 29 to implement, apparently because the German
economy was in a state of flux. Meanwhile, Goring's comrade in Spain,
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Johannes Bernhardt, raised additional economic problems for the Berlin
party men. When Bernhardt presented Franco's demands for more military
and economic aid on credit, Goring answered the call by expanding the
infant Four-Year Plan offices. 36
To find personnel for the Spanish economic operation, he sought the aid
of Paul Komer, state secretary in the Ministry of Economics, who suggested
the creation in Germany of a new trading corporation to receive Spanish raw
materials. 37 According to Korner, setting it up would take four weeks.
Bernhardt claimed that, with the aid of party chief Rudolf Hess and the AO,
the corporation could be created in three days. Indeed, Hess did nominate
Nazi AO members with business experience in South America. Among
them were Eberhard von Jagwitz and Friedrich Bethke. Jagwitz, a major in
World War I, had lived in Argentina, was an old friend of Bernhardt, and had
worked in the AO office in Berlin for Ernst Bohle since 1934.38 Bethke was
working for a drug company in Chile and was in Berlin on vacation when he
was recruited in October for the German-Spanish operation. 39
As a result of Bernhardt's conference with Goring, on October 2, 1936,
a new government corporation was initiated under the chairmanship of
Jagwitz.4o It was given a credit of three-million reichsmarks ($1.2 million)
and the name Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft G.m.b.H.
(ROWAK).41
To provide credit to Franco and ROWAK, Goring applied to Alfred
Olscher, ministerial director of the finance ministry. In addition to his
finance post, Olscher also held a seat on the board42 of Vereinigte Industrie
Unternehmung A.G. (VIAG), a large stockholding company owned by the
finance ministry. VIAG, then the largest government-owned corporation in
Germany, held its assets in the Reichskredit Gesellschaft (RKG), the fourth-
largest banking chain in Germany, whose chairman was none other than
Olscher.43 ROWAK thus became a financial subsidiary of VIAG. Olscher, a
man who wore three hats-those of the finance ministry, VIAG, and
RKG-acquired a vital link to Bernhardt's system for extending arms on
credit to Franco (see figure 2).
ROWAK's first function was to be sole purchasing agent for the Spanish
raw materials supplied through HISMA. An administrative order (Novem-
ber 9, 1936), by the foreign exchange division of the Reich Economic
Ministry prohibited private sales or purchases in any part of Spain, except
through ROWAK.44 This laid the foundation for ROWAK's economic
power, and the monopoly company then charged all German importers
purchasing Spanish goods a commission of 2 to 3 percent. In addition, the
ROWAK director, Jagwitz, acted as sole sales agent for any German firm
exporting to Spain, and charged a commission of 3 to 5 percent on such
exports.45 Jagwitz seems to have set his fees at levels that discouraged
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German civilian sales to Spain. In this way the German military aid was
given top priority, and German activities in Spain could be controlled and
kept more secret.46
In contrast to the roadblocks put in the way of private German firms, the
ROWAK system clearly benefitted government contracts with such quasi-
private firms as Rheinmetall-Borsig, one of the biggest arms suppliers to
Spain47 and the manufacturer of the famous "eighty-eight" anti-aircraft gun.
This pattern of interlocking directorates sheds further light on the powers of
ROWAK in relation to Spain. Max Wessig headed Rheinmetall-Borsig, a
subsidiary of VIAG, and he kept the company accounts at RKG, a bank of
which he was a board member; in addition, Olscher of VIAG and RKG was
on the Rheinmetall-Borsig board. Bethke replaced Jagwitz as chairman of
ROWAK in 1938 when Jagwitz became a special ministerial director for
foreign trade in the Economics Ministry. This ministry was increasingly
being nazified from below and from above as the ambitious Goring curtailed
Reichsbank president Schacht's power. By the spring of 1938, ROWAK was
integrated within the nazified Economics Ministry.48 The relationship of
Goring and his subordinates was more feudal than military, however, so
Figure 2 is a mere snapshot from a moving scene.49 Although HISMA,
ROWAK, and Rheinmetall were different in kind from purely government or
purely private organizations, the Third Reich had, by 1936-1938, developed
what today could be called a military-industrial complex.
In Spain, HISMA developed monopoly rights similar to those exercised
by ROWAK in Germany. Had Franco been able, he probably would have
cancelled the charter of the monopoly buyer company, sold his raw materials
for the best price on the international market, and bought arms and supplies
as cheaply as possible. Instead, the generalissimo, with the exception of one
Italian tie, was forced to do his main purchasing from Bernhardt's monopo-
listic HISMA. To administer the chief of state's nonmilitary political and
economic affairs, Franco made his brother Nicolas general secretary of the"
Junta Tecnica del Estado, the Nationalist organ of government set up in
October 1936. Nicolas Franco had the primary duty of maintaining contact
with Bernhardt and Italian arms suppliers. During 1936 and the first part of
1937, Nicolas· chose the military items that needed to be ordered from
HISMA. Bernhardt then sent Franco's requests to ROWAK, which handled
the German end of the business. 50
Italy used a prewar Chilean nitrate import firm, SAFNI (Societa Fertil-
izzanti Naturali Italiani), incorporated in Rome, for its trade to Spain.51 One
of the great differences between the German and Italian economic policies,
however, was that the Italians had no real parallel to HISMA in Spain itself.
Nicolas Franco did his bargaining with the Italians in Rome. 52
The Spanish Nationalists were restive with the HISMA-ROWAK trad-
ing system, especially when Bernhardt pressed Franco for payment in
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scarce foreign exchange.53 About February 10, 1937, the Spanish junta
asked for an intergovernmental clearing and commodity agreement that
would regularize trade. 54 Bernhardt and Bethke were prepared to put up a
good fight for their one-sided monopoly. A key conference was held in
Berlin with Goring presiding, and the HISMA-ROWAK exchange system
emerged victorious: Goring refused the Spanish request for an official
clearing agreement between two equal governments. 55 Despite the rejec-
tion, Nicolas Franco continued promoting a clearing agreement as a step
toward free trade. In mid-May, Ambassador Faupel told Franco that German
aid might not be forthcoming if the Spaniards did not continue trade through
Bernhardt's system.56 The generalissimo reluctantly agreed. 57
The one German exception to the monopoly rights ofHISMA-ROWAK
was the mysterious, semi-illegal activity of Colonel Josef Veltjens. Before
the outbreak of the civil war, Veltjens had become interested in selling
German arms to the Spaniards. In fact, it is possible that some of the right-
wing conspirators contacted his agents in Spain twice--on June 17, 1936,58
and several weeks later, on July 6. 59 The evidence is too fragmentary to
prove the sweeping thesis held by some on the Left that Germans played a
secret role in starting the Spanish Civil War. If any German did provide pre-
uprfsing aid, however, Veltjens is a major contender for the role.
Veltjens, a World War I ace and friend of Goring from those days,60
joined a Freikorps in the early 1920s and the Nazi party and the Brownshirts
in 1929.61 Hitler had him expelled from the party in 1931 for corruption and
Veltjens was still on the Nazi party blacklist when the rebel coup was
attempted in 1936.62 In June, when the Spanish army conspirators were
hatching their preliminary plans, Veltjens was making his living in Berlin by
exporting arms. Possibly before, but definitely shortly after the outbreak of
the generals' coup, Veltjens developed a new personal contact with Goring,
who then protected the colonel's career against hostile elements in the Nazi
party until his death in World War 11. 63
On July 22, 1936, before Bernhardt completed his famous flight to
Hitler, the German steamship Girgenti was docked in the Spanish port of
Valencia when a dozen leftist militiamen boarded her, looking for arms. The
ship's captain repelled them by force, and the German Foreign Ministry
protested the militia action to the Madrid government.64 Soon thereafter, the
vessel was definitely chartered by Veltjens, for on August 22 it left Hamburg
loaded with weapons from the Sonderstab Wand the OKM and bound for
the Nationalist port of La Coruiia. 65 The question arises whether Veltjens
had chartered the Girgenti prior to the Spanish generals' rising for the
voyage to Valencia. 66 In any case, Veltjens also dispatched a half dozen He
51 fighters for General Mola, which were delivered at La Coruna on August
14.67
In September, Veltjens sent Mola a second load of ten million rounds of
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7.92 caliber cartridges specially made to fit Spanish weapons. 68 Then in late
1936, Veltjens joined with Henry Aschpuvis of Hamburg to form a new
shipping company managing three vessels and called the Hansagesellschaft
Aschpuvis & Veltjens. 69 Aschpuvis had a small operation before the civil
war, and the new firm's first ships were chartered. In November 1936 the
firm's steamship Urundi transported a brigade of six hundred Irish Catholic
fascist Blueshirts, headed by General Eoin O'Duffy, to Franco Spain.7o By
1938 Aschpuvis & Veltjens was building a one-million-reichsmarks office
in Hamburg. 71
The main business activity of Veltjens, however, was to perform special
transport services for HISMA, ROWAK, and the OKM.72 Veltjens spe-
cialized in the shipment of high explosives,73 and throughout the war he
continued to contract with the Nationalist government to procure the special
cartridges needed to fit Spanish weapons. 74 The bills that he charged
Franco's army were assigned to Bernhardt's HISMA for collection in Spain,
but Veltjens received for his special service valuable convertible pounds
sterling, rather than the frozen paper reichsmarks or blocked pesetas that
HISMA was piling up in Spanish banks. Veltjens apparently had this extra
power because some of his specialized arms exports required the previous
import of nickel, tungsten, and other items that required German allocation
of scarce foreign exchange.
In early 1937, Aschpuvis & Veltjens, to disguise its activities from the
Non-Intervention Committee and from the rest of the German government,
bought a French freighter, a Danish freighter, and a Swedish freighter to ship
munitions to Republican Spain.75 In the summer of 1937, Veltjens added
two more vessels to his secret fleet (which flew Panamanian flags) to
continue violating the Non-Intervention Agreement by supplying both
Spanish warring factions. By November 1938, the Reich Economics Minis-
try recorded a monthly turnover of £60,000 in foreign exchange from
Veltjens's clandestine Spanish shipping activities. 76
Still, from the standpoint of the overall magnitude ofeconomic-military
development of the Spanish Civil War, Veltjens was a secondary character in
the story. Franco's postwar debt to Veltjens, according to the German gov-
ernment, was 14.2 million RM ($5.7 million) out of a total German claim of
538 million RM ($215 million).77 For all practical purposes, Bernhardt's
,HISMA remained a monopoly. The sinister episodes linked with Veltjens
simply provided a minor break in the overwhelming rise of the ROWAK-
HISMA complex.
It can be seen, then, that HISMA's monopoly rights rested mainly on
Franco's desperate need for arms and his unrecognized international posi-
tion. International diplomacy forced Franco to give way to the monopoly's
continued existence, because only Germany and Italy were willing secretly
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to sell the Nationalists arms contrary to the embargo imposed by the Non-
Intervention Agreement.
Despite Hitler's rescue of Franco at a crucial stage of the war, the
Spanish aristocrats who surrounded Franco objected to the lowly social
origins and corrupt behavior that characterized the band of adventurers who
worked for Bernhardt. It has been noted that Carranza became totally
alienated from the company he nominally founded. Others have testified
that Bernhardt apparently had four passports,78 and a very close associate
charged him with embezzlement.79 One of HISMA's high officials had
been a street photographer a few years before the war, and others peddled
gold watches and silks to wealthy Spaniards in defiance of the exchange
regulations of the Franco government. A high Spanish military source told
the American consul at Seville: "As soon as the war is over we shall not be
slow in getting rid of the Germans: but when one's house is on fire a bucket
of water will be appreciated from anyone even if he has halitosis. "80
For some of its employees, ROWAK recruited Spanish residents in
Germany. Mostly produce and wine merchants, they had been cut out of the
middleman business by ROWAK, which now marketed all Spanish prod-
uctS. 81
In hopes of Nationalist victory, the Germans were working through their
monopoly setup to enhance Germany's eventual postwar economic position
in Spain. On February 18, 1937, Goring, as commissioner of the Four-Year
Plan, gave Bernhardt a third mission. Not only was he ordered to expand
Spanish exports to Germany and to collect foreign exchange, but also--with
an eye to the future-to increase German investment in Spain, particularly in
mining. 82 Consequently, under the terms of a July 16, 1937, secret pro-
tocol,83 the German Foreign Ministry arranged legally that part of the
Spanish war debt would be liquidated by "German commercial" activities;
in other words, HISMA's increased investment in Spain. During the civil
war Franco did pay HISMA at least 25 million RM ($10 million), which the
German company used primarily to buy up Spanish mines. 84
A HISMA subsidiary concentrating on mining investments, Montana
S.A., began operations in 1937. Assisted by geologists sent out to Spain by
another Goring subordinate, Wilhelm Keppler, state secretary for mining
under the Four-Year Plan, Montana obtained two hundred-odd claims85 on
old mines of the major minerals found in Spain, from wolfram to copper.
The property rights and mining concessions of Montana S.A. caused a long-
lasting dispute, engaging the energies ofBernhardt and Ambassador Stohrer
for nearly a year. After numerous legal skirmishes with the Franco au-
thorities, who were reluctant to allow Spanish mines in which the Spaniards
had certain legal claims to come under predominantly German control,
Montana achieved a more settled status late in 1938.86
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As Bernhardt found enterprising ways by which the Francoists could
pay for the arms and civilian necessities sold on credit, HISMA's original
function as an air transport company faded into the background. During
1937 he formed about ten subsidiary companies,8? and small-time pro-
moters went to work for them. This complex of Spanish corporations, all
organized under the banner of HISMA (a term used rather loosely), had its
original management headquarters in Seville but later moved to Salamanca
to keep in touch with the generalissimo. 88 In addition to Montana, one of the
more important subsidiaries created by Bernhardt and his associates was
called Nova S.A. Nova had a monopoly on sales of German communica-
tions and transportation equipment-and on arms imported from ROWAK.
HISMA and his other companies continued to grow, so Bernhardt
reorganized them into a holding company called SOFINDUS (Sociedad
Financiera Industrial Ltda.), incorporated in November 1938 in Lisbon and
valued at 2.5 million pesetas ($250,000).89 The old name stuck, however,
and for this reason much of the literature continued from 1939 to 1945 to
refer to HISMA, or to speak of "HISMA-SOFINDUS." As the Nationalist
troops expanded throughout the peninsula, the German monopoly opera-
tions also expanded: in 1939 they employed 260 persons, half of whom were
Spaniards, in fourteen companies engaged in fourteen types of activities-
transport, hides, mines, machinery, wine, and fruit. 9o This was not a very
large contribution to the total Spanish national output, but it was significant
in the international trading position of Spain.91 Despite occasional strained
relations between Bernhardt and the Spanish chief of state, Franco gave the
SOFINDUS director a personal gift at the end of the war of 1.4 million
pesetas ($140,000).92
SOFINDUSmaintained offices in eight Spanish cities in 1939, and, in
contrast to the other fourteen companies, confined its activities to acting as a
central foreign trade broker for German-Spanish trade. 93 Bernhardt re-
mained titular head, but he had to organize a complicated interlocking
directorate. For instance, Christopher Fiessler, a resident of Seville and
friend of Bernhardt, was appointed president of HISMA (overseas trans-
port), president of PRODAG (agricultural export), member of the board of
directors of Minerales de Espana (ore export), and attorney for SOFINDUS
(finance and central organization).
In late 1938 Goring made another change when he promoted the former
ROWAK chief, Jagwitz, to the post of state secretary in the Economics
Ministry. The promotion came as part of a general shake-up involving the
gradual decline in power of Schacht as minister of economics and his
replacement by a Goring appointee. Party man Jagwitz was placed in charge
offoreign trade, and his assistant, Bethke, also a former director ofROWAK,
became ministerial director under him in a special section. ROWAK was
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Table 1. Effect of Spanish Civil War on Exports of Pyrites and Iron Ore
(in Thousands of Tons)
To 1935 1936 1937 1938
Iron Orea
Germany 1,321.0 1,067.0 302.0b 1,083.0b
Great Britain 1,129.0 1,186.0 938.0 510.0
Pyrites
Germany 563.0 404.0 836.0 896.0
Great Britain 205.0 198.0 290.0 326.0
France 342.0 99.0 1.5
Source: LG. Farben Yo. Wi. Abt, "Der spanische Aussenhandel," Frankfurt a.M.
to OKW/WI RU Amt, 18 Apr. 1940 (Misc. Germ. Rec., 243/1958110-58, frames
26-27, 53-54.
alron ore from Spanish Morocco not included.
bThe change between 1937 and 1938 reflects the fall of Viscaya Province, the
largest iron-ore-producing province in Spain, to Franco in June 1937.
nominally taken over by another minor party man from South America by
the name of Anton Wahle,94 but Bethke retained in the special section the
real decision-making power of ROWAK.
By early 1939, various Germans were expressing a good deal of
discontent with HISMA-SOFINDUS. The old prewar German companies
with business in Spain accused Bernhardt of mismanagement, since many'
of the mining claims had proved unworkable and a number of subsidiaries
were operating at a loss.95 The fact remained, however, that German eco-
nomic interests as a whole had greatly expanded their proportion of Spain's
trade in certain vital products. At the end of 1935, 35 percent of Spanish
exports of iron ore, pyrites, wool, and skins had gone to Germany. By the
end of 1939, 80 percent of these products went to Germany.96 The gain in
Germany's position as a Spanish importer was particularly significant when
measured in terms of pyrite sales. Although total exports from Spain to the
industrial powers had decreased, Germany had gained a larger share of those
exports still available, as compared to Britain and France. Furthermore,
much of the increased importance of German-Spanish trade was achieved at
the expense of Germany's major international rival, France (see table 1).
HISMA obtained ore not only from the mainland of Spain but also, as
previously noted, from the protectorate of Spanish Morocco. The major iron
ore mines there were the Rif mines. Bernhardt had complained in early 1937
that the company's finance had Jewish and British strings attached to it;97
yet, despite his suspicions, the company had exported most of its ore to
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Table 2. Annual Export of Iron Ore from Spanish Morocco, 1936-1938
(in Kilograms)
To 1936 1937 1938
Germany 592,281,950 802,343,572 742,401,536
Great Britain 191,180,250 182,735,525 163,895,775
Hollanda 96,379,860 245,291,070 7,551,600
France 64,983,125
Italy 6,191,500 146,703,025 397,495,975
Source: Spain, Ministerio de Industria y Comercio, Estadfstica Minera y
Metalurgica de Espana, 1942,860.
aMuch of this ore was reexported to German~
Germany before the war. In 1936, the Third Reich bought 503,000 tons of
Rifiron ore out of a total of986,000 tons exported. 98 Bernhardt negotiated a
new contract between Rif mines and himself in October 1936 so as to raise
the German share of the exports to 840,000 tons for the following year. 99
Bernhardt's overall success in obtaining iron ore from Morocco can be seen
in table 2.
In Tables 3 and 4, the reader can observe the general ascent of HISMA
during the whole civil war period. The total value of exports from Nation-
alist Spain to ROWAK was 224. million RM ($90 million). The total value of
German manufactures and coal imported for Spain's civilian and war needs
was 125.1 million RM ($50 million). The difference went to pay for arms in
the state account. Besides this $40 million, the Germans held additional
bills for arms sold in blocked pesetas. In all, they claimed a grand total of
$215 million of Nationalist war debts owed to them.
The economic role of the Italians in Spain differed markedly from the
German role-there were few gains in Spain for Italy, other than Morroccan
iron ore (table 2). Before the civil war, Spanish exports to Italy were
relatively small. Temporarily, at least, Spain increased its exports to Italy
from 44.4 million lire ($3.2 million) in 1936 to 177 million lire ($9.2
million) in 1938. 100 In the long run, economic relations were to remain
poor, however, because these exports repaid little of the Italian military
effort. The Italian and Spanish economies were too similar. Both countries
exported citrus fruits, pyrites, sulfur, and mercury, and both needed wheat,
coal, and oil.
The Spanish Civil War proved a tremendous drain on the Italian econo-
my, for the Duce's country was no great economic power. 101 From July 1936
to the end of November, the British-owned mine Rio Tinto sent Italy only
one small cargo vessel of pyrites. 102 It was not until May 1938, after
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Germany obtained an amortization agreement with Franco, that Italy ob-
tained a similar agreement. 103 Although Italy sent more arms to the Nation-
alist Spaniards than Germany did, the Burgos government continued to
export more to Germany than to Italy. Spain exported to the two Axis powers
in ratios that favored the Reich 3 to 1 for 1936, 9 to 1 for 1937, and 2.7 to 1
for 1938. 104 The real economic significance of the Spanish Civil War for
Mussolini was that Italy had somewhat exhausted itself by 1939, which
probably helped delay the Duce's entry into the Anglo-French war with
Germany for another nine months. 105
The prewar situation in which Britain, America, and France predomi-
nated in the Spanish economy altered considerably as a result of the civil
war. France had supported the loser by permitting International Brigaders
and supplies to cross French territory on the way to Loyalist Spain. Britain
and the United States remained largely neutral, while Germany had backed
the winner-Nationalist Spain. These political and military facts made their
impact economically. Though all countries lost absolutely because of the
destruction wrought by war, the Germans gained a larger share of the fewer
products Spain had for export, relative to Britain and France. 106
In the peacetime year of 1935, every country had tried to maximize its
own exports, but, by the time of growing international tension in 1938,
Britain and Germany were more and more interested in planning for block-
ades and blockade-breaking. Under the new conditions, the Axis and the
Anglo-French entente increased their interest in obtaining the raw materials
of Spain. By 1939 Nazi Germany was Nationalist Spain's primary trading
partner in both exports and imports, having overtaken both the United States
and Britain in relative importance of trade with Spain, compared to 1935.
Meanwhile, the "New Spain" had imposed a near embargo against France.
Comparing table 5 with the situation in 1935, one notes that the total for
Spanish exports to the four most significant economic powers actually in-
creased, from 40 million gold dollars to 46 million. 10? But a significant
amount of exports available shifted from France to Germany. In 1935 France
obtained 8.5 million gold dollars in Spanish exports; in 1938, only 3
million. Germany in 1935 obtained $9.2 million, compared to $22 million
in 1938, when the Third Reich obtained almost half of the Spanish exports
available.
Whether Germany's gain in percentage of Spain's available exports
would be permanent, however, remained in question. The Germans were not
satisfied with current gains alone. The rise of the Reich as the number-one
foreign trading influence in Spain resulted from the temporary condition of
civil war, and the Germans in March 1939 wanted long-term legal protection
of this increased trade by treaty rights. 108 They also wanted Spain to cut back
Anglo-French investment and to increase the German investment.
Table 3. Total Value of HISMA Exports, September 1936 to 31 December 1939 (in Reichsmarks)
QC
QC
Sources: HISMA, Ltd., "Statistical Report" (Madrid, Dec. 1939), pp. 10-12; unpublished set of tables, original c/o Herbert R.
Southworth, Ruedo Iberico, Paris; photocopy in author's possession.
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Germany Pushes lrading Concessions and Damage Claims
At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, German and Spanish traders were
guided by a comprehensive commercial treaty concluded between their two
countries on May 7, 1926. 109 When the full extent of the Italian military aid
to Franco became apparent in the first half of January 1937, the charge,
Faupel, suggested to Berlin that it would be in the German interest to
conclude economic negotiations before German political influence fell to
second place. 110 Hitler directed that this suggestion be acted on as soon as
possible. 111
In February 1937 the Germans, taking advantage of their military aid to
Franco, submitted a draft agreement of six articles amending the 1926 treaty.
The German Foreign Ministry hoped to reduce the existing discriminations
by obtaining from Spain most-favored-nation tariffs toward Germany, as
well as most-favored-nation treatment for German ships and citizens visiting
Spanish ports. 112 The Spaniards did not hurry to conclude the agreement.
On July 8, 1937, Faupel protested the delay in signing his proposed econom-
ic agreement, which he claimed had been "long since worked OUt."113 The
German ambassador also complained of Spanish intrigues against the
HISMA-ROWAK barter system.
Within a week, the public economic treaty and three secret protocols
were signed in Burgos. 114 By the secret protocol of July 12, the Spaniards
and Germans postponed comprehensive economic negotiations until the
end of the war, while, in a second protocol of July 15, they merely agreed to
maximize current trade. 115 In actuality, these agreements were simply
Spanish promises to extend better terms of trade to German merchants after
the war ended.
Later, ROWAK concluded a semi-private ~ontract with Spanish mer-
chants in Guinea for okume wood, used in making plywood for building
planes. The Germans wanted to buy all the wood the colony could supply,
while the Spaniards wanted to reserve some for Italy. The Germans also were
interested in obtaining a three-year contract in the spring of 1938. 116 After
long negotiations, on December 6, 1938, the Spanish ambassador, Antonio
Magaz, signed a special okume protocol with ROWAK, providing sixty-
thousand tons for the German market for 1939, and another sixty-thousand
tons for 1940; included was an agreement that, if for "technical reasons" the
Spaniards could not deliver the wood, they were not to deliver it to third
countries but only to Spain itself. 117 This treaty indicates that the Germans
were thinking of the post-civil-war economic situation in Spain in relation to
a wider European conflict.
In addition to difficulties on trade and tariffs, there was a problem of
prewar commercial debts. By 1936 Spain had accumulated a balance-of-
payments surplus of $12 million against Germany through the expenditures
























Sources: HISMA, Ltd., "Statistical Report" (Madrid, Dec. 1939), pp. 10-12; unpublished set of tables, original c/o Herbert R.
Southworth, Ruedo Iberico, Paris; photocopy in author's possession.
aStatistics begin in October.
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Great Britain 12 16
United States 7 5
France 6 3
Total 44 46
Source: Marion Einhorn: "Die okonomischen Hintergriinde derfaschistischen Inter-
vention in Spanien 1936-1937 (Berlin, 1962), citing Nachrichtenfiir Aussenhandel, 9
July 1940.
of German tourists in Spain and Spanish loans to the Weimar Republic. 118
Normal operation of the Spanish Foreign Exchange Office became impossi-
ble after July 1936, owing to wartime disruptions. After Hitler recognized
the Burgos government in November 1936, Franco attempted to spend
Spain's accumulated prewar bank balance in Germany. Officials of the
Banco de Espana who had fled to Nationalist territory approached the
Reichsbank, suggesting the possibility of drawing out one million RM
($400,000) in Spanish credits for the rebel war effort. On December 3,
1936, however, all funds in both countries were officially frozen. 119 The
German bank postponed the question of the prewar accounts until the end of
the civil war and the signing of a comprehensive commercial treaty. 120
This move was linked with another important economic question be-
tween Germany and Spain: the claims of German private citizens who lost
property in the Spanish Civil War. These claims explain why the Reichsbank
would not hand over to Franco the surplus accumulated in Spain's "invis-
ible" capital account since the 1920s. The Germans wanted to see how the
overall economic costs of the war would fall, because, if the republic won,
they did not want to be liable twice. Some thirteen thousand expatriate
Germans in Spain had been forced to flee their homes and businesses in
Republican territory because of anti-German feeling aroused by Hitler's aid
to Franco and by the general anti-fascist and anti-Nazi propaganda put out
by the Left since Hitler's coming to power in 1933. Most of the investment
of the Third Reich was located in the Republican-held industrial centers of
Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao, and Valencia. Assuming 100-percent loss, these
claims amounted to 160 million RM ($64 million) as tabulated by the AO of
the Nazi party in August 1937; of this, 90 million RM ($36 million) as-
sumed a total write-off for property of the Germans who had fled. The
remaining 70 million RM ($28 million) covered inventories that had been
92 Hitler and Spain
delivered in 1935 and early 1936 by German exporters on normal short-term
business credit but that was still unpaid because of wartime disruption. 121
Early in the civil war, Olscher, ministerial director in the Finance
Ministry, held the view that the Reich must avoid accepting responsibility for
bringing suit against the Franco government on behalf of German cit-
izens. 122 He cited the precedent of the Russian Revolution and said claims
for property damage should be postponed. It will be recalled that Olscher
had been instrumental in the creation of ROWAK, which was dependent
upon the Finance Ministry for credits, and that he held an interest in
Rheinmetall-Borsig, the firm supplying much of Franco's artillery. For
Olscher, of course, the interests of ROWAK and Rheinmetall-Borsig could
only be jeopardized if bringing petty claims from prewar commerce against
Franco's government created "bad blood."
On the other hand, the AO leadership in Berlin, while agreeing with
Olscher that claims should be postponed until the end of the war, busied
themselves collecting information about German losses in Spain. Alfred
Hess (brother of the celebrated Rudolf)-who acted as an assistant of the
AO chief, Ernst Bohle-pressed for this action. 123 In mid-1937, therefore,
the AO created the Hilfsausschuss fur die Spanien-Deutschen, a committee
that handled relief and listened to and recorded the complaints and claims of
German refugees from Spain. 124 Rudolf Hess, deputy to the Fuhrer and
head of Nazi party administration and patronage, told the newly appointed
Ambassador Stohrer to take up these claims with Franco. 125 On October 24,
1937, Franco declared to Stohrer that he was willing to accept responsibility
for damages in principle, and he suggested establishment of a mixed claims
commission.
At the beginning of 1938 an agent of the German Relief Committee, a
unit of the AO, went to Spain to gather further information on the commer-
cial claims. 126 Somebody in the Finance Ministry, possibly Olscher, con-
ferred with the Nazi claims investigator before his departure, warning him
not to support the business claims at that time. The Finance Ministry argued
that this would only ruin the Reich's reconstruction opportunities, while, if
German businessmen were permitted to return to SpaiQ, they would have
nothing to import or sell anyway. 127 The Relief Committee thought, at least
temporarily, that the advice was sound; hence, it did little to support the
German refugees after its agent got to Spain.
Still, some four thousand claims that had been filed with the Relief
Committee in the summer of 1937 were rigorously investigated by cross-
checking with party personnel in Spain. 128 After the German union with
Austria in March 1938, the claims of a few Austrians were also consid-
ered,129 but the AO automatically excluded German Jews living in Spain
because of "their responsibility for the outbreak of war. "130 Because of Nazi
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race theory, Jews were not considered worthy of ordinary German legal
protection. Goebbels promoted the line by delivering inflammatory
speeches at Niirnberg rallies in the autumn of 1937, blaming the entire
Spanish Civil War on "Jewish bolshevism."
Because of tariffs, shipping rebates, frozen prewar capital accounts, war
damages, and HISMA-ROWAK's growing war debt, the Germans, early in
the civil war, had accepted the Spanish Nationalist argument that no com-
prehensive economic negotiations could take place under wartime condi-
tions. The Wilhelmstrasse had decided to postpone pressing for a new treaty
to replace the one of May 1926 until after the war. The July 1937 agree-
ments131 merely gave Nazi Germany first option on contracts (as opposed to
Britain, France, and the United States) to reconstruct New Spain's econom~
When Nationalist forces split the Republican territory and reached the
Mediterranean in April 1938, Berlin assumed that Franco was bringing the
Spanish war to a close. Hitler thought immediately that the time was right to
conclude an economic treaty. 132 Shortly afterwards, however, he learned
that Republican resistance was still strong and shelved the idea of negotia-
tions. It did not arise again until January 1939, when Franco was overrun-
ning Catalonia. 133
As a result of Hitler's intervention and military aid to Franco, Nazi party
people were able to secure new economic influence in Spain through the rise
of Bernhardt's HISMA-SOFINDUS. For example, the Nazi military-indus-
trial complex invested $8 million in five mining companies, 134 and Spanish
pyrites exports to Germany increased from 563,000 tons in 1935 to 896,000
tons in 1938. By January 1939, almost 50 percent of Franco's foreign trade
went to and from Germany. Moreover, the destructive nature and long
duration of the war, as well as Franco's political outlook, seemingly por-
tended a revolution in Spain's foreign economic policy. The Nationalist
government spoke vaguely of autarky135 and denounced the traditional
liberal capitalistic Anglo-French influence in Spain.
The Nazis entertained great hopes that a Falangist Spain would cement
close ties with them after the civil war. The problem for the Third Reich in
1939 was whether the recently won trading position in Spain would prove to
be truly permanent, or whether American, British, and French capitalists
would recover their former influence. Even with the increased investments
of SOFINDUS, the prewar British ($194 million), French ($135 million),
and American ($80 million)136 capital could be more important in the
Spanish economy ifFranco chose to recognize their claims, because the new
German total was only $46 million-$36 million in old investments plus
$10 million for SOFINDUS.
If ROWAK were to claim the entire $215 million that Spain137 owed for
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the services of the Legion Condor and the Sonderstab W, however, that
would be a formidable investment in relation to the traditional economic
power of the liberal capitalist bloc prior to the civil war.
In 1936, Hitler assumed that German economic gains in Spain would be
valuable for their own sake. When he dispatched his first planes, he believed
their cost would be paid for by the Nationalist movement. During the war, he
granted Spain as an economic fief to Goring through the Four-Year Plan,
HISMA, and ROWAK. That fief, Hitler believed, could playa real role in his
evolving plans for expansion in eastern Europe.
5
The Place of Spain
in German War Plans
The Mysterious Admiral Canaris Deals with Spain
Responsibility for Hitler's actions in the Spanish Civil War has sometimes
been laid upon Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Hitler's chief of military intel-
ligence. I Through his twenty-year history of activity in Spain, Canaris was
the officer in the German War Ministry with the best contacts in that country
when the civil war began.
Canaris remains one of the controversial figures of recent German
history, not only because of his "cloak and dagger" operations, but because
of his eventual opposition to Hitler. Jailed. shortly after the failure of an
attempt to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, the admiral was executed by the
Nazis in April 1945.
The best-known biographers of the Abwehr chief have not satisfactorily
explained the beginnings nor the extent of his opposition to Hitler. The first
unambiguous evidence of Canaris's opposition to Hitler's foreign policy
does not occur until August 27, 1938, when Canaris recommended that
Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudentenland Nazis, inform the Fuhrer of his
inclinations against war with Britain. 2 Almost a year later, on July 22, 1939,
Canaris warned the Italians-who at that point were also reluctant to fight
Britain and France-that Hitler was determined to bring on a general war,
despite the unpreparedness of the German armed forces. 3 Here the docu-
mentation is even clearer, because Canaris told an Italian military intel-
ligence officer that he opposed -a German war with Britain.
On the other hand, in 1935, according to all documents, the master spy
seems to have been devoted to Hitler.4 In the 1920s and early 1930s, Canaris
had welcomed nazism as an answer to communism5--communism proba-
bly meaning social revolution or socialization of property. After his promo-
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tion in January 1935 to Abwehr chief, he definitely supported the effort to
conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. 6
In the context of Hitler's Spanish gambit, an important question
arises-whether Canaris played a key role in German decisions concerning
the Spanish Civil War. When Canaris's name appears in the documents
during the 1936-1939 period, he is collecting information or carrying out
orders, not making polic~ Nonetheless, his influence on German policy
cannot be dismissed. Regardless of the conflicting interpretations of his
behavior, the head of German military intelligence had strong ties to a
conservative-reactionary Spain. Canaris thought like a conservative-reac-
tionary Prussian of the 1920s, a group that showed its latent power again in
the July 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler.
Shortly after the July 1936 Spanish uprising, Canaris's old friends in
Spain held important offices: General Severiano Martinez Anido became
Franco's police chief, and Colonel Alfredo Kindelan headed the air force.
From Canaris's viewpoint, therefore, the 1936 rebellion was simply to
restore the old order in Spain, after the leftist politicians from 1931 to July
1936 had placed obstacles in the path of German long-range naval plan-
ning. 7
The historian must ask whether the admiral actively encouraged the
July 1936 uprising,8 as three of his hagiographers claim.9 A British Marxist
journalist, for whom Canaris was a villain, believed in 1938 that Hitler's
military intelligence chief had taken the initiative in advising Spanish
intervention. 10 Some circumstantial evidence suggests that this interpreta-
tion may be correct, because as early as 1933 the Abwehr had "businessmen
spies" observing "communist" activities in Spain. 11 But what do these
terms spies and Communists really mean?
Actually, Canaris organized three types of agents. First, there were
regular personnel in the army and navy who did espionage work. Second,
there were the part-time spy-patriots--Germans living abroad who worked
in business, industry, or shipping (sometimes with reserve commissions),
and who volunteered part-time information. Third, Canaris had lined up the
Etappendienst, a clandestine service to supply German vessels, especially
submarines, with oil, ship's stores, and docking facilities in the event of war
with France. 12 Altogether, Canaris ha<:l perhaps fifty full-time or part-time
agents in Spain on the eve of the war in 1936. 13
As to communism, Canaris personally had a fanatical hatred and fear of
social revolution, dating at least from Germany's troubles following World
War I. In fact, he had served on the court martial that exonerated the
murderers of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, 14· for which he was
much maligned by the German Communist party in the public press. Further
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strengthening his ultra-conservative views on social questions was his
family background and marriage into great wealth. 15 He thought more like
Franco than like Hitler, Goring, or Faupel.
The extent of Abwehr involvement in events during the decisive first
three weeks of the civil war poses a complex question. According to the
testimony of an Abwehr officer captured by the Soviets at the end of World
War II, Canaris had an agent named Edmond Niemann in the Canary Islands
on July 17, 1936, who made contact with Franco from the very beginning.
Niemann supposedly flew with Franco to Tetuan and brought in veteran
Nazis Langenheim and Bernhardt to see Franco, then to carry the decisive
messages for Hitler and Goring. After the German businessmen's tri-
umphant return, Langenheim became the head Abwehr agent for Spanish
Morocco. 16
On the basis of surviving documentation and Bernhardt's testimony,
however, Spanish historian Angel Vinas and German historian Hans-Hen-
ning Abendroth have discounted this story. 17 At least Bernhardt, who made
the flight, stated that he never saw Canaris at Bayreuth on July 25-26.
Neither Bernhardt nor his biographers mention Niemann, and Bernhardt
claimed Langenheim was too old to play an active role in espionage. 18
Bernhardt said his real objection was that, unlike himself, Langenheim was
not as enthusiastic for nazism or for Franco's rebellion. 19 Nevertheless,
Langenheim did have three sons, two of whom worked with him in Morocco
for the Abwehr, with the third on Ribbentrop's staff. 2o Furthermore, ignor-
inghis age, both British and French intelligence reported as late as 1940 that
Langenheim was one of the top three German agents in Spanish Morocco,21
while the French had suspected him for years. Given the Abwehr's extensive
network of "businessmen spies," it is possible, although not proven, that
Langenheim and even Bernhardt were reporting to Canaris in July 1936.
The three biographers of the Right seem to base their belief that Canaris
was present when Hitler decided to intervene in Spain on a Foreign Ministry
document stating that "an admiral" was at Bayreuth along with Goring and
Blomberg. 22 A naval document, however, names Rear Admiral Eugen
Lindau of the Kriegsmarine Dienststelle (naval coordinator of merchant
shipping) as present at Bayreuth and says nothing about Canaris. 23
Yet there is still further evidence that Canaris could have known 'all
about the Bernhardt mission. Bernhardt, before going to Bayreuth, asked
Ernst Bohle, his party chief in Berlin, to present Franco's letter to Hitler.
Bohle had never met Bernhardt, and he regarded Franco as an uncertainty.
He communicated the story to SS Obergruppenfiihrer (General) Wilhelm
Bruckner, Hitler's SS adjutant, who gave permission for Bernhardt to go on
to Bayreuth.24 Bruckner may very well have consulted the Abwehr. In any
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case, when Bernhardt spoke to Hitler, Bruckner brought in a detailed dossier
on Spain, so that a well-prepared Hitler had already been thinking of the
Spanish question before Bernhardt's arriva1. 25
In any event, it is likely that Hitler got advice from Canaris on Spain,
even if the elusive admiral did not attend the Bayreuth conference in person.
General Rudolf Bamler, who worked as chief of Abwehr Department III
(counterespionage), testified after World War II that Canaris persuaded
Hitler to aid Franco primarily through Goring and, secondarily, through
Ribbentrop and Himmler. 26 Goring, in part, confirmed this testimony at the
Nurnberg Trials. 27
Erhard Milch, the state secretary, has said that the Bernhardt party
(possibly including Spanish officers and Langenheim) first went to Canaris
in Berlin on July 24-25,28 before Bernhardt and the Franco messengers went
on to Bayreuth. In Milch's opinion, the Abwehr chief was too cautious to
make any decision, but it is certain that Blomberg and Milch then appealed
through Bohle and Hess to authorize the Spanish party to see Hitler in
Bayreuth. Goring later contacted Milch on Sunday, July 26, after Hitler
decided to send Franco aid. 29 Milch's story confirms Bamler's and Goring's
estimates of Canaris's character-namely, that he worked very indirectly,
and that he was not likely to give Hitler advice that the Fuhrer did not want to
hear.
Nevertheless, Milch's account supports some kind of role for Canaris in
Hitler's original decision to intervene in Spain. Recent historians have "over-
revised" the exaggerated role assigned to Canaris by earlier writers of the
Right. The newer works dismiss Canaris as unimportant in initiating Ger-
man intervention, but they have ignored the question ofjust exactly what the
intelligence chief was doing during the vital days July 17 to July 25.
Our knowledge of the events from July 17 to the end of the month
depends, in large measure, on the sketchy memoirs recorded by Nazis and
Spanish Nationalists, mostly after April 1939. One memoir implies that
General Mola, conspirator in Navarre, had made contact with Canaris by
July 12 or 13.30 If Canaris had been in touch with rightist leaders such as
Mola, Jose Sanjurjo, or Jose Gil Robles, between February and July 1936,
then the admiral was well aware of a possible army revolt in Spain. Because
of the death of Sanjurjo on July 20, however, it may be that Canaris had bet
on the wrong man. According to Bamler, Canaris had long known Franco
but had a poor opinion of the general at the outbreak of the civil war. Canaris
hoped that General Martinez Anido, his acquaintance since the 1920s,
would take over after the death of Sanjurjo.31 Martinez Anido had achieved
considerable notoriety for his bloody suppression of the Barcelona unions in
1920 and later in his position as minister of interior in charge of the
repressive Civil Guards under General Miguel Primo de Rivera. If the
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reports about Canaris's contacts with the Spanish rightists other than Franco
before July 1936 are correct,32 this may explain why arms salesman
Bernhardt and the Nazi party became so involved. It was Franco who
nominated Bernhardt.
In conclusion, Canaris did advise Hitler somehow in July 1936. He
undoubtedly counseled tactical caution, but he may have backed Hitler's
own resolve. Messages from Spain, July 17-25, reached the Abwehr in
Germany through the German military attache in Paris. 33 Also, on about
July 25 or 26, the self-appointed rebel "ambassador" in Paris, Count Jose
Quinones de Leon, sent his secretary to Berlin to appeal for arms for Mola.
In Berlin, Mola's messenger was joined by another Mola agent on July 28,
just after Hitler had already agreed to send planes to Franco. Both of Mola's
representatives met with Canaris in Berlin, and they regarded him as their
principal advocate. However, Count Welczeck-at that time ambassador to
Paris after ten years' service in Madrid-was well informed about these two
Mola emissaries and opposed their going to Berlin. He feared that any
German aid to the Spanish rebels could complicate relations with France,
while the disunited rebels probably would not win. 34 Welczeck may have
warned Canaris to be cautious, but-with the French cabinet's reversal, on
the night of July 25, of their earlier decision to back the Republicans-both
Welczeck and Canaris had less reason for worry that France would fully
back the Spanish Republic.
To Bernhardt, late on the night of July 25, Hitler appeared to have, the
latest information on the Spanish crisis and to be well informed, despite the
very confused unfolding of the plots. The FUhrer already was consulting a
dossier on Spain, and by this date the general lines of the Spanish events
certainly did not pose much of a mystery to Canaris. 35
The most likely explanation of Canaris's behavior during the first week
of the civil war is that he was concentrating on reactions in Paris36 and
Rome. In any case, Canaris definitely discussed Spain with top Italians on
August 4 and August 26-28. Like his Italian counterpart, General Roatta,
Canaris went immediately to Spain; unlike Roatta, his stay was brief. During
August, he received news of Spanish events mostly through insurgent agents
in Paris and Lisbon, in addition to his own brief trip to Seville. 37 He
apparently met with Franco and German military advisor Colonel Warli-
mont once or twice in September. 38 Certainly Canaris traveled to Spain in
late October with the news that the Legion Condor was being sent. 39 It is
also documented that he attended the December 6 conference in Rome on
stepping-up ground support for Franco;4o the Abwehr chief, like Hitler at
that time, wanted Mussolini to maximize Italian participation, while Ger-
man aid was being minimized.
In 1937 Canaris made at least three trips to Spain.41 He reported on
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Franco's disagreement with General Sperrle42 over the slow pace of the war,
and probably on the feud between Sperrle and Ambassador Faupel as well.
In July 1937 Canaris told Franco's operations chief that Goring's group
wanted to win the war, and that he was working in Berlin to obtain more
material for Franco. Canaris also assured the Spanish Caudillo of his
heartfelt sympathy for the Nationalist cause, his appreciation of Franco's
performance, and that his report to Berlin would make more aid forthcom-
ing. The German intelligence chief then requested that the Russian prisoners
whom the rebel armies had captured be turned over to the Germans; Franco
agreed. Next, Canaris asked that the Nationalists send all the information
they had on French Morocco. Lastly, the intelligence chief recommended
that the Caudillo employ in the Nationalist movement his old friend in
Spain, an associate of shipbuilder Horacio Echevarietta, Naval Captain
Daniel Araoz, the Baron de Sacro Lirio. 43 The baron became a personal
advisor to Franco on aviation matters and a director of civil aviation.44
Canaris made at least three trips to Spain in 1938, one of which resulted
in diplomatic activity to tie Spain politically to Germany.45 The Abwehr
chief also inspected the military situation in Spain; as a result, reinforce-
ments were sent to the Legion Condor after a long halt in aid. At the end of
the war, in April 1939, Canaris pressed Franco to publicize Spain's attach-
ment to the Axis through the signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact.46 Then
in July 1939 he was in Spain preparing the ground for Abwehr operations
during a possible future war with the West.47
Despite the Abwehr chief's obvious activity and personal influence, his
aims still remain somewhat mysterious. Apparently Hitler trusted Canaris.
The Fuhrer was a born talker and Canaris, a born listener.48 Canaris's
reactionary social philosophy could easily explain his support for Hitler's
experiment in Spain. But Canaris's philosophy could also militate against
Hitler once it became clear that the Fuhrer was willing to risk war with a
conservative British Empire. He differed with Hitler by August 1938 on the
eve of the Sudentenland crisis, and again in the summer of 1939, simply
because Canaris feared that Germany would lose a naval war with Britain.
Canaris's opposition to France was more important than either his long-
standing connections and romantic affinity with the Spanish Right or his
desire to crush a suspected social revolution, Communist or otherwise. As
an intelligence officer, Canaris had 35 agents in France in 1935, 153 by
1937, and 274 by 1938.49 As a naval officer, he had joined in planning war
games in which Spanish sea bases were to play a role against France.5o In
fact, the major objective of the German navy from 1919 to the outbreak of
the civil war in Spain was preparation for a naval war with France and
Poland. Canaris believed that, to win such a war, the United States and Great
Britain would have to remain neutral. In 1935 the German navy, like Hitler,
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wanted an Italian alliance, or at least benevolent neutrality, to weaken French
naval power in the Mediterranean. Therefore, when Hitler received Franco's
appeal at Bayreuth, neither Hitler nor the navy needed great persuasion to
aid Franco; they had the same interest-to weaken French seapower by
backing the ambitions of Mussolini and Franco, assuming a quick rebel
military victory.
In addition, Spain could prove useful for German strategy in the event of
a land war with France. The U. S. military attache in Berlin reported, in the
first weeks of the civil war, that the threat posed by a fascist Spain could
mean the removal of six French divisions from the German frontier. 51 To
Canaris, then, as to Hitler and others, Spain was a means to a larger end, just
as it had been in World War I.
According to a conservative confidant of Canaris, the Abwehr chief
supported Hitler's Spanish policy throughout the civil war on military and
conservative social grounds; but, at the same time he opposed Hitler at home
on moral grounds. 52 Yet Canaris's moral reservations led to no overt action,
as, for example during the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis of February 1938, when
Hitler purged the Prussian army leadership and installed his minion, Gener-
al Wilhelm Keitel. Further, opposition to the possibility of a British war was
not equivalent to sabotage of the Nazi regime. The master spy's prime
resistance to Hitler, from 1939 to 1944, consisted in tolerating one of
Hitler's real opponents, Major General Hans Oster, within the Abwehr
organization-but Oster played no role in Spain. Canaris, a fascinating and
enigmatic figure who flitted in and out of the Spanish story, remains in the
end as mysterious as ever. The admiral's influence on the Spanish issue may
have been his greatest role.
The Legion Condor Performs in Spain
Military history and the way battles are won or lost influence diplomats and
politicians in guessing about the future balance of power. Military victories
create a bandwagon effect politically. Hitler directly contributed to Franco's
military victory on land, sea, and air. Hitler's first aid, Operation
Feuerzauber, flew 13,523 Spanish and Moroccan infantrymen53 across the
Straits of Gibraltar to Seville when they were most needed by the rebels-
between July 29 and October 11, 1936. This was the first successful large-
scale airlift in history. Because Franco had only five signal officers at the
beginning of the war, the initial aid of German communications equipment
and technicians was also important. 54 These were mostly sent during
Hitler's second stage of military intervention, Operation Otto.
By November Hitler was dispatching to Spain the Legion Condor,
which attained a maximum strength of 5,600 men and from 140 to 150
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planes55 that were vital to a Nationalist victory. Over the course of the war,
Germany shipped at least 16,846 and possibly as many as ·19,000 men to
Spain, losing about 355,56 while 232 planes of the legion were also IOS1. 57
During the period November 1, 1937, to October 31, 1938, the Sonderstab
W, which administered aid to Franco, reported 96 Republican planes de-
stroyed in Spain; by comparison, only 35 Nationalist planes had been
destroyed. 58
Organizationally, the Legion Condor consisted of five major aviation
units: S/88, the command station; J/88, four squadrons of fighters (36-48
machines); Kl88, four squadrons of bombers with 9 to 12 planes each; A/88,
one squadron of land observation planes; and AS/88, eventually two squad-
rons of sea scout planes. The four fighting units comprised 99 to 132 planes
in all. 59 In addition, the German aviation command created two units for
experiments (VK/88), six batteries of flak gunnery, F/88,60 and a field
artillery group known as Luch1. 61 The Legion Condor also included two
radio decoding and communications groups known as Wolm62 and an
original 30- to 48-tank corps organized under the name of Drohne.63 These
fighting units were supported by LN/88 , ammunitions group; B/88, traffic
control; P/88, telegraph and telephone; and SAN/88 , parts and sanitation.64
In addition to this direct support, another major contribution made by
the Germans to Franco's victory consisted of training 56,000 Spanish
officers, known as group Imker. 65 Finally, German equipment generally was
superior to that of all other powers, except for Russian heavy tanks, because
the German War Ministry improved its equipment by testing in Spain. The
German 8.8 em anti-aircraft gun proved to be the best in the conflict. Early
in the war the Italian CR 32 proved to be the best fighter aircraft, and the
German He 51, an inferior machine. By early 1937 the Me 109B appeared,
and by early 1939 the Me 109E was the fastest fighter plane of the war. 66 All
told, the Luftwaffe tried out some twenty-seven types of aircraft in Spain.67
The German bombing technique developed over Madrid in late October
1936 consisted of bombing in three waves. First came the 2,000-pound
bombs, which smashed concrete buildings; then the 220-pound bombs to
break up the rubble in smaller pieces; then the incendiary and antipersonnel
22-pound bombs to kill the men who came to put out the fires. In total, the
Germans dropped more than 21 million tons ofbombs on Spain in the course
of the war. 68 The top German ace in Spain was Captain Werner Molders,
who shot down fourteen planes; the war as a whole produced fifteen German
aces. 69
Compared to the Italians, the Germans sent more technical services for
their $215 million, while the Italians with their $354 million contributed
much more in the form of infantry to the Nationalists. The combined Italian
and German money nearly equalled the amount of gold that the Republicans
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spent in Paris and Moscow. The Italians sent 80,000 men, reaching a
maximum operational strength of 44,700 to 48,000,70 of whom they lost
3,819.71 However, they also sent Franco 729 aircraft;72 the Germans sent at
least 593 aircraft, and possibly as many as 708. 73 In February 1939, the total
Nationalist air strength had reached 491 planes, which included 126 Ger-
man-manned and 192 Italian-manned craft. Spanish personnel piloted 173
planes, about two-thirds of them Italian and one-third German.74
Better equipment and training were major reasons for the Axis victory
in Spain over the technically and logistically weaker "private" aid from
France and the semiofficial, Soviet~dominatedComintern. British Military
Intelligence concluded that the Nationalists gained permanent superiority in
the air by October 1936, and that the Russian pilots had disappeared from
the Spanish skies by late November 1937.75 The regular Italian and German
forces together lost 4,170 men, compared with the 11,876--Frenchmen,
Germans, Italians, Americans, and eastern Europeans-who sacrificed
their lives volunteering for the International Brigades.76
The combat history of the Legion Condor is difficult to evaluate on an
independent tactical basis, since the legion was cooperating daily with the
Italians and Spaniards. Who received the credit if an He 111 shot down a
French plane? Condor planes included Spanish observers and trainees on
their missions. In early 1937, Sperrle was put in charge of a combined air
operation of 150 planes-his own legion, the Italians, and Spaniards-----over
the northern front in Franco's war against the Basques.77 Although Franco
had on his staff five Germans and five Italian advisors, he apparently
listened most closely to Sperrle, then to his two successors, Generals
Helmuth Volkmann and Richthofen.
Besides the Gibraltar airlift from July to October 1936, German units
fought in thirty battles, from bombing the Battleship Jaime I on August 12,
through two battles of Teruel in the winter of 1937-38 (probably the
bloodiest of the fighting on both sides), to the last offensive, sprung in
Toledo Province toward Madrid on March 27, 1939.78
In July through October 1936, Franco marched from Seville to Badajoz
to Caceres to Toledo to Madrid. Mola wiped out pockets of resistance from
Pamplona to the outskirts of Madrid during the same period. The Interna-
tional Brigades probably saved Madrid in late October. The ensuing stale-
mate at Madrid from October 1936 to January 1937 convinced Sperrle and
Franco that they should tum their attention to the northern front-the
Basque country and Asturias.
On April 26, 1937, the Luftwaffe bombed the Basque village of
Guernica. A few days later Franco's forces captured the town and tried to
deny the fact of the bombing for the sake of international public opinion.
This led to a series of charges and countercharges, so that the story of this
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relatively minor military event became a study in morality, international law,
and propaganda.79
The Spanish Republic lost control of the sea coasts in September 1936
when Franco and Mussolini won the battle of Mallorca. 8o This island was
lost not for lack of sea power but because the Republican minister of the navy
cautiously decided to evacuate Loyalist forces for political and strategic
reasons. Later that same month, the Republican navy lost control of the
Straits of Gibraltar. During the war British private merchant vessels supply-
ing the Republic were frequently attacked by Italian and Nationalist block-
ade vessels and aircraft. According to British private shipping company
statistics, they suffered 125 attacks and 14 sinkings; 40 men were killed and
68 wounded. 81 The British government claimed 162 attacks on private
merchantmen in which the Axis and the Nationalists sank 20 vessels, killed
20 meo, and injured 26. 82 The Legion Condor, the Italian "corps," and the
Nationalist air force using Mallorca were responsible for more sinkings in
1938 than the Italian submarines in 1937.83
Throughout the war, the .commander of the Legion Condor met with
Franco on almost a daily basis. The Axis charges, Anfuso and Faupel, had
agreed to the joint Italian-German staff in the generalissimo's headquarters.
The only problem with that formula was that Faupel tried to add his own
voice, to the annoyance of Franco and the Italians. 84 A subject of continuing
debate among the generalissimo and Sperrle, Volkmann, and Richthofen
was the choice of targets. According to the Germans, Franco had a stubborn
tendency to lose sight of grand strategy. for the sake of minor tactical or
psychological victories. For example, the battles of Toledo in September
1936 and Teruel (December 1937 to February 1938) were senseless wastes
of time from the German point of view. 85 The German task was to keep
Franco on the main target of Madrid. Ironically, while Hitler wanted a slow
war for the sake of his European strategy, Franco wanted an even slower war
for tactical reasons. The chiefof state dallied in order to capture valuable war
plants, consolidate his disloyal rear, and humor the British. The German
military claimed that only through General Antonio Aranda's chief of staff,
General Juan Vig6n, did the whole strategy of the war become successful. 86
Aranda, one of Franco's major corps commanders, was the conqueror of
Oviedo, Teruel, and Valencia, among others. Vig6n took German advice, so
that a most significant contribution of Germany to the Franco crusade may
have been to provide it with a strategy. Spanish military historians and future
research may, however, repudiate that claim.
The German military came to recognize that the Spanish war had more
to teach them than World War I, while the French conservatives, with minds
riveted on World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, learned the· wrong
lessons from Spain. The Germans learned nine major military lessons from
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the Spanish Civil War on land, sea, and in the air. These lessons included,
first, to concentrate their armor in a spearhead;87 and second, to spread their
modem fighter planes88 because, with greater speed, World War I's close
aerial formations no longer worked. 89 Captain Werner Molders revolution-
ized aerial tactics. He later demonstrated for the British and Americans the
"Finger Four" formation, based on his Spanish experience.90
The third lesson, which deserves some elaboration, was to coordinate
armor and bombing to create panic-the famous Blitzkrieg. Colonel
Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, commander of the tank corps Drohne (con-
taining sixty tanks by December 1936),91 developed this tactic and became
the mentor of General Heinz Guderian of World War II fame. Because of the
secrecy of Hitler, the pride of Franco, and the conservatism of the Italians
and French (as well as exaggerated propaganda by the air forces of the
world), the story of Spain's tank units is still obscure.92
From November 1936 to July 1937, the Russian T-26 tank proved
superior to the German light tank (the Mark I) and the Italian Fiat.93 Thoma
experimented with the Mark II and III in Spain.94 During the battle of
Brunete, July 6-28, 1937, the Republic still had more and better Russian
machines, but the Russian advisors lost the battle because they did not
follow up their tanks with Republican infantry. General Jose Varela, with the
advice of the German Drohne personnel, developed better coordinated
tactics combining artillery, aircraft, and tanks. The tactic was then known as
the Schwerpunkt, spearhead or breakthrough.95 The first official German
historian of the Spanish war, Werner von Beumelburg, recognized the
success of "close cooperation of air force and ground troops" not at Brunete
but rather in the later battle of Santander in August 1937.96 As chief
instructor, Thoma had trained a Spanish unit of 180 tanks by 1938.97
General Juan Yagiie and the Legion Condor used the Schwerpunkt maneu-
ver in July and August on the Ebro; some days the Germans gained twenty-
five miles. 98 In the Catalan campaign the Germans doubled their previous
pace to fifty miles a day.
The air side of the Blitzkrieg was developed by General von Richt-
hofen,99 who took his dive bombers to Poland and France after the Spanish
war. For political reasons, Hitler was content that the civil war, for a while,
bear the appearance of a stationary siege, a Sitzkrieg, like World War I.
From Thoma's and Richthofen's vantage points, the coordinated attacks of
dive bombers and tanks were winning in 1938. Spain, not Poland, thus saw
the first Blitzkrieg. 100 The earliest mention of the word Blitzkrieg comes in
May 1939 from General Georg Thomas of the OKW economic staff. 101
The Italians never got over their defeat at Guadalajara, in which their
light tanks got bogged down in the mud, 102 and never learned the lessons of
Drohne. French military intelligence came to the conclusion in June 1938
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that the German light tank had proved inferior, so the French concentrated on
the heavy tank thereafter. 103 In France in 1940, the secret of the Thoma-
Guderian success was to have regiments composed of two-thirds medium
tanks and one-third fast tanks, coordinated with modem fighter-bombers.
As part of the German general staff, Thoma fought in twenty-four battles in
Poland, France, Russia, and Africa, while he had participated in 192 tank
actions with the Legion Condor in Spain. 104
The joint Nationalist-German mass bombing of Guernica, coordinated
by Germany's Sperrle and Richthofen and Spain's Mola and Vig6n, led to
such an international outcry that the massive bombing experiment was not
continued, at least not on towns. 105 The bombing of Guernica produced at
least a thousand victims. 106 From a technical point of view, the mixed high
explosive and incendiary raid was made to destroy a strategic bridge and a
weapons factory. It was probably an "accidental" side effect that Guernica's
wooden houses burned quickly. In any case, the Sonderstab W concluded
that the raid was a complete success,107 although the target factory and
bridge were not hit. Guernica served as a foretaste of the brutal inefficiency
of so-called "strategic bombing," or rather the indiscriminate bombing of
civilians, that marked World War II and the Korean and American-Indo-
china wars.
More important to the history ofbombing, although given less publicity,
was the systematic bombing of the Catalan coast. From January 19 to March
31, 1938, the combined operations of German, Italian, and Nationalist
aircraft killed at least 1,349 persons in 88 attacks. l08 Those air raids
continued on into the following year. Their purpose was allegedly to stop
Republican sea deliveries of materials, so it was a form of economic war-
although it was also a kind of "terror bombing" employed to demoralize the
Catalans.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth lessons of the Spanish Civil War affected the
Luftwaffe and enabled the Germans to improve their air fighting equipment
as the months rolled by. The Me 109 was superior to Russian and French
planes. On the other hand, the Stuka dive bomber was effective against
enemy fortifications but was generally vulnerable. 109 As a result of their
Spanish experience, the long-range strategic bomber units learned to avoid
anti-aircraft artillery by adopting night bombing. Navigational techniques
for flying at night and in bad weather were also developed, so that in these
areas the Luftwaffe was superior to Britain's RAF in 1939. 110 The Nation-
alist troops appreciated the morale boost that German air superiority pro-
vided.
The German air force decided in January 1937 to modify the entire
production schedule of military aircraft. They increased production of the
heavy fighter plane and the light bomber, but these changes forced them to
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drop development of the heavy bomber. 111 The consequences of this deci-
sion were to help Hitler win the Battle of Poland and the Battle of France, but
they also may have contributed to the loss of the Battle of Britain. In addi-
tion, the Germans developed a torpedo plane that might have been effective
against the British fleet in World War II had Hitler not rejected the Legion
Condor experience. 112 The Japanese proved the effectiveness of the torpedo
plane at Pearl Harbor.
A seventh lesson was learned by the supply sections of the Legion
Condor. When Operation Winteriibung began, the legion·had one hundred
different types of motor vehicles. Eventually a simplified parts department
and supply train were developed to help keep the infantry mobile. 113 These
were used later in France. Eighth, the Germans had a chance to test captured
Russian equipment, with one result being Germany's rapid development of a
heavier tank. 114 Finally, it was in Spain that the Germans, who originally
viewed the 8.8 cm gun (the "eighty-eight") as an anti-aircraft weapon,
learned that it could be mobilized as field artillery and as an antitank
weapon. 115
There were other general benefits to the German military from the
Spanish war. Needless to say, some of the 16,800 to 19,000 who served in
Spain entered Poland in the fall of 1939 as combat veterans. Twenty-nine top
German World War II aces had Spanish experience. 116 More specifically,
the Legion Condor veterans organized a training team in Germany upon
their return and trained 200 air crews for the Polish campaign. 117 Man for
man, the German army was the best in the world in 1939 (excluding possibly
the Japanese), in part due to Spanish experience.
The prime lesson of the Spanish Civil War for Keitel-stationed in
Berlin throughout that war but later Hitler's "chief of staff" for the Wehr-
macht-was mobilization planning and the need for closer coordination
between the services, the Foreign Ministry and the propaganda ministry. 118
In fact, the Sonderstab W was a precursor to the Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht, announced in February 1938. Warlimont was an architect of
both organizations. Hitler applied Keitel's and Warlimont's ideas of coordi-
nated propaganda and military might by having Sperrle, former commander
of the Legion Condor, present at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938,
when Hitler terrorized the Austrian chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg. At
one point in the meeting, Hitler reinforced his "persuasion" for Anschluss
by calling on Sperrle to speak about the Spanish experience. 119
Sperrle in May 1940 cooperated with Generals Albert Kesselring, Karl
von Runstadt, and Fedor von Boch in Operation Yellow, which decisively
defeated France. 120 Richthofen in 1941 commanded the VIII Air Corps and
contributed to Hitler's conquest of Crete. 121
The western hemisphere was also affected by the German military
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intervention in Spain. The Legion Condor proved to be a practical training
ground for the Spanish-speaking German agents who infiltrated Latin
America in 1939 and 1940. 122
The lessons of Spain should not, ofcourse, be exaggerated. Some of the
German military experience proved valuable in World War II, while other
"lessons" were misapplied by the successors of the Legion Condor or were
shown to be misleading. Goring and Thoma also learned negative lessons
from Spain, namely a contempt for the Italian military. 123 Despite Hitler's
personal flattery of the Duce, the Axis relationship remained strained at
lower echelons throughout its short history. Experiences during the Spanish
war were one source of this strain.
Although given worldwide publicity, the raid on Guernica had little
effect on the military or diplomatic outcome of the war, except that the
incident intensified the mutual hostility of the British and the Axis press. 124
Throughout the civil war, despite the efforts of the British government and
the Tory party to maintain "the spirit of Locamo" and "appeasement," the
events in Spain-the Guemica incident in particular-helped create anti-
German feeling in Britain. Ironically, many conservatives who would later
suffer in the Battle of Britain chose to believe in 1937 that the Guernica
holocaust was a propaganda stunt trumped up by "the reds."
Except for Guemica, the extent of military victories attributable to the
Germans became apparent only after Franco's triumph on March 31, 1939.
The slow way in which Franco conquered territory at the time obscured the
importance of the lessons of the drawn-out war in Spain. Further, the British
and French military deduced some wrong lessons from the civil war because
they failed to gauge German diplomatic and military power accurately:
Perhaps the greatest tribute to the Legion Condor was made by General
Franco in July 1938 when he told the German ambassador that the services
of the "Legion Condor could not be dispensed with."125 This judgment
should be balanced by the comment that, despite the achievements ofThoma
and Richthofen, the lessons of the Spanish experiment were incompletely
absorbed by the Luftwaffe chief, Goring. He remained too much of an
individualistic World War I ace, essentially ignorant of supply, logistics,
strategy, tactics and technology.126 But whatever Goring's shortcomings
may have been, the Nationalists respected the technical efficiency and
comprehensiveness of the Germans more than they did the larger numbers of
the Italians.
Naval Strategy Shifts against Britain
Because of their strategic interests in the Balearic Islands, the Canary
Islands, and Gibraltar, the French and British probably viewed the German
navy's assistance to Nationalist Spain as even more important than Hitler's
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aviation, tank, artillery, and communications services. The Oberkommando
der Kriegsmarine (OKM) did not take an active part in naval warfare,
however. The German navy instead concentrated on delivery of war material
and on gathering intelligence. In August 1936, a special team of German
naval officers reconditioned the Spanish heavy cruiser Canarias and trained
replacements for officers killed by leftist sailors. In October, the Canarias
and the cruiser Almirante Cervera took control of the Straits of Gibraltar
away from the Republican nav~ The Germans also assisted the Nationalists
to lay mines around the Republican ports of Almeria and Valencia, resulting
in the loss of nineteen Loyalist vessels. 127 German advisors helped sweep
mines from northern coasts after Franco's armies took the Basque country in
June 1937; each Nationalist minesweeper had a German officer on board.
The OKM also aided the Legion Condor by creating a section known as
the Gruppe Nordsee, consisting of about seventy~five communications and
supply personnel. 128 Nordsee had two radio men in Salamanca with the
code name "Anker," fourteen men in Cadiz ("Partner"), three at El Ferrol
("Peter"), one at Seville ("Witan"), and twelve in the observation sea plane
squadron AS/88, stationed at Melilla129 and later in the Balearics. Al-
together, 2,200 German sailors served on German warships in Spanish
waters. 130
During the civil war the radio men of Gruppe Nordsee for the most part
limited their work to reporting the activities of the Spanish Loyalists and the
movement of British, Soviet, and French merchant vessels aiding those
forces. The deliveries to the Republicans included both food and other
consumer goods not prohibited by the NIC, but also contraband arms. For
example, between January 1 and March 31, 1938, Nordsee reported that
twenty-two British, three Greek, two American, one French, and one Rus-
sian vessel had brought supplies from the USSR to various Republican
portS.!3! Such information helped the Nationalist navy's efforts to maintain
their blockade, while the Germans avoided confronting the superior British
navy. At the same time, Hitler deployed an intelligence unit that, in the event
of a wider war, could have functioned beyond Spain.
Germany had fought France twice in the past two generations; thus
Berlin's military elite had been thinking of another war against France since
1919. Geographic considerations and World War I experience led Berlin's
naval planners to expect more help from Spain than the German army could
hope for in such an event. The navy could weaken France's southern front by
operations in Spanish waters, while the anny would have to concentrate on
going for Paris directl~ During the first year and a halfof the civil war, Hitler
subordinated his ambitions for German military action to his prime diplo-
matic aim of manipulating the other Great Powers because he was not yet
ready for a showdown with France. Although the navy had a stake in Spanish
waters, in 1936 Hitler at first did not expect that the Abwehr agents in Spain
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could be used openly against Britain, the world's foremost sea power. By
April 1938, however, his viewpoint would change, and Spain would be seen
as useful for his overall strategy:
Despite Hitler's interest in building a large German navy, he had
confused ideas about how to employ it. In Mein Kampf, the Fuhrer had
written of making Britain an ally. The Anglo-German naval arms limitation
agreement of June 1935 was supposed to reaffirm the hopes of both London
and Berlin that another 1914 would never happen. Ribbentrop was sent to
London as ambassador in August 1936 to get an agreement on the basis of
anticommunism, but the ex-champagne salesman did not impress the aristo-
cratic British. Ribbentrop's disillusionment with England increased gradu-
ally, beginning in May 1937 and becoming complete by December. 132
Nonetheless, the German War Ministry assumed, until June 1937, that
Britain would be neutral in its war plans against France. 133
Into 1937 the Tory cabinet was still hoping that Hitler would sign
another "Western Locarno Pact," even though Nazi Germany had violated
the Locarno treaty by occupying the Rhineland the year before. British
officialdom--particularly Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden...........showed more
hostility toward Mussolini's Mediterranean ambitions than toward Hitler's
activity in Spanish waters. Upon the dispatch of Italian troops to the Balearic
Islands in September 1936 and further large-scale landings of the Black
Shirts in December and January, Eden argued to a hesitant British cabinet
that the aggressiveness of the Duce should be stopped. The major British
concern was not the small German navy but fear that the large Italian navy
would stay in the islands. 134 Eden's famous resignation of February 1938
protested his prime minister's Italian, rather than German, policy.
The first incident emerging out of the civil war that had much effect on
the overall Anglo-German relationship involved the pocket battleship
Deutschland. In fact, the most sensational events during the entire war
involving the German navy were the bombing of the Deutschland by
Loyalist aircraft and the retaliatory shelling by the German navy of the city
of Almeria on May 29-30, 1937. 135 Afterwards, Ribbentrop shocked the
British at an NIC meeting by announcing Hitler's decision to withdraw from
the committee. 136 The incident briefly raised the possibility that the Spanish
Civil War might expand into a general war. 137 Almeria proved to be the
exception to the rule, however, and the incident had more of an impact on
London and Paris than it had on the eventual success of the Nationalist
blockade. The Left in the liberal democracies used the incident to publicize
the German danger, while the Right, indignant at the attack on the Deutsch!""
land, continued its compromises in the NIC.
As a result of the Deutschland-Almeria incident, the Anglo-French
entente powers and the Axis temporarily drew further apart. In June 1937,
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Blomberg, the minister of war, visited Rome for military consultation with
the Italians, 138 while Hitler cancelled a planned visit by Germany's foreign
minister,Neurath, to London. The bombing of the Deutschland was cited as
an excuse. 139 Furthermore, the Germans alleged that about two weeks after
the "Soviet" bombing, a "Russian" submarine fired a torpedo at the German
cruiser Leipzig while it was near Oran, Algeria. 140 No damage was done, no
submarine was seen, and the German commander of the fleet observed later
that the listening equipment was defective. 141 The commander of the
Leipzig saw no torpedo wake and also reported that the original report of
torpedoing had been a false alarm. 142
Hitler thereafter became increasingly anti-British for the sake of main-
taining a united front with Mussolini. 143 For their part, the British were
disappointed that Neurath did not make the London trip, and they blamed
Ribbentrop for Hitler's snub. 144 The Germans agreed to return to the NIC on
June 15,145 but they continued to boycott the four-power naval patrol
commission146 that, since April, had been attempting to control (by doing
little more than reporting on) merchant vessels trading with the two Spanish
factions.
Meanwhile, Hitler's eastern policy forced the OKM to make new war
plans. On June 18, 1937, the German naval operations chief, Admiral
Wilhelm Marschall, drew up a proposal for the commander in chief,
Admiral Erich Raeder; it assumed, for the first time since the Versailles
treaty, that Great Britain might back a Soviet-French war against Germany.
But the OKM concluded that British sea power was too strong for Germany,
so Germany must avoid a war. 147 Nevertheless, Marschall included a naval
war with Britain as part of Hitler's war plans against Czechoslovakia.
Blomberg also drew up a series of war possibilities involving France
and Britain in June 1937. Case Green envisioned a two-front war with
German concentration on Czechoslovakia; Case Red, a two-front war with
France; and Extension Green/Red, a war in which Britain would intervene.
Case Richard foresaw the extension of the Spanish Civil War into world war
by a "provoked incident."148 The four plans hypothesized war with Britain
as well as France. In all four the Iberian Peninsula could be involved sooner
or later, if the fluid Axis and the fluid entente crystallized into two hard, rival
alliance systems.
Nonetheless, Hitler was unwilling to back these. plans with increased
appropriations for the navy at home or with greater material aid to Spain.
Inasmuch as the navy was just contemplating theoretical problems, it still
hoped to avoid war with Britain, as well as with France, because the OKM
just did not have enough firepower. Planning against France alone, as had
been traditional since the 1920s, continued simultaneously with the Red,
Green, Extension Green/Red, and Richard contingencies until as late as
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November 1937. 149 Hitler himself still worked to keep the civil war lo-
calized while continuing to hope that Britain would not back France if
French-German warfare erupted over some eastern European question.
In contrast to Hitler, Mussolini expanded his commitment to Franco's
anticommunist war through "piracy" on the Mediterranean in August and
September 1937. Italian submarines' torpedoing of merchant vessels led to
new difficulties with the Anglo-French entente, resulting in the Nyon
Conference, held September 10-13,150 which Germany refused to attend.
After much British pressure on Italy to participate, which they technically
refused, the Italians later endorsed the pact in principle. Mussolini did send
a naval representative to a subsequent Paris meeting on September 30,
which modified the Nyon texts of September 13 to suit Mussolini's sen-
sibilities. 151 For Chamberlain some kind of agreement with Italy and France
was a sine qua non. .
From a naval standpoint, both the Nyon texts and Paris texts were of a
symbolic nature, since Mussolini subsequently concentrated more on
bombing than on naval action. Earlier in August the Italian navy secretly
invited Germany to take part in the "pirate activities," asking that a German
operations officer come to Rome. Furthermore, in outlining Italy's proposals
to the German naval attache, Rear Admiral Eduardo Somigli referred to his
monologue as our "common discussions." The Germans remained cool; the
attache merely thanked Somigli for the inform~tion and said he would
inform Berlin. 152 Although the German navy gladly accepted the right to
use the ports of Cagliari, Naples, and Genoa,153 Hitler mainly reacted to
Mussolini's difficulties with the entente by advising him to hang on to
Mallorca. 154
After the Anglo-French resolve to take action against submarines in the
future, proclaimed at the Nyon Conference, Mussolini visited the Fuhrer in
Berlin during the last week of September. The two fascist imperialists
secretly divided Europe into two spheres of influence: Germany would get
the East, while Italy would control the Mediterranean. In early November
the Duce made the decisive move of signing the German-Japanese Anti-
Comintem Pact, further splitting Europe and its global empires into blocs.
Hitler welcomed Italy's pressure.on Anglo-French interests in the Mediter-
ranean. The Fuhrer observed that the British and French had done relatively
little at Nyon and invited the Italians to participate in the proceedings against
their own "pirates" while the entente excluded the USSR. Weakness only
encouraged Hitler's own claims in the East. 155 The Italian foreign minister,
Ciano, referred to the pact as "a military alliance forcing England to re-
consider her position everywhere. "156 Likewise, the Duce thought he was
"in the centre of the most formidable political and military combination
which has ever existed."157
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It is certainly true that the Axis support overwhelmed Soviet aid in the
naval sphere. The Soviets sent the Republicans four motor torpedo boats,
while the combined Axis sent Franco directly four destroyers, two sub-
marines, and ten motor torpedo boats. The German contribution to the
Nationalists was six motor torpedo boats, two more than the Soviet Union
sent the Republic, but minor compared to Italian aid. During August and
September 1937, when Mussolini went on the naval offensive throughout
the Mediterranean, he indirectly assisted Franco's war effort with fifty-two
Italian submarines, forty-one cruisers and destroyers, and two naval auxili-
aries masquerading as Spanish cruisers. 158
The Duce and Ciano were fond of heroic talk. Nevertheless, in their
more sober moments, the Italians realized that militarily they needed the
assistance of German forces in Spain. At one point Mussolini asked the
Germans for a unification of the Legion Condor and the CTV under a single
command, but the Germans politely refused. 159 Because of Spain, the
Italians sought a general military understanding with Germany that the
OKW delayed giving. Ciano by February 1938 advised General Alberto
Pariani , under secretary for war, that military staff talks with the OKW
should soon begin. 160 The Italians were t~lking of an Axis war against both
Britain and France, but the Germans postponed military discussions until
April 1939. 161
Hitler set aside his war minister's fear of a two-front war involving
Czechoslovakia by his famous November 5, 1937, speech to his military
advisers. In it he confidently excluded the possibility of British intervention
against his designs for aggressive war against Czechoslovakia. According to
Hitler, the Spanish Civil War was capturing all of Europe's attention; Britain
was weak, owing to trouble with Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Japan, and in "all
probability England and perhaps also France have already silently written
off Czechoslovakia."162
Later that November Goring boasted to the American ambassador in
Paris that "the British Fleet cannot operate anywhere at the present time. It is
completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in
the Mediterranean."163
Boasts aside, it should be remembered that active German planning
with Spain to weaken the Versailles powers did not develop from a premedi-
tated plan by Hitler. The outbreak and development of the civil war resulted
from a complex series of unforeseen events, and Hitler made his immediate
decisions about Spain with an eye on Italy and France. Only gradually did
European events encourage Hitler to think about postwar military oppor-
tunities in Franco's Spain in connection with war against Britain.
In the fall of 1937, however, at least one ambitious German was already
thinking about expanded postwar military-economic opportunities. This was
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Friedrich von Lupin, general secretary of the Ausfuhrgemeinschaft fur
Kriegsgerat (AGK), a cartel that had monopolized German arms exports,
and that Lupin had been instrumental in creating in 1935. 164 He had also
been active before the civil war in selling arms to Spain. In September 1937
he pointed out to the Foreign Ministry that Britain and the Franco govern-
ment might soon begin economic discussions. 165 Thus, Lupin suggested
that Germany usurp the pre-civil-war position of the British firm of Vickers,
Ltd. , in the field of Spanish naval construction. At the time, nothing came of
the suggestion; both the navy and Hitler still had hopes of avoiding conflict
with Britain by focusing British attention on the communist danger within
Spain.
Naval Ambitions Grow to the End of Civil War
By March and April 1938, the somewhat passive and divided Anglo-French
entente was confronted by developments in the civil war and shifts in the
general international balance. Hitler's march into Vienna led to the creation
of a second Blum Popular Front cabinet that opened the French-Spanish
frontier for the freer delivery of weapons to the Spanish Republicans. In
April 1938 Nationalist troops were driving a wedge into the Republican
front, cutting off the Levante from Catalonia and giving Franco access to the
Mediterranean coast. Ribbentrop temporarily persuaded Hitler that EI
Caudillo's victory was at hand. Even though the new foreign minister turned
out to be wrong, the April 1938 preparations made by Germany for Franco's
victory shed light on Germany's future naval strategy.
What role could Spain- then play in the new pressure Hitler was placing
on European peace? Did the Germans have designs on Gibraltar or the
Canaries?
Admiral Canaris visited Spain to assess Franco's Mediterranean offen-
sive and subsequently sent a warning to Berlin that EI Caudillo was trying to
secure a free hand for himself. Immediately, Ribbentrop drafted a postwar
friendship treaty for Hitler's approval. 166 Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ambas-
sador Stohrer had prepared the draft treaty for Franco by April 6, 1938. They
planned to use it as a device to tie Spain to the Axis. Article Seven, for
instance, was drawn up "to promote the fostering of comradely relations
and the exchange of practical military experience between their armed
forces."167 The Germans interpreted this to mean that French and British
military technology would be excluded from Spain. At the same time, in
April 1938, Hitler again modified his war plan against Czechoslovakia.
Now, the Extended Green Plan, Fall Grlin, concentrated exclusively on
Czechoslovakia, assuming that there would be no British or French interven-
tion.
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Hitler waved Britain and France aside with the comment that the British
navy would not be prepared for two years, and its air force was out ofdate. 168
Still, lower-ranking officers in the OKM continued to worry about Britain,
with some reason. On March 6, the British cruiser Arethusa had helped to
ward off an attack by Legion Condor planes on the port of Barcelona. This
annoyed Keitel, the OKW chief. 169
Even though Hitler told his conservative army advisors that he would
carry out war against Czechoslovakia only if England and France would not
intervene, Hitler had no way of guaranteeing the future. Despite his confi-
dence, the German armed forces were still maintaining attack plans against
Britain and France, in case the West "started" war after the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. 170 In pursuance of the provisions of the draft German-
Spanish Treaty of Friendship and the Green Plan for Czechoslovakia, the
OKM sketched out a specific role for Spain.
On April 7 ,arepresentative of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line had
a conversation with Lieutenant Commander Hellmuth Heye of Naval Opera-
tions, in which the use of Spanish docks to construct some commercial
shipping for Germany was discussed. 171 Bernhardt, whose HISMA enjoyed
profits from a monopoly of trade in German weapons and Spanish raw
materials,172 had already informed both parties of his interest in postwar
construction possibilities in Spain. In addition, the German naval attache in
Spain, Commander Kurt Meyer-Dohner, informed the OKM that Bernhardt
had proposed joint postwar construction to Goring, who had endorsed the
idea. Consequently, Bernhardt came to Berlin on April 21 , 1938, to ask the
OKM for its cooperation. Bernhardt wanted German commercial shipbuild-
ing interests to join with his company to help Nationalist Spanish industry
reconstruct merchant shipping. 173 In the course of the conversation, Bern-
hardt mentioned that he had been interested for at least four months in
obtaining Spanish docking facilities for Germany. Taking up where arms
merchant Lupin of the AGK had left off in his September 1937 visit,
Bernhardt had been negotiating with fOUf private Spanish firms, including
Canaris's old 1920s contact, Echevarietta. 174 Although Bernhardt knew
Spanish market conditions, he needed credits and technical assistance from
German shipbuilders. Unfortunately for Bernhardt, the German builders
showed no interest in his projects, so Bernhardt was now appealing to the
OKM for support. Both Bernhardt and Meyer-Dohner saw possibilities in a
joint German-Spanish construction proposal, using Spanish docks to sup-
port Germany in the event of war with Britain and France. It also would
afford an opportunity to oust Britain's influential Vickers Ltd. from Spain.
More important than Bernhardt's pressure, however, were strategic
decisions in Berlin. The chief of the Operations Section of the OKM, after
receiving Ribbentrop's draft treaty for Spain and Hitler's Extended Green
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Plan, drew up a more specific plan for even broader German-Spanish naval
cooperation. 175
In a possible war with France and Britain, the Straits ofGibraltar and the
Balearic Islands would play, according to Vice Admiral Gunther Guse, a
significant role. Although benevolently neutral, Spain would have a duty to
cooperate with Germany on all questions concerning international and
maritime law. Guse, the operations chief, believed that benevolent neutrality
favoring the Axis would be better than a Spanish declaration of war because
the raw materials of Spain would be safer during a British block:;lde under
the Spanish flag than if a weak Spain were an ineffective war partner. Yet
Spain could supply German war vessels and aircraft, and would cooperate in
the field of intelligence. Moreover, Spain could exert political influence on
Portugal and the Latin American states to take up pro:..German positions,
and Spain could leave "the pro-British" League of Nations. The Germans
would undertake to reconstruct the Spanish commercial and fishing fleets,
particularly in the strategically located Canary Islands. Expanding upon
Bernhardt's and Lupin's suggestions to construct vessels for Germany,
Guse's plan envisioned Germany aiding in the construction of war vessels.
The chief of naval operations also suggested the training of Spanish sailors
(which Canaris had just discussed with Franco). 176
Guse sent his proposals to the German National Defense Office on
April 26, 1938, and there they remained in the dead file for months. Hitler
was still optimistic that Britain and France would not deter his plans for
Czechoslovakia. In addition, Franco's situation had deteriorated because of
the heavy aid France sent to the Republicans during the brief tenure of
Blum's second Popular Front premiership.177 The Germans had ceased
delivery of replacements for the Legion Condor about three months before,
possibly in an attempt to implement Hitler's Machiavellian, but half-hearted,
hope for a French-oriented Catalonia. 178 Therefore, Franco and Ribbentrop
agreed to postpone the planned friendship treaty until the end of the civil
war.
Meanwhile, in May 1938 at a lower level in the bureaucracy, Canaris's
representative, Lieutenant Eberhard Messerschmidt, who had had experi-
ence in Spain since the twenties, was lending support to Bernhardt's Spanish
naval construction proposal. Messerschmidt proposed that four German
companies (including Rheinmetall-Borsig where Goring had influence)
form a consortium to create a Spanish firm that would replace Vickers in
Spanish naval construction. Both commercial and war shipping could be
built for Spain, and aviation and trucking equipment could be manufactured
later. 179 The proposal received Guse's endorsement, and further talks with
Bernhardt and German industrialists were held in early June 1938 at the
Naval Ministl)~ 180
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Shortly thereafter, Heye made a secret trip to Iberia and Morocco on be-
half of Naval Operations, visiting Burgos, Seville, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Tetuan,
Melilla, Mallorca, and Lisbon. At his ports of call he discussed the varied
interests of the OKM with the Spaniards, the Italians, and the Legion
Condor officers in the field. 181 Heye visited the Echevarietta docks, then
being rebuilt with German money at San Fernando near Cadiz; discussed
with Vice Admiral Francisco Bastarreche, commander of the Cadiz base, the
possibility of Germany lending Spain torpedo equipment; and talked with
the Spanish operations chief and with the commander of the Legion Condor
seaplane observation squadron about information gained concerning the
British base at Gibraltar. Leaving no prospect to chance, he examined
possible U-boat sites in Spanish Morocco and the Balearics, and explored
with the Italian naval command the possibility of Italian naval aid to the
Spaniards in the Balearics. Because the purpose of the extensive talks was
mainly to look into Spanish opportunities, no definite agreements were
concluded. Indeed, this thorough survey of Spanish conditions convinced
Heye that it was absolutely necessary for the Italian navy, not the German, to
take the lead in any postwar naval reconstruction aid to Spain. German naval
production was limited; and consistent with the spirit of the Axis, Italy
should maintain the burden of Spain.
As of December 1937 the Spaniards already had begun to work on a
contract with Italy to build eight destroyers. 182 Admiral Francisco Mo-
reno--the operations chief whose attention was focused on fighting the
current war in Spanish waters rather than planning for postwar expansion-
had suggested that Spanish naval officers be sent to Germany for immediate
training. The unenthusiastic Heye thought the idea could be useful to
Germany if it did not cause competition with Italy. At the time, however, the
OKM did nothing about Moreno's request, inasmuch as the presence of
Spanish cadets in Germany had little short-range value in strengthening
anti-British influence in Spain.
In any case, the growing Czechoslovakian crisis in the summer of 1938
caused German military planners once again to speed up their thinking
about the need for direct German-Spanish ties. As the Sudetenland crisis
worsened in August, the German navy again had to face the possibility of
general war. It seemed that France and Britain, hitherto divided over
Ethiopia, Spain, and the role of the USSR, were gradually coming together.
If, therefore, the Western powers declared war on behalf of Czechoslovakia,
it would be handy for the German navy, which was totally unprepared for a
protracted world conflict, to have the assistance not only of the Italian and
Japanese navies but even of Franco's modest naval facilities.
As far as Spain was concerned, more important to the Germans than the
fleet was the possibility of acquiring naval supplies by virtue of Spain's
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strategic location. Captain Kurt Fricke, who had replaced Guse as chief of
the OKM Operations Section, on August 18 revived the suggestions that his
predecessor had made the previous April. Fricke proposed that talks-for
the exchange of intelligence; cooperation in supporting each other's fleets
with oil, ammunition, and supplies; and common definitions of interna-
tionallaws, such as the meaning of belligerent rights-be taken up by the
German naval attaches in Rome, Tokyo, and San Sebastian. 183 Although
Hitler approved Fricke's suggestion on August 31, 184 little was done imme-
diately to implement the plan; the Fuhrer was still confident that the British
and French navies could be discounted. Nevertheless, the OKM decided on
September 1 to act on the matter of officer training. The Spanish admiralty
had suggested in April and again in June that Spanish officers be sent to
Germany for refresher courses. 185 In September the Germans countered
with a proposal to send one German officer and twelve noncommissioned
officers to Spain in exchange for a single Spanish officer to be sent to a
German naval school. In the event of war with Britain and France, the navy
of the Third Reich would at least have additional observers stationed in the
strategic Iberian Peninsula.
As further evidence of the German navy's general interest in Spain
during this time of international tension over Czechoslovakia, Admiral
Canaris brought Don Juan, son of ex-King Alfonso, to tour naval installa-
tions in Germany from August 21 to 28. Canaris showed Don Juan the Hitler
Sportsfest, the shipyards, the Siemens naval arms plants, the naval base at
Wilhelmshafen, and V-boat maneuvers in the North Sea. 186 Because of
dissension within the Spanish·Right about restoring the monarchy, Prince
Juan's trip had Franco's prior approval on the condition that it be considered
only a "private visit. "187
The passionate discussion within Franco's camp about a return of the
monarchy may have meant that the elusive, cautious, but patriotic Canaris
was preparing the ground for a possible tum of events. Or did a Ma-
chiavellian, anti-Hitler Canaris-knowing that Don Juan was persona non
grata--deliberately invite the heir-apparent to Berlin, hoping it would cause
an embarrassment between Hitler and Franco? In any case, despite Hitler's
confidence that he was not risking general war over Czechoslovakia, the
German navy kept in mind both short- and long-range plans involving
Spain.
By late August, when the Czech crisis had become acute, Hitler decided
to modify his overall military plans again. 188 Now he expected more backing
from his Italian ally than he thought France would receive from Britain.
When questioned about the hastened Green Plan, as amended on August 25,
1938, for taking over Czechoslovakia, Goring later said that Hitler and he
had thought the entire French navy would be necessary to contain the
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Italians in the Mediterranean. 189 Hitler still did not expect Britain to
intervene in any case, so the Italian navy was expected to ensure that the
French would not be available for action in the North Sea.
The optimistic Nationalist Spanish leaders generally ignored the prob-
lems of eastern Europe and focused instead on a long-range postwar naval
program-the enlargement of the Spanish fleet. Franco-a naval officer's
son who had been raised in the naval academy town ofEI Ferrol, 190 and who
had originally planned on a naval career rather than one in the army-had
ambitions for the future power of the Spanish navy now that victory seemed
within his grasp. 191 His minister of industry and commerce, Juan Suanzes,
and Suanzes's right-hand man, Lieutenant Jesus Alfaro, were both naval
officers. Rebuilding the Spanish fleet was one of the prime interests-if not
the prime interest-of Suanzes, whose ministry was to be in charge of
reconstructing war-torn Spain. In 1939 Suanzes proposed to his Caudillo
and former classmate a ten-year construction program that would include
four battleships of 38,000 tons with 38 cm guns, twelve cruisers, sixty
destroyers, and an unspecified number of submarines. 192 In contrast, rela-
tive to the Great Powers, Spain's token navy before the war had consisted of
two battleships, three active cruisers (plus two fitting out and one under
repair), and twelve active destroyers (plus five in fitting out).193 The
question still remained: who would construct the projected, extravagant
fleet.
Since April 1938, Guse, Heye, Messerschmidt, and Bernhardt had all
made general suggestions that Germany give technical aid to oust British
naval influence from Spain. A major problem facing both Spaniards and
Germans, however, was the shortage of docking and engineering facilities,
so German proposals would be difficult to implement economically.
During late August 1938, when so much other German naval activity
vis-a-vis Spain was under way, a key German arms salesman went to Spain
to do further scouting. Hans Eltze, director of Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dussel-
dorf (one of the more active members of the AGK cartel), had been vitally
interested in the Canaris-Echevarietta deal of 1925. In order to sell German
arms, he had traveled to Spain in November and December 1935, to Spain
and Portugal in August 1936, and again to Portugal that December. 194 Then
in August 1938, during the general European crisis, he was making at least a
fourth Spanish visit to survey Franco's naval needs. The AGK interests were
economic and technical, and Eltze made his trip at the invitation of
Bernhardt, Goring's arms salesman. As far as is known, the activities of
Eltze were kept completely separate from combat activities of the Son-
derstab Wand the Legion Condor. From Franco's standpoint, Eltze was
officially discussing only Spanish post--civil war naval needs. But if world
war broke out in Czechoslovakia, and if the two Spanish camps were drawn
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in, then Eltze would be available for immediate military supply requests.
In Burgos and Bilbao, Eltze talked with Spanish naval officers, includ-
ing Lieutenant Alfaro of the industry and commerce ministry. 195 Alfaro
limited his part of the talks to Spanish postwar needs, yet he told the AGK
representative that Spain was anxious to cut its ties with Vickers. 196 The
British company had hitherto controlled Spanish naval construction through
a monopoly of patents and a 140-million peseta loan ($20 million).197
Alfaro pointed out to Eltze, however, that just because the Nationalist regime
would be happy to see the British company go, that did not mean it wanted
Germany to replace the British.
The AGK director returned to Germany even before the Sudetenland
crisis was "solved" at Munich with a temporary papering-over of the
growing Anglo-German breach. In Berlin, Eltze reaffirmed the conclusions
of Lupin and Heye, as well as the general Axis guideline of not interfering
with Italian-Spanish contracts, that in the future Spain would work pri-
marily with Italy in the field of postwar naval construction. He, too, foresaw
no future in Spain for increased German naval arms exports and joint
construction contracts.
On September 4, Admiral Bastarreche, of the naval base near Cadiz,
informed German naval attache Meyer-Dohner that Italy would build the
first four battleships in Suanzes's program. 198 The Italians would add to
their already existing agreement with Spain to construct eight destroyers at
EI Ferrol.
In September 1938, however, the building of a large postwar Spanish
fleet was still only a gleam in Suanzes's eye. The Republicans had to be
defeated, and Franco had to avoid getting involved in an Anglo-German war
over the Sudetenland. As the crisis developed, Franco's government indi-
cated to Germany its lack of interest in eastern European affairs, its inability
to support Germany, and even a belated fear and hostility toward the effect
the crisis might have on Franco's possibility of victo~199 Although Franco
had wanted to remain neutral in any larger war, he still needed Hitler's
military equipment for his own counterrevolution and therefore wanted to
keep Hitler's good will. Thus, Admiral Cervera, chief of the Spanish naval
staff, spoke in cautious tones to the German naval attache about the kind of
aid Germany could expect from Nationalist Spain if a general war broke out.
Cervera's deputy chief of staff, Rear Admiral Salvador Moreno (brother
of the operations chief, Francisco Moreno), assured Meyer-Dohner that
Spain would "spontaneously" support Germany with "all means without
compromising its neutrality," in the event of a war with the western democ-
racies. 2OO
The exact meaning of this vague formula did not come to a test because
of the Anglo-French retreat at Munich in September. After the Four Power
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Agreement on Czechoslovakia was signed, the German navy temporarily
dropped its interest in developing Spain's naval possibilities.
Military planning followed politics. Between September 1937 and
September 1938, German arms dealers and naval officers showed interest in
Spain in ten different respects: (1) encouraging Franco's dream ofbuilding a
large navy; (2) ousting British influence from the Spanish naval construction
industry; (3) preferably accomplishing these two steps with Italian capital;
(4) gathering intelligence from Gibraltar and Morocco; (5) having Spain
define neutral and belligerent rights in such a way as to resist the expected
British blockade; (6) supplying weapons to Spain if they were needed
against increased French military aid to the Spanish Republicans; (7) using
Spanish docks and manufacturers to supply the weak German navy; (8)
impressing Spanish military circles with the technical superiority of Ger-
many; (9) obtaining oil for German V-boats and tenders; and (10) obtaining
other supplies for V-boats and tenders. Never mind that German naval power
was insufficient to put real muscle behind these various schemes and hopes.
Hitler, the politician, gave little thought to his navy's problems. He was
confident throughout that England would not fight for Czechoslovakia, and
he proved to be right.
Among the ways Spain could be useful to Germany and deserving of
more attention was the German navy's need for oil and other supplies for
submarines and tenders. Over two-thirds of the oil supplies of the Third
Reich had to be imported. 201 Guse, in his basic plan for Spain outlined in
April 1938, mentioned Spain's ability to supply Germany with oil. Needless
to say, Heye also was interested in looking over the ground for satisfying
these German needs during his June trip to Spain, Portugal, and Morocco.
One other possibility to consider was that of Germany obtaining a base
from Spain. Ever since the French-Soviet publicity of July 1936 about
Sanjurjo's earlier visit to Berlin, there had been much western press specula-
tion and fear that the Germans were angling for a base in Spain, Morocco, or
the Canary or Balearic Islands. But an open base similar to Britain's in
Gibraltar was pretty much out of the question. If Hitler asked for a base,
Spanish nationalism, which he counted on to be primarily directed against
Anglo-French interests, would be offended. Second, inasmuch as British,
French, and even American observers were closely watching areas such as
the Canary Islands,202 an overt base ran the risk of being attacked openly in
the event ofgeneral European war. Moreover, it was Hitler's policy to lull the
passive governments of England and France to sleep by giving them "assur-
ances" in the west so he could have a free hand in the east.
Nonetheless, Canaris and his colleagues did not seek a "base" in the
narrow sense of the word; they had greater ambitions. Before the civil war,
Canaris had set up the special secret service, Etappendienst, with its primary
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goal being to arrange for all of Spain and her dependencies to provide secret
economic support to the German navy. From 1934 to 1938 the Etappen-.
dienst was mainly concerned that Spain obtain crude oil from Latin America
and the United States so that the Germans could purchase refined petroleum
products in Spain in the event of a German-French war. 203 Even though
Spain had no oil reserves, a government benevolently neutral toward Ger-
many, and Spanish nearness to French shipping lanes, were keys to the
German navy's secret strategy.
From the point of view of the Etappendienst, the civil war only served to
disrupt these secret long-range plans, because only a peaceful, prosperous
Spain could afford to re-export supplies to the German U-boat fleet. Bar-:-
celona-the location in 1934-1935 of a branch of the Deutsche Werke, an
Etappendienst front204-was held by the Republicans, and the civil war had
increased suspicions among Germany's Great Power rivals. The outbreak of
civil war in 1936, then, had temporarily forced deactivation of Etappen-
dienst plans for Spain. During the civil war the Legion Condor had no oil
problem because Royal Dutch Shell Oil Company, Texas (Oil) Company,
and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey delivered the fuel the Legion
needed. 205
With the pro~pect in 1938 of a united, friendly government, Spain again
was to become one of the four worldwide centers of the Etappendienst. 206 In
fact, the country was intended to serve as the German navy's main European
base of Etappendienst operations outside the Fatherland. During the sum-
mer of 1938 steps were taken to reactivate the Etappendienst, and inspecting
supply possibilities in Spain was one of Heye's objectives during his June
1938 trip.
As the summer wore on, the Sudetenland crisis worsened. Admiral
Erich Raeder, until then an optimist about splitting Britain and France, came
to the pessimistic conclusion on September 9, 1938, that the Czechoslo-
vakian crisis would lead to combined war with Britain, France, and the
Soviet Union. 207 Raeder predicted that Germany would eventually lose this
war, but he nevertheless planned to send the pocket battleship Deutschland
into the mid-Atlantic where it would be supplied with oil indirectly through
Spain. The battleship was to do as much damage as possible to the British
merchant marine before its own eventual defeat. 208 Berlin instructed its
naval attache in Spain that, when the code word Wundergarten. was sounded,
supply service from the German auxiliary August Schulze, located off the
coast of Spain, would begin. 209 Canaris also provided his agents with cash
in U.S. dollars for purchases in Spain for the August Schulze and U-
boats. 210
How could the Etappendienst get Spanish cooperation, yet simul-
taneously keep the service secret from the Versailles powers? In July 1938,
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Canaris proposed to disperse secret funds of 11.5 million RM ($4.6 million)
in gold and foreign exchange that had been earmarked for OKM oil
purchases in such neutral cities as Amsterdam, London, and Zurich. Of this
money, 1.5 million RM ($600,000) would be sent to Spain and one million
RM ($400,000) to the Canary Islands. 211 The Etappendienst took this
security precaution to avoid possible seizure or freezing of their funds by
British and French banks.
The Germans had another source of Spanish funds. During 1937 the
German firm Schroeder & Devrient of Leipzig printed peseta banknotes for
the Franco regime, and the Reichsbank kept some for the Abwehr's future
war plans. The Allgemeine Electrikische Gesellschaft (AEG), Schering
Drug Company, I.G. Farben, Banco Aleman Transatlantico, and Banco
Germano America del Sur were to be the conduits. 212 HISMA-ROWAK
also accumulated funds inside Spain for intelligence purposes by retaining
Spanish damage payments in pesetas to Legion Condor troops, who re-
ceived payment in reichsmarks in Germany. 213 By the end of World War II,
the Etappendienst front of Deutsche Werke, Barcelona branch, held foreign
currencies in some twenty-seven countries from Argentina to India, includ-
ing Spain. 214
On August 26, 1938, when so many other naval authorities were
mobilizing, the OKM discussed with their Foreign Ministry Spain's role in
helping to solve Germany's major problem of oil supply. One of the par-
ticipants was Consul Jakob Ahlers of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, who had been
serving in the Canary Islands since World War 1.215 Ahlers, a member of the
Etappendienst, had served in the German navy in World War I and still held
a reserve commission. Since the 1920s he had run a business, including coal
and oil sales, that monopolized German trade in the Canary Islands; in
addition, he did intelligence work for the OKM. Franco called upon Ahlers
through his commander in the Canary Islands as early as August 1936 for
some special machinery to increase ammunition production. 216 In par-
ticular, Ahlers's banking services were at the disposal of the OKM to
dispense secret funds to purchase oil, coal, and information. 217
Besides Ahlers, others who discussed the German navy's oil problem
were Ministerialrat Dr. Fritz Fetzer of the 0 KM, Legationsrat Winzer of the
Economics Ministry, and Karl Schwendemann, the foreign ministry chief of
the political division for Spain and Portugal. 218 The navy placed on the table
on August 26 for discussion the question of the only major oil refinery in
Spain, at Santa Cruz de Tenerife in the Canary Islands.
This refinery, with a productive capacity of 5,000 barrels per day, was
owned by CEPSA (Compania Espanola de Petr6leos, Sociedad An6nima)
and had been constructed from April to November 1930.219 Its original
capital was 75 million pesetas220 (worth about $8 million in 1930); 60
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percent of its stock was owned by Juan March, 221 the Spanish financier and
shipping magnate from Mallorca.
.The company traced its origins to the politics of the monarchy and the
dictatorship of the late Miguel Primo de Rivera. In 1927 the Spanish
petroleum market had been mostly controlled by Royal Dutch Shell and
Standard Oil of New Jersey. 222 In June of that year, the Spanish minister of
Finance, Jose Calvo Sotelo, had decreed the confiscation of the retail sales
facilities of Shell, Standard, and other private firms, and the creation of the
state monopoly known as CAMPSA (CompafiiaArrendataria del Monopo-
lio de Petr6leos, S.A.).223 To assure supplies for CAMPSA, the Spaniards
wanted independent oil fields and refineries.
By creating CEPSA a few years later, they attempted to establish their
own refinery,. utilizing crude from independent fields in Venezuela for the
monopoly,224 in which March also held shares. 225 CEPSA, however, was
not very successful in gaining a truly independent source of crude oil
because of the hostility of the Standard-Shell interests on the supply end of
the business. Despite some links with British banks, March, an early
Nationalist supporter, was during the fall of 1938 in a position to further
German naval ambitions if it could be shown that he could make money by
doing so.
The German navy held a discussion in late August 1938 on the question
of how to utilize the oil refinery at Santa Cruz de. Tenerife in the Canary
Islands. Four Germans-Ahlers, Fetzer, Winzer, and Schwendemann-
talked of buying oil from Mexico and having it refined in Santa Cruz de
Tenerife. They hoped to thwart the plans of British Shell to obtain control of
the Spanish refinery and to boycott Mexican oil because of Mexico's March
1938 expropriation ofShell and Standard oil fields. The Germans planned to
arrange a three-way barter deal: Mexican crude oil in exchange for German-
made tankers and transportation to the refinery in the Canaries. The finished
petroleum products would then be used in Spain, with the surplus sold to
German submarines. Consequently, Reich officials agreed that the OKM
,WOUld buy up 50 percent ofCEPSA's capital, if necessary, to keep the Shell
interests OUt. 226
Although the worried talks of August 1938 proved to be a false alarm for
the Etappendienst, by the opening of World War II thirteen months later, the
OKM and its supply service were able to utilize some of the products of this
independent Canary Islands refinery. 227 So as a result of its 1938 war game,
the Etappendienst acquired experience that proved useful in 1939 when war
actually did break out.
A second function of the Etappendienst network of German agents,
who were to purchase and arrange for Spanish supplies with hard currency,
was to observe British and French activities. During much of the civil war
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the Etappendienst did not need to carry out an intelligence mission. Gruppe
Nordsee already gathered the necessary intelligence from Spain. In case a
general war had broken out in 1938, the intelligence network of the Legion
Condor could have been expanded to gather infonnation on a broader basis.
As Franco's Catalan campaign reached its decisive stage in December
1938 and January 1939, Canaris foresaw that the Legion Condor soon would
be withdrawn and that new arrangements would have to be made for
coordinating Gennan naval intelligence in Spain. On January 12, 1939,
Lieutenant Rolf Riiggeberg arrived in Burgos by air to satisfy a Spanish
request for a naval instructor at the San Fernando Naval School at Cadiz.228
Riiggeberg, born in Barcelona of Gennan parents in 1907, had been known
to Canaris in 1926,229 his father having served the kaiser as an agent in
World War 1.230 In 1934, the young Riiggeberg was working for naval
intelligence in Gennany as a radio expert.
When it came time to organize the withdrawal of the Legion Condor, a
dispute over Riiggeberg's status arose between naval attache Meyer-Dohner
(who was nominally part of the Legion Condor) and his superior, General
Richthofen of the Luftwaffe. Richthofen wanted Riiggeberg, who was of-
ficially listed as a member of the Gruppe Nordsee, to return to Germany
with everyone else in the Legion Condor. To ensure successful operation of
the Etappendienst, however, the navy and Canaris wanted Riiggeberg to
remain in Spain.
When Canaris visited Franco in April 1939 to witness the triumph of
Nationalist anns, Meyer-Dohner took his quarrel with Richthofen to the
Abwehr chief. 231 The upshot was the retention in Spain of Riiggeberg,
whose subsequent activities with the Etappendienst were to reveal him as
considerably more than a mere instructor. 232 Moreover, not only did Riig-
geberg stay, but on April 19, 1939, three naval reserve officers (one of whom
was Commander Eberhard Messerschmidt) arrived under civilian cover. 233
Canaris needed these men-along with certain foreign office personnel,
including Consul Ahlers in the Canary Islands and Consul Gustavo Drager
in Seville-to operate the reorganized intelligence and supply system.234
Lieutenant Alfred Menzell, the naval attache aide who was also a member of
the Abwehr,235 assisted the other Etappendienst agents. Stohrer, whose
contacts with Canaris had begun in World War 1,236 had knowledge of these
plans and activities; some "private" businessmen such as Ernst Klingen-
berg, an associate of Bernhardt, also were involved.
One would be hasty to conclude from the Riiggeberg incident that
Richthofen, Goring's aviation representative in Spain, was seeking to thwart
Gennan espionage activity. Rather, Richthofen's objection appears to have
stemmed from a lack of communication among German officials, or possi-
bly from interservice rivalry. The Nazi regime was plagued with a good deal
126 Hitler and Spain
of this waste, which often rose from the jealousies ofHitler's lieutenants, and
it was exacerbated because the Fuhrer fostered dissension for his own ends.
Not wholly content with the agencies officially charged with spying, such as
the Abwehr (overseas) and the Gestapo (at home), Goring had his own large-
scale intelligence-gathering outfit. Although Goring's Forschungsamt had
begun in 1933 with just 120 men, it had developed a staff of 3,500 em-
ployees by 1937-1938.237 Paul Korner, better known as state secretary for
the Four-Year Plan under Goring, headed this intelligence agency.
The versatile Goring was the highest-ranking party and military man
with direct control over military and economic dealings in Spain during the
civil war. 238 As such, the field marshal and his men had contact with
Canaris and his agents. The Riiggeberg incident aside, Canaris and Goring
generally enjoyed a harmonious relationship. In the first place, the Abwehr
and the Forschungsamt made an agreement to exchange intelligence infor"
mation. 239 As nominal economic dictator, Goring also diverted funds for
use by Canaris's agents. 240 Secondly, Goring paid for the entire intelligence
and Etappendienst operations; on April 17, 1939, Canaris and Goring
agreed to spend $96,000 in foreign exchange in Spain for military intel-
ligence. 241 In addition, Goring dispensed an annual fund of $600,000 for
acquiring naval supplies, mostly oil. Beyond the oil fund, the annual
expenditure for the Etappendienst worldwide amounted to $1,480,000 as of
May 23, 1939.242
Nevertheless, the field marshal had his own independent plans for the
postwar development of Spain in Germany's larger "New Order." As com-
missioner for the Four-Year Plan, Goring had jurisdiction over German
economic activity in Spain. Also, Goring's Luftwaffe from the end of
December 1938 through April 1939 sent at least seven members of the
Sonderstab W to Spain. 243 Although their activities 'are not known, their
presence in Spain, and the fact that special transfers of money were secretly
made to them, were reasons enough for the documentation of their trip to be
kept in Abwehr hands.
More is known about Goring's responsibility for sending a "fishing
expedition" to the Canary Islands between July 14 and August 14, 1938.
Actually, the fishermen were looking for a site for a military base. 244
Participants in the operation took photos and made many maps of the
Canary Islands from a fishing vessel of 456 H.P., the Richard Ohlrogge. 245
The main figure in the islands behind this venture was Gustav Winter, who
supposedly was seeking a site on which to construct a fish cannery. After his
training in Germany as an electrical engineer, Winter had lived in Spain
during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1927 he had worked for a Spanish company
that brought electricity to Las Palmas, and there he had conceived the idea of
developing an uninhabited peninsula on the island of Fuerteventura. Some-
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Source: Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961), 130.
time in 1937, he had begun promoting his idea of a German fishing port in
the Spanish islands in the Atlantic with Goring's officials (see map 4).246
Winter's efforts met with some success, and profits from Bernhardt's trading
company financed the venture, in whole or in part. 247
Possibly the Munich settlement caused Goring and his associates to
drop their interest in the Canaries. Nothing more was heard of this project for
some months, until Ambassador Stohrer and the Foreign Ministry learned of
the summer 1938 voyage. 248 In January 1939 Stohrer objected to Goring and
Bernhardt about having been left in the dark concerning the project, but by
then Goring had lost interest. He sent no further "fishing expeditions" to the
Canaries until June 1939.249
Such expeditions aside, Goring as the number-two man in the Nazi
bureaucracy was the focal point of various people interested in expanding
their ties with the new Nationalist Spain. Many Germans brought reports to
the field marshal about developments in the Spanish Civil War and about the
growing Anglo-German tension in Europe as a whole, as well as occasional
reports on activities in Spanish ports and islands. Goring was badly overex-
tended, however, and he did not develop a clear Spanish policy of his own.
He merely responded to the events in Spain and to Hitler's overall expan-
sionist ideas in Europe.
In the wake of the Munich crisis, Hitler sought recommendations from
Guse, Fricke of Naval Operations, Stohrer, and Ribbentrop about the strate-
gic use of Spain in any future war with Britain. In November 1938, the
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Fuhrer told Keitel, the OKW chief, that if Italy and Germany fought Britain
and France, Spain should remain benevolently neutral. 250 According to
Hitler, Italy was supposed to press Spain to increase its economic and
strategic contribution in such a war, to continue its occupation of the
Balearic Islands, and even to eliminate the British base at Gibraltar by
attacking it.
Hitler further defined Germany's post-civil-war role in Spain to Keitel
on March 3, 1939. On the eve of his Czech take-over, the Fuhrer reaffirmed
Spain's need to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of a world war,
but he hoped that Franco would build up his army and agree to a bilateral
exchange of officers. In consideration of Spanish Volkscharakter, however,
he said Germany would have to await Franco's decision. Any future eco-
nomic assistance for rebuilding the Spanish military potential would be
under Goring's Four-Year Plan offices, after the Legion Condor was with-
drawn. 25t
Hitler's seizure of Prague, and new demands for Danzig in late March
1939, fanned the flames of anti-German feeling in Britain and France and
spurred Chamberlain's famous speech to the House of Commons on March
31, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Poland from German attack. In
the midst of these developments, Stohrer and Ribbentrop finally concluded
with Spain the long-delayed friendship treaty. It will be recalled that Hitler
once had questioned this idea, but in the spring of 1939, when the British
Foreign Office was declaiming that there would be no more Munich-type
concessions to Germany, the "fostering of comradely military relations"
between Spain and Germany took on new meaning.
Franco finally signed the treaty on March 31, 1939, the last day of the
civil war. It provided for a military clause, and it pledged collaboration with
Ital~ If, however, Italy refused to supply Spain's military needs, the way was
open for an expanded bilateral German-Spanish military agreement. The
time had come for Hitler to tie Franco to the Axis and to ensure that Spain
would serve his cause in any future war with the western entente.
Military Plans Grow from Franco's Victory to the Pact of Steel
Just before the German march on Prague in March 1939, General Gastone
Gambara, commander of the Italian units in Spain, returned to that country
from a brief sojourn in Rome. He carried the Duce's message for Franco,
stating that the Italian troops would remain only as long as Franco needed
them. 252 Richthofen, then commanding the Legion Condor, agreed that
German troops would be withdrawn at the same time. Hitler was prepared to
withdraw the Legion Condor as soon as Italy indicated its readiness. 253
For Hitler, the end of the Spanish Civil War came into sight after the
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success of Franco's Catalan campaign in Janua~254 In a speech before the
Reichstag on January 30, 1939, Hitler revealed to the German public for the
first time the existence of the Legion Condor.255 On February 24, as the
military situation in Spain looked even more favorable to Franco, the Fuhrer
notified the OKW of his decision to give the Legion Condor great publicity
upon its victorious return to Germany:256 Hitler dispatched OKM Com-
mander Pistorius on March 7 to organize the withdrawal of the legion,257 on
whatever final date Franco would set for the departure of German and Italian
forces.
The question thereby arose of future military cooperation among Ger-
mans, Spaniards, and Italians. In mid-March General Gambara informed
Colonel Baron Hans von Funck, German military attache in Spain, that
Franco wanted a preliminary Italian-German military agreement deciding
the distribution of the military aid each power would grant Spain after the
war. 258 Following the long-established policy of refusing beforehand to
divulge German military plans for Spain, Funck did not commit German~
In a second conversation a few days later, Gambara outlined Spanish
military needs and tried to draw out the Germans about what they intended
to do. Funck again avoided saying anything specific to Gambara. 259
Despite Funck's evasiveness, his superiors in Berlin did have in mind
several ways in which the Spaniards could be useful in a German war with
the West. For instance, by digging trenches in the Pyrenees and thus
appearing a menace to France, the Spanish army was expected to divert a
French army corps from the Rhine frontier. 26o Yet Italy and Spain would
have to carry the burden of Spanish naval rearmament on their own because
the Germans offered no specific aid.
In mid-March 1939, Admiral Bastarreche, the commander at Cadiz
who had been keeping Meyer-Dohner informed about Spanish fleet con-
struction, represented Franco at the coronation ceremonies ofPope Pius XII.
Bastarreche spent part of his fourteen-day stay in Italy conferring with
Italian naval leaders, including Rear Admiral Giovanni Remedio Ferretti,
who in 1936 had been liaison at Franco's headquarters. He had helped build
a blockade headquarters on Mallorca for the Nationalist naval effort. 261
Bastarreche and Ferretti talked about building up the Spanish fleet,262 and
upon his return to Spain, Bastarreche reaffirmed to Meyer-Dohner that the
Spaniards would buy the eight Italian destroyers already under contract. The
Spanish admiral had no interest in German destroyers, which he claimed had
too high a silhouette, but he did want German V-boats. Meyer-Dohner
advised the OKM to reject the Spanish bid for German submarines because
Germany needed all these vessels it could build for itself.
Despite the caution of Funck and Meyer-Dohner, Goring was ready to
implement the military clause of the friendship treaty, concerning German-
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Spanish officer consultations. 263 Through Richthofen, Goring invited many
Spanish officers in, the air and ground forces to come to German~ Franco
answered the invitations by cautioning that before the military talks could be
implemented, the Legion Condor must be withdrawn from Spain. He then
promised that a Spanish military delegation would go to Germany in
connection with the homecoming ceremonies for the legion. 264
On April 17, the OKW sent to Spanish waters a German training
flotilla265 consisting ofpractically all the warships Germany had: the pocket
battleships (Deutschland, GrafSpee, Mmiral Scheer), two cruisers, eight
destroyers, and eight submarines, accompanied by four supply ships. They
planned to stop at Tangier, Ceuta, EI Ferrol, and Lisbon from April 18 to
May 10.266 Supplementing the main flotilla, a sailing vessel would put into
ports in the Canaries on April 27 and continue on to Brazil. 267
The visiting German naval officers met with Etappendienst agents in
Ceuta and Cadiz; with the Spanish high commissioner for Morocco; with
the Moroccan caliph; with Nazi Ortsgruppenleiter (town leader) Lan-
genheim and his son (an Abwehr agent); with Suanzes, the Spanish minister
of industry and commer~e; and with Bastarreche of the Cadiz naval base.
One member of the party, Commodore Karl Donitz, later famous as World
War II commander of the Third Reich's submarine force, took a side trip by
auto to Tetuan and concentrated his attention on anti-French, anti-Jewish
Moroccans. He wanted to sample Moroccan opinion toward the French, the
British, and particularly toward the Arabic translation of Mein Kampf and
Hitler's speech of April 28, 1939,268 which reviewed German foreign policy
since the Versailles treaty.
Timed to coincide with his fleet's tour of Iberian waters and Spanish
bases in North Africa, this was one of Hitler's most significant and well-
planned addresses. In his introduction he pretended that he had been a prince
of peace; he then denounced British encirclement in general, and specifical-
ly the Anglo-German naval arms limitation treaty of 1935. He also reiterated
his claim to Danzig, repudiated the German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934
with Poland, and boasted of Axis military strength. Hitler responded pub-
licly with laughter and sarcasm to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's April 15
appeal to him for a pledge of peace to last ten years. 269
This speech and the German fleet's "training exercise" clearly were
directed against Britain, France, and even the United States. For their part,
the French saw the German fleet's visit to Spanish waters as part of an all-
Europe war scare and a maneuver to avoid a general blockade. 270 When the
pocket battleship Admiral Scheer stopped in Bilbao, Meyer-Dohner took the
opportunity to talk to Suanzes once again about Spain's revised fleet
construction plans. 271 The minister intended to build four battleships,
fifteen to eighteen cruisers, and twenty-five to forty U-boats, all within eight
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years. At this time, Suanzes said it was still an open question whether he
would accept Italian or German aid-the Bastarreche-Ferretti negotiations
in Rome had broken down over financial issues. Although Italy had two
contracts on paper to build destroyers and battleships, so far very little had
been done about them. The Spanish hint for German hardware brought forth
a renewed offer to sell destroyers, which the Spanish navy had already re-
jected.
Discussion of the battleship project on the Italian end continued when a
group of Spanish naval officers arrived in Rome on May 5, at Mussolini's
invitation. 272 Later in the month the Italians sent twenty naval officers to
Spain, including three rear admirals. 273 Yet they took only another small
step on the plans to construct the four battleships. Fundamentally, Italy's
military interest in Spain had declined ever since Hitler's seizure of Prague
and the end of the civil war. By July the Italian naval construction work at EI
Ferrol, which had not gone very far in any case, came to an end.
Despite the symbolic value of such visits, the old principle of the
original Axis protocols-an Italian sphere of influence in the western
Mediterranean in exchange for a German sphere in the east-had become
moribund. For Mussolini, the Italian victory at Barcelona had avenged the
defeat of Guadalajara. From April to July, he increasingly talked about his
ambitions in Yugoslavia and Egypt but ignored Spain.
During April and May, the Germans had been content to leave the
March 31 Treaty of Friendship with Spain largely unimplemented. While
German-Spanish military relations were confined to exploratory talks, the
more important German-Italian military negotiations at this point began and
progressed quite rapidly. The OKW, which had parried Italian requests for a
military alliance for more than a year, for the first time was eager to proceed.
In the initial series of talks, Keitel, the OKW chief, met with the Italian
under state secretary for war at Innsbruck on April 4, 1939. 274 Goring
followed this with a visit to Libya in early April, and to Rome April 14-17, in
order to confer with the Duce, Ciano, King Victor Emmanuel, and others. 275
The Goring-Mussolini discussions ranged over the whole map of Eu-
rope. As far as Spain was concemed,Goring and the Duce agreed that
Germany and Italy would jointly grant economic aid to Spain after the civil
war. Goring encouraged the Italians to remain in the Balearic Islands and
take Tunis from the French.
But Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, pointed out to the Reichsmarshal
that Italian deliveries to Spain had already been large and that little payment
had been received. Amplifying upon this assertion, the Duce added that
Italy, having swallowed Albania, planned no action against France or Tunis
for two or three years. With the French, however, Goring took a conciliatory
line. Mentioning the German fleet's visit to Spanish waters to the French
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ambassador in Rome, the Reichsmarshal said the French press exaggerated
the threat of war. Goring maintained that the German fleet was engaged only
in routine maneuvers and blamed Britain for trying to dominate the Mediter-
ranean. 276
Goring's talks in Rome brought complaints from Germany's foreign
minister, Ribbentrop, for they had not been authorized by the German
Foreign Ministry. In turn, Ribbentrop granted permission for the com-
mander in chief of the army (OKH), General Walther von Brauchitsch, to
make an official visit. 277 The German army head visited Italy from April
28, the day Hitler publicly denounced the Western democracies, to May 11.
Brauchitsch met with Mussolini, the king, Ciano, a war department repre-
sentative, and the chiefs of staff of the army, air force, navy, and fascist
militia. 278 To demonstrate German-Italian alignment, he also inspected
Italian troops and military installations in Libya and La Spezia. Finally, on
May 9, the anniversary of the founding of the Italian empire, Brauchitsch
participated in the bestowal of 138 medals upon Italian soldiers returned
from Spain.279 Afterward, Italian generals were invited to Germany for
military maneuvers. 280
A still more important event for German-Italian military solidarity
occurred in Milan. There Ribbentrop made preliminary arrangements for the
long-awaited political and military alliance with Italy, triumphantly an-
nounced later, during Hitler's visit to Mussolini on May 21-22 in Rome.
Ribbentrop told Ciano during their Pact of Steel conversations, May 6-7,
that the Germans were satisfied with the attitude of Franco. 28l A reluctant
Ciano accepted Ribbentrop's draft on the assumption that it was a defensive
treaty to deter England and France and that war was not yet on the horizon.
Ribbentrop added that the Axis should strengthen their bonds with Spain in
order to pin down French armed forces. In practice, the Axis link with Spain,
as far as Hitler and Ribbentrop were concerned, still meant mainly an Italian
bond with Spain. The Italians, however, had grown less interested in the
western Mediterranean. For one thing, the "war scare," invented by the
Fascist party in late 1938 between Italy and France over Corsica and other
French western Mediterranean possessions, had disappeared. Again the
Duce reiterated what he had told Goring, namely, that he was satisfied that
the Spanish Popular Fronf'had been destroyed and that the triumphant new
dictator in Spain was emulating Italian Fascism.
The decision of the Duce and Ciano at Milan to postpone war talk282
was followed by the return of the Corpo Truppe Voluntarie to Italy and the
Legion Condor to Germany, after the huge May 19 victory parade in Madrid.
The date for the German embarkation was fixed for May 26. 283 Franco gave
himself maximum flexibility at a time when he feared the growing Anglo-
German tension over Poland.
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This chapter has examined German military ideas on the strategic
position of Spain. The navy had engaged in certain construction projects in
Spain during pre-Nazi times. Since 1933 they had planned to use Spain as a
supply point for their submarine operations against the French navy and its
merchant shipping. The German intervention in Spain's civil war in July
1936 was not a preconceived military plot to start a general war; in fact, the
destructive social conflict of the Spaniards disrupted and weakened the
plans of the secret Etappendienst to utilize a healthy Spanish economy.
Hitler's military operations in the Spanish Civil War escalated in three
stages: Operation Feuerzauber, July 1936; Operation Otto, September 1936;
and operations Luftubung Rugen and Winteriibung Hansa in October,
dispatching the Legion Condor. Over the course of the civil war, the Legion
Condor's five thousand highly trained men were probably essential for
Franco's victory. Subsequently they provided Hitler's air force, panzers and
signal corps with experienced personnel for the Polish and later campaigns.
For Franco the Legion Condor provided a valuable balance to Italy's corps;
but in 1937 and 1938 Mussolini, pursuing his own European aims, pushed,
with Hitler's encouragement, for even greater glory for the CTV and Italy's
Mediterranean navy.
As the civil war developed, the German navy realized belatedly in June
1937 that Spain might be useful in a future war with Britain. The OKM
hoped this contingency would never come to pass, but Hitler's April 1938
extended plans for Czechoslovakia encouraged the OKM to expand its plans
to use Spain against Britain. At the same time, Franco's victory in the
Levante seemed to give Stohrer and Ribbentrop an excuse to sign up Spain
with the Axis before the Legion Condor was withdrawn. When Republican
resistance revived, however, Hitler did not press for his navy's needs or
Ribbentrop's scheme to expand the Anti-Comintern Pact to Spain. Instead,
he pinned his immediate hopes on Britain pressuring a weakened France to
write off eastern Europe. Hitler won his bluff at Munich, and the decision to
tie Spain to the Axis was delayed until Franco occupied Madrid at the end of
March 1939.
With relaxation of the September 1938 "period of tension" (as the
Germans called the Sudetenland crisis), the German navy did little more
about Spain until after the Spanish Civil War was over in 1939. By then, the
eyes of Hitler and Chamberlain were turning toward Poland. Hitler would
again try previously successful diplomatic bluffs, combining propaganda
about communism and national self-determination with military threats.
The Treaty of Friendship, signed at Burgos along with the Anti-Comintern
Pact, was supposed to ensure that Spain would be a neutral friend in the event
of general war. The pattern might be like the pacts with Italy-from the Axis
Protocol to the Anti-Comintern Pact and ultimately to the Pact of Steel.
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Under the right circumstances, the Spanish pacts could also conceivably be
converted into a full-fledged alliance. Indeed, many western leftists and
journalists already regarded Franco as fully committed to the Axis at the end
of the civil war.
When the German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship was signed, Goring
sent out invitations to leaders of the Spanish armed forces to get military
discussions under way; Franco ruled that these depended on the return of the
Legion Condor to Germany, and talks were delayed two months. During the
time between April and June 1939, the German military concentrated on
strengthening its ties with Italy, because Germany hoped that the Duce
would take the diplomatic offensive against Britain and France in the West.
Most German naval strategists and the Abwehr realized that Franco's
aid to the German supply service (Etappendienst) would basically be a
small-scale operation. If Germany and Britain were to go to war, the
Etappendienst would be pitted against the world's greatest sea power and its
potential ally across the Atlantic, in a replay of World War I submarine
tactics. Hitler's experimental military and economic relations with Franco
seemed to be paying off, but beneath the surface of ideological unity,




This book has examined three basic questions. First, what role did Adolf
Hitler play in bringing Francisco Franco to power in Spain? Second and
third, during the years of the Spanish upheaval, what gains did the Fuhrer
make in the European balance of power generally and in Franco's Spain
specifically? In the decisive years of 1936-1939, Hitler made his Spanish
decisions in four interrelated areas: political, military, ideological, and
economic. This book has traced the paths of development in those areas.
The failed coup d'etat of July 1936 turned into a long campaign to
reconquer Spain, the consequences of which were to eliminate most of the
social reforms made by the Second Spanish Republic from 1931 to 1933.
When the civil war broke out, Benito Mussolini and Adolph Hitler began
pursuing parallel policies toward Spain-their goals being to weaken the
influence of the French and, secondarily, the British in that troubled country.
The two Axis powers sent Franco organized and effective military aid that
outweighed the intervention of other Great Powers. In fact, European liber-
als were reluctant to act at all, so the Spanish Republicans sought the aid of
Soviet military advisors and weapons. Internationally, during 1937, Mus-
solini took the lead over Hitler, both on the Spanish front and throughout the
Mediterranean, in opposing the Soviet Union and France. Hitler welcomed
the Duce's imperalist concentration on the southwest, because that meant
Austria by 1938 was free for the Fuhrer's taking. The Spanish crisis also
helped divert France, Britain, and the USSR in the fall of 1938 from uniting
to defend Czechoslovakia against German territorial demands.
The Spanish fr.ont seemed to some European military observers to have
been bogged down in stalemate during the two years from November 1936 to
November 1938. In fact, Franco's troops, city by city, village by village-
from Malaga to Bilbao to Vinaroz on the Mediterranean-gradually recon-
quered Spain from the Left. From the international perspective, Franco won
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his war in eight decisive stages: (1) the bringing in of Italian and German air
transport in July 1936 to help Franco's forces cross the Straits of Gibraltar;
(2) the capture of Badajoz on August 14, linking up Franco's troops with
those ofGeneral Emilio Mola from the north and thereby securing a friendly
border with Portugal; (3) Mola's victory at Ir6n on September 4, sealing off
one unfriendly frontier with France; (4) the Nationalist navy's coming to
dominate the Straits of Gibraltar in late September and, with the aid of
Italian forces, capturing Mallorca in the Balearic Islands; (5) the conquest
of the Basque capital of Bilbao in June 1937, which provided EI Caudillo
with a major industrial base; (6) the decision of Georges Bonnet, the French
foreign minister, in June 1938 to seal off the Pyrenees against further
substantial clandestine aid by French leftists to the Spanish Republicans; (7)
the joint decision in September 1938, on the eve of the Munich Conference,
by Juan Negrin, the Republican prime minister, and Stalin to withdraw the
International Brigades; and (8) the international inattention to Spain suc-
ceeding Munich, while Franco undertook the final assault on the Republican
redoubt.
Until Franco's offensive began against Catalonia on December 23,
1938, the front was relatively static. Hitler, Mussolini for the most part, and
Stalin continued to provide only enough arms to maintain their respective
Spanish friends. Both British and French policymakers, Neville Cham-
berlain and Georges Bonnet, privately hoped that Franco would win, but
they refused to say so publicly. Franco's decisive campaign in Catalonia in
January 1939 finally closed the frontier with France, and hundreds of
thousands of Loyalists fled into exile.
Although Franco and the Nationalists battled their way to power through
their bloody military conquest of Spain, Axis aid was essential. Without the
arms and military expertise (total value $569 million) extended on credit
from the two Axis dictators, Franco would not have won the civil war.
German manpower, while less than Italian, was more effective, concentrat-
ing the air, tank, artillery, and communications technical services of the
5,OOO-man Legion Condor.
In terms of the international balance of power in 1936, the Fuhrer and
the Duce transformed a local Spanish struggle into a European diplomatic
contest in which developments in Spain served to weaken the ties of France
with the Soviet Union and Britain. During the course of the civil war, the
Fuhrer concluded anti-Comintern pacts with Japan and Italy, in addition to
the Axis agreement with Mussolini. Although stalemated around Madrid,
Franco's forces made significant advances in the north and south of Spain in
1937, and Mussolini became heavily involved both on land and in the
Mediterranean.
In March 1938 ,Hitler took Austria; in October, the Sudetenland; and in
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March 1939, he seized the remainder of Czechoslovakia. The Austrian and
Prague occupations occurred at times when Hitler thought the Spanish crisis
was about to end. Then, at the end of the civil war, Hitler capped these
diplomatic coups with a bilateral Treaty of Friendship with Spain, Spanish
adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the solidification of the Rome-
Berlin Axis by the Pact of Steel.
In 1935, before the eruption of the Spanish crisis, the British foreign
minister, Anthony Eden, had visited the Soviet Union and had speculated
about the possibility of an Anglo-French-Soviet coalition against Hitler. In
May 1938, Winston Churchill christened the would-be coalition the "Grand
Alliance." The war in Spain had made any such deal impossible, however.
With the potential"Grand Allies" so badly divided after 1936 that they could
not become allied until 1941, the Axis helped to perpetuate the Spanish
struggle for nearly three crucial years. If the Axis had left Spain alone, the
social crisis of 1936 might well have resolved itself much sooner. As it
happened, however, the Axis dictators were influenced to cooperate in Spain
in joint opposition to decisions made by the Soviet and French left-wing
organizations.
In July 1936, Hitler's military participation was in advance of Mus-
solini's and Stalin's. By early October, Stalin's involvement had caught up;
then Hitler moved ahead again, in late October and in early November, with
the dispatch of the Legion Condor. From December 1936 to the end of the
war, the Fuhrer refused to increase German support; instead, Italian aid
forged ahead. Franco's eventual victory resulted, in part, from the compli-
cated diplomatic maneuvering of the five Great Powers, from which Hitler
emerged as the principal winner.
Hitler's motives and tactics in Spain were complex. Neither Mussolini
nor Hitler designed his initial technological aid in accordance with a
preconceived plan for a new fascist Spain; both lent their money piecemeal,
in a half-dozen or so major installments. As the war progressed, the slowness
of Franco's armies in the field determined, to some degree, Berlin's and
Rome's ad hoc decisions to provide additional military aid for the Nation-
alist cause.
On the other hand, Hitler's desire to deceive the diplomats of the other
Great Powers determined at least two of the three military steps he made in
1936 (Operations Feuerzauber and LuftubungRugen/Winteriibung Hansa).
After the major escalation represented by the Legion Condor, Hitler set his
subsequent policy of sustaining aid at that level during the rest of the war.
His deceit was proven when he secretly sent weapons, ammunition, and
supplies to Spain on 134 vessels while continuing discussions in London's
ineffective Non-Intervention Committee.! Of course, the Italians, Soviets
and French were also talking and double-dealing.
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Hitler's European strategy was revealed by his encouraging Mussolini
to be the prime foreign interventionist in Spain. While he harangued
Niimberg party rallies with preaching against the devil, "communism," he
left Franco with the main burden ofkilling "the reds. " For Hitler, the Spanish
labyrinth provided a convenient place for experiments--diplomatic, eco-
nomic, propagandistic, and military. From July 1936 to March 1939,
Mussolini cooperated in the main with Hitler's ambitions for Europe, and in
general he trumpeted Hitler's- Spanish policy as well as his own. During
periods in 1937 and 1938, Mussolini adopted Hitler's tactic of merely
maintaining Franco's military machine; at other times, the Duce, proud of
reviving Italian military might, continued to escalate the war beyond any
other nation's intervention. In the summer of 1937 he carried out a "pirate"
campaign in the Mediterranean. In the spring of 1938 he joined Franco and
the Legion Condor to bomb systematically the port cities of the Spanish
Mediterranean coast. Among all the foreign participants in the Spanish
upheaval, only the dogged Mussolini showed himself committed to the end
to Franco's total victo~
Hitler's reputation as a quintessential propagandist rests, in part, on his
successful exploitation of the thirty-two-month-Iong Spanish war as a
crusade against communism. The war's events intensified the negative
emotional reaction to communism by many people in Britain, its empire and
commonwealth, France, Italy, Japan, the Americas, and much of Europe-
except for the Soviet Union and groups among the liberal-socialist Left. In
August 1936, Hitler justified to his own people the introduction of the Four-
Year Plan in the name of anticommunism. From July to November 1936 he
pressed the Japanese military, who ultimately agreed to the Anti-Comintem
Pact. During the visit by the Italian foreign minister, Ciano, to Berlin in
October to sign the Axis Protocols, Hitler took the opportunity to link the
"communist threat" and the Spanish crisis. Goring (Luftwaffe), Himmler
(SS), Canaris (military intelligence), Goebbels (general propaganda),
Rosenberg (party propaganda), and Ribbentrop (foreign affairs) worked
"against communism" with their Italian counterparts in 1936 and 1937.
Through the power of German persuasion, Mussolini adhered to the Anti-
Comintem Pact in 1937, and Franco finally agreed to join at the end of the
civil war in 1939.
Hitler also got much mileage from exploiting the fear of revolution in
Spain in his communications with British and French leaders. Notable
impacts were made, for instance, on their ambassadors in Berlin, on Lord
Halifax during his Berlin visit of November 1937, and on Chamberlain at
the Munich Conference. Conservatives everywhere suspected the Soviet
Union of a revolutionary role in Spain. Actually the USSR had a dual stance
in Spain-preaching democracy and popular front to the Left around the
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world, while repressing anarchism and Leninist revolution in the Republic
itself. Chamberlain, favoring the social status quo in Spain and the "bulwark
against communism" claimed by Germany and Italy, supported the re-
pressive Spanish Nationalist movement, appeased the Axis, and under-
mined the popular fronts that opposed them in Spain and France.
The Germans' delaying role in the Non-Intervention Committee in 1936
and 1937 was tolerated because the British government thought the NIC had
importance. The Germans used those discussions mostly to play for time. 2
After February 1938, German bureaucratic paper shuffling at the NIC was
less necessary. The focus on intervention then shifted to Anglo-Italian
negotiations for mutual withdrawal of foreign troops. The Germans merely
backed Mussolini and Franco, who took the burden of stalling in direct
negotiations with Britain. 3
Events during the civil war misled not only European conservatives but
also liberals and social democrats. They saw Franco become the chief of
state in October 1936 and then make himself the Caudillo of a totalitarian
party when he united the Falange with the Carlists in April 1937. In March
1938, Franco publicized his fascist Labor Charter, modeled after Italy's
laws, and he adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact in March of 1939. Thus
leftists in the democracies assumed, with Hitler, that by 1939 Franco had
become like Mussolini, or Austria's Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Hungary's Admi-
ral Nicholas Horthy, or Czechoslovakia's Father Josef Tiso, all of whom
Hitler could manipulate. Leftist propaganda generally portrayed Franco as
one more dictator of a monolithic fascism.
Hitler may have hoped that the Nationalist ideological hate for revolu-
tion would obligate Franco to join his "New Order." Yet even to Hitler, the
New Order was little more than a loose propaganda slogan derived from a
racist group called by that name in 1900. The term was first used publicly by
the Fuhrer on March 22, 1936, to characterize a peace proposal, but Hitler's
famous confidant and first-hand biographer Hermann Rauschning has af-
firmed that Hitler really meant a new racial order. In 1937, as interpreted by
Alfred Rosenberg, the New Order came to mean a general suppression of
communism. 4 The slogan also was used outside Germany. In November
1938 the Japanese defined the New Order as Japanese economic and
political predominance in China, as opposed to the preceding British and
American "capitalistic" order. 5 Thus New Order, like "fascism" and "Axis"
and "communism", was used by the anti-Comintern powers to justify their
own imperial claims in euphemistic language.
In Spain it is the word fascism that has been subjected to greatest abuse.
In 1936 the term was broadly defined by the Left to be equivalent to all forms
of reaction. 6 Many conservatives use the word strictly for the Falangist party.
Spanish fascism should be compared with Italian fascism and German
140 Hitler and Spain
National Socialism,7 for there are similarities among the three. World War I,
the Moroccan Wars, the civil war itself, the imperial ambitions of the three
"have-not nations," and a hatred of internationalism-these were factors
creating pro-fascist sentiment in Germany, Italy, and Spain, and eventually
creating fascist regimes. Franco's fascism became overt in April 1937 when
he assumed the title of EI Caudillo and formed the single legal party in
Nationalist Spain.
Debates about the extent to which Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini were or
were not fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian8 generally are not helpful. All
three dictators had totalitarian ambitions; they all wanted power to flow to
and from themselves. Yet in all three nations, some opposition groups
managed to survive, so that totalitarianism was never fully achieved any-
where. All three were fascist in the sense that they repudiated such liberal
institutions as parliaments, elections, independent judiciaries, the free
press, multiple parties, free religious conscience, and a bill of rights. All
three glorified war. All three were anticommunist. From the Marxist point of
view, they represented degenerate capitalism trying to preserve itself by
resorting to dictatorial militarism.
StilL Hitler's pragmatic economic actions in Spain from 1936 to 1939
proved that he was not a starry-eyed crusader for the anticommunist ideal.
Throughout the war the economic role of the Third Reich in Spain continued
to grow. Franco's war debts accumulated during the conflict, while Johannes
Bernhardt's trading companies made war profits and multiplied invest-
ments. The stronger economic influence of Germany in Spain, coupled with
Spanish weakness, gave Hitler some additional leverage in the European
balance of power.
At the end of the civil war, Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini seemed to be
riding the wave of the future. The Fuhrer's experiment in Spain appeared
triumphant in all dimensions. Yet, despite the apparent solidarity of the
"fascist Axis," Hitler was already encountering difficulties with both Mus-
solini and Franco. The Spanish experiment as a limited military operation
coupled with propaganda was one thing; but in the second half of 1939 it
proved to be no firm foundation for a long-range military strategy for
Hitler's southern flank.
In the spring of 1939, Franco on the eve of victory joined Hitler's Anti-
Comintern Pact. After the diplomatic bombshell of the Nazi-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, however, the Caudillo sent warm
congratulations to Germany for the COUp.9 Actually Franco was relieved by
the pact, since its effect was to excuse war-ravaged Spain from taking a
hostile stand against France. If there had to be a European war, Franco
preferred having it fought in the East rather than in western Mediterranean
waters. In practice, the Spanish generalissimo gave less weight to sympathy
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for "Catholic" Poland and antipathy for communism (meaning the Soviet
government) than one might suppose from his regime's anticommunist
preaching.
Economic destruction wrought by the civil war dictated Spanish neu-
trality in 1939-1940, although the Caudillo risked occupying Tangier in
June 1940 after the fall of the French Third Republic, when Britain was
standing alone against the fascists. At that time the Fuhrer took steps to take
Gibraltar from Britain through Spain. 10 But Franco's caution kept Spain
from throwing in its lot openly with the Axis, as a chilly meeting with Hitler
at Hendaye in October 1940 showed.
After Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941, Franco sent the Blue
Division to the eastern front to fight the Soviets. Ramon Serrano Sufier, then
foreign minister, publicized this as a great anticommunist crusade. Franco,
like Hitler, originally thought that Russia would prove a short campaign,
after which he would be in a better bargaining position for Mediterranean
concessions. That he was motivated by revenge against Stalin for the Soviet
dictator's aid to the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War has been assumed
by many; certainly Serrano Sufier's profascist press thirsted for revenge. In
any case, 47,000 Spaniards fought in the USSR, and some 4,500 died
there. 1 1
On the other side, many of the able-bodied Republican refugees in
France fought the German invasion in 1940 and joined the Maquis during
1942-1945. Of the 500,000 Spanish Popular Front refugees who fled Franco
in 1939, 72,000 were arrested by Vichy France and sent to German con-
centration camps, where 10,000 to.12,000 of them perished. 12 Thus did the
Spanish Civil War merge into World War lIon both the eastern and the
western fronts.
In September 1942, on the eve of the American landing in French
Morocco, uncomfortably close to Spanish territory, Franco fired his brother-
in-law, Serrano Sufier, as foreign minister. The American move on the
Azores in preparation for the North African landing may have triggered this
decisive move toward a more cautious neutrality. 13
The Anglo-American invasion of Italy in July 1943 brought the down-
fall of the Duce, Franco's erstwhile ally, and sounded the death knell of the
Axis alliance. By October 1943, after Russian troops had made gains during
the summer against Hitler's army, the Spanish generalissimo and chief of
state hinted to Hitler that the Blue Division should return home. A with-
drawal gradually took place during the rest of the European war-although
some units of the Blue Division fought to defend Berlin the the last days in
April 1945.
While Franco never gave up denouncing communism, he clearly was
abandoning his prior close association with his anti-Comintern allies long
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before the war's end. Following World War II, Franco stayed on as dictator,
long after Mussolini and Hitler were dead and discredited. The Falange was
downgraded to merely "the Movement," and in 1945 Franco appealed to his
monarchist·supporters by allowing a referendum to consider the eventual
return of the Bourbons. Indeed, when Franco's dictatorship ended thirty
years later with his death, Alfonso XIII's grandson became King Juan
Carlos.
After fifty years, what is the judgment of history on the civil war that
excited a generation of democrats to proclaim it as "the last great cause"?
The idealism of those days is hard to recapture in a post-modem era that has
been disillusioned by Machiavelli, Orwell, and the American intervention
in Vietnam in the name of anticommunism. The horrors of Guernica have
dwindled in the flames of Hiroshima and the shadows of thousands of
stockpiled nuclear bombs. Still, the continuity of diplomatic history is
apparent when one studies the Spanish Civil War in the light of American
military and economic dilemmas posed by Latin America. The intervention
of the Great Powers in 1936 in Spain has something to tell us about the
current American-Soviet economic, political, ideological, and military
rivalry in the Third World.
In diplomatic history the place of the Spanish Civil War is secure. As
Basil Liddell Hart, one of the greatest military thinkers of the century, put it,
the second Great War of the twentieth century began in Spain in July
1936. 14 The Spanish Civil War was indeed an opening round of the great
power struggle now called World War II. Fifty years later, ideological
rivalries among communism, anticommunism, liberalism, totalitarianism,
and democracy continue to trouble the world.
Appendix A.
Note on Monetary Values
To translate the monetary values of the 1930s into values that have real
meaning in terms of contemporary purchasing power, there are two ways of
measuring inflation: (1) by noting the rise of the cost-at-living index in the
United States; and (2) by noting the fall of the value of the peseta relative to
the dollar in the international market. In other words, the amount of gasoline
an American could buy in 1935 for 44 cents would cost him $3.30 in 1985.
Meanwhile, Spanish inflation has been even greater. The Spaniard could
have purchased 12.3 cents' worth of gasoline for his one peseta in 1935 but
only 1.4 cents' worth in 1980 and .57 cents' worth in 1985.
Prices for 1913-1967 '!re based on the index in which the years
1957-1959 = 100. In 1967 the U.S. Department of Commerce made a new








(Statistical Abstract ofthe United States, 1940, pp. 291, 328; 1965, p. 356; 1970, p.
339; 1975, p. 417; 1986, pp. 471, 858; Hugh Thomas, Spanish Civil War [New
York, 1977], pp. 971-72.)
Appendix B. German Intelligence
Agents in Spain before July 1936
This list is only a tentative beginning to a complex problem. Many questions
remain, particularly about the dates of entry into Spain.
The most comprehensive list of German spies in Spain was made by the
U.S. government following World War II. It had 104 names of undesirable,
black-listed Germans living in Spain. At least 15 of these were living there
before July 1936. See Counselor Paul T. Culbertson, Madrid, to Secretary of
State, dis. 378, 1 July 1948, SD, 862.20252/7-148 (hereafter cited as
"Culbertson Report").
The numbers assigned here to the 60 agents listed also serve as source
notes, below. For abbreviations used in the notes, see pp. 163-66.
Entry
Name/(Alias) Profession into Spain Place
1. Kiihlenthal, Army; military 1928 Paris: Army Abwehr
Lt. Gen. Erich attache Office for Spain
2. Kiihlenthal, Karl Erich 1935? (Wife Spanish)
(son of Erich? same?)
3. Lietzmann; Navy 1932 Paris: Naval Abwehr
Cmd. Joachim Office for Spain
4. Messerschmidt, Navy, Abwehr 1926; (Traveling Berlin
Lt. Cmd. Eberhard Jan. and and Spain)
Sept. 1936
"Ritt, Otto" (same?) Abwehr June 1936 Pamplona
5. Ahlers, Jacob Consul, Navy, 1914 Tenerife, Canary Islands
("Ernst Groth") Abwehr
6. Becker, Otto Navy, motor 1929 Barcelona
sales
7. Bertram, Otto Lufthansa, Abwehr 1935? Las Palmas,
("Bremen") Canary Islands
(See Riiggeberg)
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Entry
Name/(Alias) Profession into Spain Place
8. Burbach, FriedheIm Consul, AO 1935 Bilbao
9. Classen, Richard Consul, Abwehr 1920s Cadiz
10. Dede, Hans Consul, Abwehr, Navy 1935 Mallorca
11. Draeger, Gustav Consul, Abwehr, Navy 1935? Seville
12. Eiking, John Abwehr agent 1914 San Sebastian
("Jean Alexandre S-2110
Frotos")
13. Ehrhardt, Eugenio Abwehr 1935 Bilbao
14. Eitzen, Meino von Coal, oil dealer 1929 Vigo
15. Flick, Harald Consular official 1935 Las Palmas
16. Forschler, Pablo Metallurgist,
Navy 1929 Bilbao
17. Fricke, Henrique Abwehr 1935? Cartagena
18. Gabelt, Erich Business administrator 1934
HISMA 1936 Salamanca
19. Geise, Alfred Abwehr 1935 Ceuta
20. Goss, Franz von Journalist, Abwehr 1922 Madrid?
("Grande")
21. Goudschall, Telegraph agent 1935 Vigo
Hikko Enno
22. Heinichen, Otto, Navy 1928 ?
Korv. K.
23. Janssen, Christian Coal, oil dealer, 1935 Madrid
("Antonio Silva") Abwehr
24. Klingenberg, Ernst Attorney, Abwehr 1935 Malaga
("Maximo Soler") HISMA 1937? Salamanca
25. Klumpp, Felix Engineer, Sept. 1933 Corona
Abwehr agent
F-2321
26. Knobloch, Conrad Consul 1925 Alicante
27. Knobloch, Hans ? 1925? Alicante
(son of Conrad?)
28. Koss, Maj. Army, Abwehr 1916 Barcelona
Albrecht von I.G. Farben 1.935?
HISMA, Nova July 1938? Salamanca
29. Kramer, Eugen Ludwig ? 1924 Melilla
30. Lange, Willy Machinery 1922 Barcelona
July 1936? Cadiz
"Lange" (same as Army, Abwehr Oct. 19361 Caceres
Lange, Willy?)
31. Langenheim, Adolf P. Mining, AO, 1907 Tetuan
Abwehr
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Entry
Name/(Alias) Profession into Spain Place
32. Langenheim, Journalist and
Heinrich C. Translator 1936 London
(son of Adolf) I.G. Farben 1938 Spain
Abwehr 1939 Tetuan
33. Liesau, Franz 1932 ?
34. Lippenheide, Friedrich I.G. Farben 1921 Bilbao
35. Mayrhofer Telefunken 1922
Navy, Abwehr Jan. 1936 Madrid?
36. Menzell, Lt. Alfred Navy, Abwehr 1922 Madrid
37. Messner, Otto Coal, oil, Abwehr 1911 Bilbao
38. Meyer, Conrad Army, Abwehr 1928? Vigo
39. Meyer, Kurt ? 1933 Ceuta
40. Moldenhaus, Richard Chemist, I.G Farben Sept. 1932 Barcelona
41. Niemann, Edmond Shipper, Abwehr 1934 Las Palmas,
("Pablo Garcia") Canary Islands
42. Oberbeil, Wilhelm Abwehr 1934, 1936 Occasional visits
43. Pasch, Karl 1935? ?
44. Pasch, Wilhelm MAN airlines, 1927 ?
zeppelins
Pasch, Hermann ? 1935 Bilbao
(same person? brother?) HISMA 1937 ?
45. Rahn, Wilhelm Navy 1935? Tenerife
46. Ratfisch, Werner Engineer 1914 ?
47. Richter, Heinrich ? 1928-1936 EI Ksar
1940 Spanish Morocco
48. "Rolland, Ino von" Business representative WWI
Journalist, spy 1934? Madrid
49. Riiggeberg, Friedrich Navy, Abwehr, Consul 1907 Barcelona
"Bremen" (Riiggeberg?
Bertram?)
50. Riiggeberg, Rolf Navy, Abwehr, 1934? Born Barcelona, 1907
(son of Friedrich) I.G. Farben
51. Schliissler, Adalbert Navy 1926? Cadiz
or Dr. Erich Schering Drug Co. ? ?
52. Schneider, IF. Abwehr, fishery 1916 Bilbao
53. Schultz, Alfred Abwehr ? Bilbao
54. Schultze, Lufthansa 1932 Seville?
Ernst Alexander Joined Abwehr 1941
Karl ("Tinto")
55. Schweiger, Jose Lufthansa 1926 Lujo?
German Intelligence Agents in Spain 147
Name/(Alias)



















1. See ch. 5 n 33, below; Angel Vinas, La Alemania nazi y el18 de Julio
(Madrid, 1974, 1977), 1st ed., 83. For 1934 and fall 1935 trips, see ibid., 2nd ed.,
265-67.
2. "Culbertson Report."
3. See ch. 5, nn 35-38, below.
4. Among the German military, Messerschmidt was probably second only to
Canaris in Spanish experience. He went to Spain many times beginning in 1925. He
was in Spain on 10 Jan. 1936: FO 371, vol. 120560 W 376/376/41. He was in Berlin
2-7 Aug. 1936: Jose Ignacio Escobar, Asf empezo (Madrid, 1974), 103. Between 27
Aug. and 8 Sept. he made a tour of Nationalist Spain for Canaris and the AGK:
Minister Huene, Lisbon, to Foreign Ministry, 11 Sept. 1936, DGFP ser. 0, vol. 3,
doc. 80. Also see "Culbertson Report."
5. See ch. 5, pp. 123-24. "Allgemeine Liste der Berichterstatter und Ver-
trauensmanner," list B, 2 Mar. 1914, OKM Docs., PG 49094.
6. See ch. 5, n 204, below.
7. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 353.
8. "Culbertson Report."
9. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 353-54. Canaris apparently recruited him.
10. Cmd. Veorger, "Etappenorganisation der Kriegsmarine," 21 Mar. 1947,
rep. 107 for U.S. ONI, ONI Doc. 111 S-A 7, U.S. Navy Yard. Also see "Culbertson
Report."
11. "Culbertson Report."
12. He was a Spanish national serving the Abwehr in Spain in World War I. In
Feb. 1936 he was living in Cherbourg, France, and decided to reactivate his Abwehr
status. He returned to Spain in 1940 and served in the Nationalist army. In 1936 his
duty was to observe shipping in Cherbourg-apparendy that bound for Spain. N. s.
R-l Ga. Abwehr office, Bremen, to Reichskriegsminister, Berlin, rep. Kdos. 35/35,
14 Mar. 1936, Abwehr Docs. , ML 37, ron 9; R-l Ga., Bremen, to RKM, rep. Kdos.
35/36,25 May 1936; ibid.; questionnaire of "Frutos," n.d. [1941], ibid.
13. Veorger, ONI, 1947.
14. Ibid.
15. Consul Sauermann [Station Las Palmas, on vacation], Saalberg i/Regb. , to
GFM, 30 July 1936, OKM Docs., PG 80785.
16. Abw. Abt. X [signature illegible], Hamburg, to OKW, Abw. I [Canaris],
memo 129/39, 8 Mar. 1939, OKM Docs., PG 48838; Meyer-Dohner to Naval
148 Hitler and Spain
Attache Group, rep. 488, 5 July 1939, ibid; declaration, Dr. Julius Schwenzer to
OMGUS, Ludwigsburg, 2 Oct. 1946, OMGUS Docs., box 79, part 3/3, file
"Repatriation-Schwenzner." He spoke about his own work and that of Forschler. He
claimed Forschler did not join the Abwehr until 1941, but it is possible he reported
informally before.
17. Veorger, ONI, 1947.
18. "Culbertson Report"; see also ch. 4, n 50, below.
19. Veorger, ONI, 1947.
20. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 162; Sabath to Stohrer, memo W 701 g. Rs., 15
May 1939, GFM, 4365/E082242-43.
21. Black List, Counselor F.M. Guerra, Madrid, to Secretary of State, dis.
1843, 20 Mar. 1946, SO, 862.20252/3-2046.
22. "Culbertson Report."
23. Veorger, ONI, 1947.
24. For 1935, ibid.; for 1937, see ch. 4, n 93, below.




28. In July and early August 1936, Koss was in Madrid: Vinas, Alemania, 1st
ed., 427-28. For 1938, "LG. Farbenindustrie, A.G. Interests in Spain," 116-page
report, U.S. Seventh Army, Heidelberg Safehaven Team, 22 July 1945, p. 16,
OMGUS Docs., box 76, part 2/3, file "LG. Farben, Interests in Spain." On 1 July
1938, Koss joined HISMA, branch Nova, S.A., ibid., p. 70.
29. U.S. embassy, Madrid, to OMGUS, dis. 2483,20 Aug. 1946, OMGUS
Docs., box 79, part 2/3, file "Repatriates, Spain."
30. See ch. 3, n 51, below.
31. Seech. 5, nn 16,17, ch. 4, n 14, below.
32. Heinrich Cromwell Langenheim, son ofAdolf, was one-fourth English. He
joined the NSDAP in 1933. From 1936 to 1937 he worked in the propaganda section
of the British embassy in London for Ribbentrop. He worked for I.G. Farben,
1938-1941, and he told his U.S. interrogators he officially worked for the Abwehr in
Spanish Morocco in 1941. Interrogation, Hohenasperg, 2 July 1946, OMGUS
Docs., box 79, part 2/3, file "Repatriates." When in 1936 he left Spain is unclear.
Ch. 5, n 20, below, shows he was working for the Abwehr at least in 1939; also see n
13 above.
33. "Culbertson Report."
34. Ibid.; Seventh Army, LG. Farben rep., July 1945, p. 62, cited inn 28 above.
35. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 32-33, 77, 91.
36. "Culbertson Report."
37. Interrogation of Otto Messner by Ulrich G. Vodin, Neuengamme- Ham-
burg, 29 May 1946, OMGUS Docs., box 79, part 2/3, file "Repatriation- Spain."
38. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 41; 2nd ed., 246.
39. British Consul General Gascoigne, Tangier, to Sir Roger Makins, FO, 1
July 1940. FO 371, vol. 24447, C 7910/16/41.
40. Interrogation of Richard Moldenhaus by W. Wendell Blanke, Hohen-
asperg, 9 and 12 September 1946, OMGUS Docs., box 71, part 3/3, file "Spain,
Interrogations."
German Intelligence Agents in Spain 149
41. See ch. 5, n 16, below.
42. Angel Alcazar de Velasco, Memorias de un agente secreto (Barcelona,
1979), 18, 20-21.
43. "Culbertson Report."
44. Ibid. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 82, 124-25.
45. OKM, "Organisation und Aufgabe der Etappen," Berlin, Jan. 1939,OKM
Docs., PG 49092.
46. "Culbertson Report."
47. Gascoigne, Tangier, to Makins, 1 July 1940, FO 371, vol. 24447, C
7910/16/41.
48. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 34,252,337. He made several trips to Spain in
the 1930s.
49. Friedrich Riiggeberg, Sr., consul in Barcelona, was a German intelligence
agent in World War I. British Ambassador Arthur Hardinge, Madrid, to Minister of
State Juan Alvarado, 11 May 1917, MAE, "b 3146," file 31. Canaris met him again
in Spain in the 1920s. On 16 Jan. 1939, Riiggeberg's son Rolfretumed to Barcelona
for the Abwehr, but when he or his father left the city is not clear. Lt. Menzell, aide to
naval attache, San Sebastian, to Naval Attache Group, Berlin, R. 35 g, 16 Jan. 1939,
OKM Docs., PG 48838. Riiggeberg Sr. or Jr. may be the same agent as "Bremen,"
who left Barcelona 29 July 1936 on an Italian vessel bound for Germany. See ch. 5, n
8, below.
50. Ibid.; on Rolf, see Seventh Army, I.G. Farben rep., July 1945, 34, 95, cited
in ch. 5, n. 228 below.
51. Meyer-Dohner to Naval Attache Group, rep. 575, 23 June 1939, OKl\tl
Docs., PG 48838; memo of conversation with Adm. Boehm at Ceuta, 27 Apr.-2
May, rep. G 3199 A; at Lisbon, 7 May 1939, OKM Docs., PG 45181.
52. IF. Schneider, Bilbao, to consulate, San Sebastian, 2 June 1939, GFM,
1308/348298-99. The Nova man was Robert Doelling.
53. Signature 111. [Mayrhofer?], Family Service, Leipzig, to Abwehr Nest
(branch office), Bremen, rep. 9 Sch 9549, 30 Nov. 1942, Abwehr Docs., M.L.
37/10.
54. W.W. Blancke, Berlin, to OMGUS and State Dept. dis. 7901, 29 Nov.
1946, OMGUS Docs., box 79, part 3/3, file "Repatriation from Spain, Flight X,
General 820.02 a."
55. F.M. Guerra, Madrid, to State Dept., 27 Aug. 1946, SD, 862.20252/8-
2746.
56. Schwenzer declaration cited in n 16 above.
57. Vinas, Oro de Moscu, 43-44.
58. Vinas, Alemania, 1st ed., 311; ch. 4, 58-59, below.
59. "Culbertson Report."






















Second Spanish Republic proclaimed; King Alfonso XIII leaves.
First series of Premier Manuel Azana's army reform decrees.
First issue of Mundo Obrero (Communist party organ).
Dissolution of the Jesuits; divorce law enacted; cemeteries secu-
larized.
Pronunciamiento of General Jose Sanjurjo. Upon reaching Seville,
Sanjurjo declares martial law. Rising fails.
Adolf Hitler comes to power in Germany.
Conclusion of the Concordat between the Reich and Vatican as a
means of winning Catholic support.
Fascist-inspired Falange Espanola founded in Madrid by Jose An-
tonio Primo de Rivera.
Strong conservative trend evidenced in elections for new Cortes.
Francisco Franco's brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano Suner, elected as
Catholic-monarchist.
Franco appointed military commander in chief in Morocco.
Arms agreement between Benito Mussolini and Spanish monar-
chists.
German navy draws up plans to obtain secret supplies, particularly
oil, from Latin America, Spain, and U.S.; to be delivered in neutral
Spain in the event of a German-French war.
Jose Antonio, head of Falange, visits Berlin; meets Hitler and
discusses Nazi-Catholic relations with Nazi party ideologist Alfred
Rosenberg.
Hitler's first meeting with Mussolini in Venice.




























Leftist revolt in Asturias and Catalonia suppressed by army using
Franco's plans.
Carlist monarchist group again visits Mussolini.
Franco appointed chief of general staff. Catholic Jose Gil Robles
made war minister.
Italians give Falange chief Jose Antonio more than $4,000 monthly
(continues through Feb. 1936).
At Niirnberg Party Day, Joachim von Ribbentrop and an Italian
journalist representing Mussolini's newspaper, Popolo d'[talia,
proclaim a united front against bolshevism.
Admiral WilhelmCanaris, Hitler's chief of military intelligence,
meets with Italian chief of military intelligence Col. Mario Roatta,
in Verona. Two powers to work together in military intelligence
"against bolshevism."
Popular Front electoral pact and platform.
Electoral victory of Popular Front. Azafia government (leftist Re-
publicans without Socialists).
Hitler's troops reenter Rhineland. Franco posted to Canary Islands.
Falange outlawed; Jose Antonio arrested; President Niceto Acahi
Zamora impeached.
Italian Chief of Police Arturo Bocchini visits Dachau; confers with
Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich, head of Gestapo, and Her-
mann Goring, Reich air minister.
German· SS reach agreement with Italian police for intelligence
cooperation throughout Europe.
Goring appointed commissioner for foreign exchange and raw mate-
rials.
Azafia becomes president.
Election of Popular Front in France. Leon Blum becomes premier in
France.
Widening of breach between Socialists Indolecio Prieto and Fran-
cisco Largo Caballero; increasing violence in streets; clashes of
Falange and Socialists.
Colonel Josef Veltjens, reserve air force officer and private arms
dealer living in Berlin, contacts right-wing conspirators in Spain.
Franco gives liberal minister of war a last warning to heed dissatis-
faction among officer corps.
Monarchist Antonio Goicoechea contacts Italian army; Foreign
Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano informed of Spanish rightist plans
for counterrevolution.
1 German SS Girgenti chartered by Veltjens for arms delivery to
Spain.




















Army rising in Morocco.
Revolt in Spain.
Serrano-Suner imprisoned by Republicans in Madrid.
Franco lands at Tetuan, Morocco, after flight from Canary Islands.
Jose Giral's cabinet formed.
Death of conspirator General Sanjurjo.
Franco asks Johannes Bernhardt to secure aid from the Reich and
sends Luis Bolin to Italy.
Republican government asks France for aid.
Andre Malraux, of French Committee against War and Fascism,
flies to Madrid to·serve as private volunteer.
Franco's brother Nicolas purchases foreign arms in Lisbon.
Premier Blum and foreign minister confer in London with Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and
Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain.
Hitler and Ribbentrop meet in Bayreuth with Japanese military
attache, General Hiroshi Oshima, to discuss Anti-Comintern Pact.
Eden suggests to Portugal a noninterventionist policy in Spanish
strife.
German embassy in London takes up with British Foreign Office
reports about deliveries of French planes to Spanish government.
German Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell calls on Italian Foreign
Minister Count Ciano··to discuss Spain.
Hitler decides at Bayreuth to launch Operation Feuerzauber, aid to
Franco.
Mussolini decides to send Savoia bomber-transport planes to Span-
ish Morocco.
Split in Blum cabinet develops over aid to Spain.
Count Jose Quinones de Leon, self-appointed rebel "ambassador" in
Paris, sends agent to Berlin to appeal for arms for Gen. Emilio Mola.
Mola's agents meet with Canaris.
General Miguel Cabanellas establishes Nationalist Junta in Burgos.
Comintern meeting in Prague discusses Spain.
Goring creates Sonderstab W[ilberg] in Berlin to direct German
intervention.
Seville under insurgent control of General Gonzalo Queipo de
Llano; reinforcement by air from Morocco.
Bernhardt returns by air from Berlin and Bayreuth to Seville.
German Ju 52s begin airlift from Morocco to Seville.
First flight of Savoias arrives in Morocco from Rome.
Bernhardt and Fernando Carranza organize in Tetuan the Sociedad
Hispano-Marroqui de Transportes (HISMA), Ltd., legally con-
trolled on a 50-50 basis.
Maj. Alexander von Scheele and 85 German "volunteers" depart
from Hamburg for Cadiz aboard SS Usaramo.
























Hitler issues memo on autarky and communism as prelude to Four-
Year Plan.
Admiral Rolf Carls arrives in Spanish Morocco aboard battleship
Deutschland. Accompanied by Bernhardt, he visits Franco.
France announces policy of nonintervention and proposes its Euro-
peanwide adoption.
Comintern initiates a worldwide call for communists to join volun-
teers for Republican Spain.
Italian propaganda chief Dino Alfieri travels to Germany. He dis-
cusses with his German counterpart, Joseph Paul Goebbels, joint
German-Italian press policy against "bolshevik danger" in Spain.
Canaris confers with Roatta in Rome on Spanish War.
SS Usaramo lands in Spain with German weapons.
Franco arrives in Seville and establishes headquarters.
Hitler appoints Ribbentrop ambassador to Britain, but he stays in
Germany until 26 October.
First International Brigade volunteers arrive in Barcelona.
Germans bomb Republican battleship Jaime I.
Veltjens delivers half-dozen He 51 fighters to Mola at La Corona.
Insurgents take Badajoz, securing frontier with Portugal.
Mussolini sends three Savoia seaplanes to Majorca.
Franco-British statement on nonintervention issued.
Japanese agree upon a text with Germany for Anti-Comintern Pact.
Hitler sends Prince Phillip of Hesse to Italy on special mission to
Mussolini.
Hitler sends Col. Walter Warlimont (Code name "Guido") of Army
Economic Welfare Staff, to Spain.
Italy, Germany, Portugal accept nonintervention "in principle."
Consul General Antonov-Ovseenko arrives in Barcelona; Soviet
Ambassador Rosenberg goes to Madrid.
Introduction of two-year compulsory military service in Germany.
Rebel armies occupy Rio Tinto mines (British-owned pyrites).
Italian troops dispatched to Balearic Islands.
Canaris discusses Spain with top Italians.
Canaris meets Spanish rebels in Lisbon, visits Seville.
Italy, the last holdout, finally agrees to French proposal on interna-
tional Non-Intervention Agreement, which goes into effect.
Madrid suffers first aerial bombardment.
Siege of Madrid, German participation.
Battles of Vitoria and Zaragoza, German participation.
German air war against Republican navy in Mediterranean.
Pope Pius XI receives Spanish religious refugees.
Franco takes Talavera de la Reina, German participation.
Largo Caballero brings Socialists into government. Cabinet of left-
ist Republicans, Socialists, and Communists.
Rebels take Irun.
























presses for expansion ofGoring's economic jurisdiction with a Four-
Year Plan.
Warlimont, Canaris, and Roatta confer with Franco at his headquar-
ters in Caceres.
First meeting of Non-Intervention Committee (NIC), London.
Alexander Orlov of NKVD arrives in Spain.
Hitler publicly announces Four-Year Plan, with Goring as commis-
sioner, at Niirnberg Party Day. '
Finance Minister Dr. Juan Negrin authorized to hide gold reserves
belonging to Bank of Spain.
Pope Pius XI, speaking to Spanish refugees, deplores "truly Satanic
hatred of God" displayed in the Spanish Republic.
Hitler expands military ihtervention with Operation Otto.
Roatta returns to Italy.
Italian reinforcements steam toward Spain.
Hans Frank, agent of Hitler, assures Mussolini in Rome that Medi-
terranean is "a purely Italian sea," and that Baltic is Germany's
Mediterranean.
Soviet SS Neva arrives at Alicante with food, secret arms, and
munitions.
Republican government reorganizes petroleum company CAMPSA
to form a general monopoly trading company for Soviet trade,
CAMPSA-Gentibus.
Rebels take Toledo with German participation. NIC refuses to hear
charges against Portugal.
Bernhardt and Warlimont on special mission to Goring to establish
new German trading company, ROWAK.
Junta de Defensa Nacional ratifies decision taken at rebel generals'
Sept. 21 meeting and designates Franco Jefe del Estado y Gener-
alisimo de los Ejercitos.
Nationalist naval victory at Cape Espartel achieves naval supremacy.
Franco moves military headquarters to Salamanca, but political
center of Nationalist junta remains in Burgos.
Franco goes to Burgos to assume executive authority over Nation-
alist government.
Battle at gates of Madrid, German participation.
Franco publicly named generalissimo and chief of state.
Franco creates cabinet (Junta Tecnica del Estado) composed of three
generals and one diplomat, with his brother Nicolas as general
secretary.
Soviets state they will not be bound by Non-Intervention agreement
any more than Portugal, Italy, and Germany are.
Goring discusses Frank's sphere-of-influence offer with Ciano in
Budapest.
Operation Feuerzauber completed.
Goring and his state secretary for the Luftwaffe, General Erhard
Milch, fly to Rome, confer with Duce and Italian aviation leaders.






















SS Komsomol unloads 50 Soviet medium tanks at Cartagena.
Republic establishes training base at Albacete for international
volunteers.
Italy sends two submarines to Spanish waters.
Loyalist government approves formation of International Brigades.
Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Japan and Germany.
Hitler concludes political protocol with Ciano in Berlin, recogniz-
ing Mediterranean as "an Italian sea."
First Russian tanks in action around Aranjuez; Russian officers
arrive in Madrid; German-Italian bombers over capital.
Hitler sends two submarines to Spanish waters, Operation Ursula,
to attack Republican vessels.
510 tons of gold from Bank of Spain leave Cartagena for Odessa.
Hitler decides to provide Franco with air force of 100 German
planes.
Luftubung Rugen (air) and Winteriibung Hansa (naval) operations
establish new German unit.
Canaris goes to Spain to inform Franco of Hitler's decision to send
Legion Condor.
General Hugo Sperrle, first commander of Legion Condor, leaves
Germany for Spain via Rome; Wolfram von Richtofen named chief
of staff.
HISMA signs contract with Rif iron mines, agreeing to take
840,000 tons of ore through 31 Dec. 1937.
Berlin Protocol christened "the Axis" by Mussolini's Milan speech.
Legion Condor begins landing in Spain.
Veltjens joins with Henry Aschpuvis of Hamburg to form shipping
company, Hansagesellschaft Aschpuvis & Veltjens. Company's
steamship Urundi transports brigade of 600 Irish Catholic Fascist
Blueshirts, headed by Gen. Eoin O'Duffy, to Franco Spain. Com-
pany continues to make arms deliveries through 1938.
Republican government moves to Valencia.
Franco fails to take Madrid.
International Brigades arrive in Madrid.
Madrid assault suspended. Germany and Italy recognize Nationalist
regime at Burgos.
Jose Antonio executed in Alicante.
Germany and Japan publish Anti-Comintern Pact.
Franco signs with Italy an "anticommunist" and "neutrality" treaty,
excluding foreign bases from Spain in any future war.
Gen. Severiano Martinez Anido, Franco's chief of police, requests
that SS send German delegation to Spain to build up Spanish police
force.
German Charge Wilhelm Faupel meets Franco.
La Rozas-Manzanares Offensive, German participation.








Attack on Bujalanca, German participation.
Germans modify Operation Ursula to observation status; Duce
increases his patrols to seven submarines.
First major contingent of Italian volunteers departs from Naples for
Cadiz.
Warlimont returns from Spain to Germany.
In Reich Chancellery, Hitler meets with Goring, Blomberg,
Wehrmacht Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Faupel, Warlimont and Col.
Friedrich Hossbach to limit future German expansion in Spanish
war.
















Goring and Mussolini discuss Spain in Rome. Germany would only
maintain current strength of Legion Condor~
Hitler in Reichstag speech denounces Jews, democracy, marxism,
and Spanish Left.
General Wilhelm Keitel proposes that Reich War Ministry set up a
propaganda section as a result of Spanish war.
6 Feb. -Mar. Jarama Offensive, German participation. Nationalist offensive held.
8 Feb. Nationalists take Malaga, German and Italian participation. Pope
Pius XI rejoices.
Serrano Suner escapes from Madrid to Burgos.
Goring and Bernhardt emphasize increased German investment in
Spain, particularly in mining; establish Montana, S.A., for mining
investments.
Abraham Lincoln Brigade first sees action.
Communist party congress demands that its rival, POUM, be elimi-
nated because of "Trotskyism."
Italian attack on Guadalajara front, German participation.
Successful Republican counteroffensive, heavy Italian losses.
Pope Pius XI issues encyclical condemning atheistic communism.
Franco pledges neutrality during any future war in a secret protocol
signed by Faupel.
Apr.-mid-June Franco's northern offensive, German participation.
Apr. Canaris in Spain.
19 Apr. Franco and Serrano amalgamate Falange and Carlists "from above"
into Spain's only totalitarian party, with Franco as EI Caudillo.
Guernica bombed by Legion Condor and Italians.
POUM, Anarchists, and Communists fight each other in Barcelona;
"May Days."
Mussolini's troops reach maximum of 44,648 in Spain.
Fall of Largo Caballero, succeeded by government of Juan Negrin.
Chamberlain succeeds Baldwin as British prime minister.






































Death of Gen. Mola in airplane accident near Burgos.
Blomberg visits Rome for military consultation with Italians.
Leipzig alleges attack by unknown submarine off Oran.
POUM leaders arrested, party suppressed at CP instigation.
Adm. Wilhelm Marschall, German naval operations chief, draws up
proposal for Commander-in-Chief Adm. Erich Raeder that as-
sumes, for first time since Versailles treaty, that Great Britain might
back a Soviet-French war against German~ Blomberg draws up
series of war possibilities involving France and Britain: Case Green
(two-front war with German concentration on Czechoslovakia);
Case Red (two-front war with France); Extension Green/Red (war in
which Britain would intervene); Case Richard (extension of Spanish
Civil War into world war by a "provoked incident").
Bilbao falls to Nationalists.
Pilar Primo de Rivera, of Falange and sister of martyred Jose
Antonio, visits Germany.
Dionisio Ridruejo, propagandist for Falange, in Germany to observe
international congress of Kraft durch Freude, meets Hitler.
Germany and Italy withdraw from naval patrol of NIC.
Orwell leaves Spain.
Portugal ends nonintervention frontier patrol.
Canaris visits Franco's operations to boost morale, promises more
aid. Requests intelligence information on Russians and on French
Morocco.
Collective letter of Spanish bishops backs Nationalists.
Brunete Offensive, German participation.
Spain and Germany sign public economic treaty and three secret
protocols in Burgos. They postpone comprehensive economic nego-
tiations until end of war and agree to maximize current trade. Spain
gives Germany first option on contracts-as opposed to Britain,
France, and U.S ...,..-to reconstruct New Spain's economy.
Sonderstab W redeploys German reconnaissance squadron, a unit of
Legion Condor, from Cadiz to Mallorca.
Franco moves military headquarters from Salamanca to Burgos.
Nicolas Franco goes to Rome to appeal for more naval force to aid
Nationalists.
Mussolini deploys Mediterranean naval force against European
(mainly British) merchant marine; about a dozen ships are sunk.
Nicolas Franco in Rome agrees to Italian payments agreement.
Santander Offensive, German participation.
Faupel departs from Spain.
Conquest of Asturias, German participation.
Fall of Santander to Nationalists.
Serrano Sufier goes to Nazi party rally at Niirnberg along with
Nicolas Franco and Adjutant General Jose Varela.
Anglo-French Nyon agreements to oppose "piracy," i.e., Italian
naval attacks on ships going to Republican Spain.
158 Chronology, 1937-1938
Mid-Sept. General secretary of German arms-exports cartel visits Spain look-
ing for postwar contracts.
17 Sept.- Nationalist Spaniards step up blockade warfare operations from




























New German Ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer arrives in Spain.
Duce visits Berlin for first time. Axis agreements are reaffirmed.
Spheres of influence--Germany would get the East, Italy would
control the Mediterranean-are agreed upon.
British-French-Italian naval understanding reached at Paris.
Papal nuncio arrives in Salamanca.
Nicolas Franco contests mining claims of German Montafia S.A.
Nationalists take Gijon. End of northern campaign.
German cruiser Schleswig-Holstein visits Canary Islands.
Great Britain sends Robert Hodgson to Salamanca as its "agent."
Franco declares to Stohrer his willingness to accept responsibility
for civil war damages and suggests establishment of a mixed claims
commission.
Negrin government moves to Barcelona.
Sperrle replaced by Gen. Hellmuth Volkmann as commander of
Legion Condor.
Hitler enunciates Mediterranean policy in Reich Chancellery
speech before Blomberg, Goring, and Hossbach. Germany would
strengthen Italy's rear; if Italy got into \var with Britain and France,
Germany would support Italy with raw materials. Germany would
let Spanish war drag on and encourage Italy to hang onto Mallorca.
Hitler would meanwhile make use of persistence of Spanish war to
"settle" Austrian and Czech problems.
Italy joins Anti-Comintern Pact.
Franco's brother Ramon shot down in Balearics campaign.
Lord Halifax visits Hitler.
Secret German-Spanish police agreement concluded whereby Chief
of Police Martinez Anido sends Spaniards to Berlin to learn from
Gestapo.
Spaniards begin work on a naval contract with Italy to build eight
destroyers for postwar expansion.
Japan grants diplomatic recognition to Franco government.
Nationalist aircraft bombard Barcelona.
Capture of Teruel by Republicans; Gen. Franco drawn from Madrid
siege.
First Battle of Teruel, German participation.
Franco reorganizes junta to include civilians.
Second Battle of Teruel, German participation.
Nationalist government completely restructured with abolition of
Junta Tecnica and introduction of a complete cabinet of ministers,






























Ribbentrop becomes foreign minister.
Alfambra Offensive, German participation.
Sperrle, former commander of Legion Condor, present at Berch-
tesgaden when Hitler terrorizes Austrian Chancellor Kurt von
Schuschnigg.
Ciano advises Gen. Alberto Pariani, under secretary for war, that
military staff talks with OKW should soon begin.
Third Battle of Teruel, German participation.
Lord Halifax replaces Eden at British Foreign Office.
Reconquest of Teruel by Nationalists; Nationalist offensive on Ara-
gon front.
HISMA-ROWAK asks for repayment of loans. Franco creates bu-
reau of military acquisitions in office of vice-presidency, then under
Gen. Count Francisco Gomez-Jordana, to deal with Germans and
ration money for arms purchases with all powers.
Nicolas Franco goes to Rome to negotiate payments issue.
British cruiser Arethusa helps ward off attack by Legion Condor
planes on port of Barcelona.
Nationalist offensive launched in Aragon, German participation.
Franco decrees Labor Charter modeled after Italy's Fascist system.
Hitler occupies Austria.
Second Blum prime ministry begins in France. Blum reopens
French-Spanish frontier to arms shipments.
Italian bombers begin regular night raids on Barcelona. Pope Pius
XI protests on 24 March.
First Nationalist Offensive toward Mediterranean, German par-
ticipation.
Negrin government reorganized; Prieto resigns from cabinet as
minister of defense.
Canaris, in Spain to assess Franco's Mediterranean campaign, re-
ports that Franco is too independent.
Hitler again steps up war plan against Czechoslovakia.
Vice Adm. Gunther Guse, OKM operations, draws up plan for
Spain to be benevolently neutral in favor of Germany in any future
war.
Hitler visits Mussolini and Pope Pius XI in Rome.
Jesuits reestablished in Nationalist Spain.
Nicolas Franco, in Rome, agrees to regular monthly repayment
schedule.
The Caudillo appoints Nicolas Franco ambassador to Portugal.
Lt. Com. Hellmuth Heye, on behalf of German navy, inspects
supply possibilities in Spain, making secret trip to Iberia and Mo-
rocco.
French close Pyrenean frontier.
Serrano Sufier attacks Jews in speech in Bilbao.
Negrin's government orders that religious services be provided for
Republican troops desiring them.


















Burgos begins monthly payment in hard currency to both Rome and
Berlin.
14 July-14 Aug.Goring sends top secret intelligence mission on "fishing expedi-
tion" to Canary Islands looking for site for military base. Foreign
ministry and navy are not informed.
Second Mediterranean Offensive.
Republican counterattack on Ebro launched, German participation.
25 July-16 Nov.Ebro Defensive battle, German participation.
Late Aug. - German arms salesman Hans Eltze, director of Rheinmetall-Borsig,
Sept. goes to Spain to survey Spanish post-civil war naval needs.
21-28 Aug. Canaris brings Don Juan, son of ex-King Alfonso, to tour military
and naval installations in Germany.
German navy, foreign ministry, and economics ministry plan three-
way barter deal: Mexican crude oil in exchange for German-made
tankers and transportation to Spain's major oil refinery at Santa
Cruz de Tenerife in Canary Islands, to supply German V-boats.
Canaris opposes risking war with Britain, first unambiguous evi-
dence of his opposition to Hitler's foreign policy.
Czech crisis prompts Adm. Raeder to plan sending pocket bat-
tleship Deutschland into mid-Atlantic to be supplied with oil indi-
rectly through Spain. 1935 naval supply service plans reactivated.
Canaris provides agents with U.S. dollars for purchases in Spain for
oil tender August Schulze and U-boats.
Negrin at League of Nations announces plans for withdrawal of
International Brigades.
Franco annoys Hitler by declaring to French that Spain would be
neutral if Germany were involved in war with Britain and France
over Czechoslovakia.
Four capitalist powers conclude Munich Agreement to press Czech-
oslovakia to hand over Sudetenland to Third Reich.
At Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler discuss Spain.
Germans resupply run-down Legion Condor.
Volkmann replaced as commander of Legion Condor by Gen.
Richthofen, former chief of staff.
Montana dispute resolved with compromise. .
Bernhardt reorganizes HISMA and Montana into a holding com-
panyof 14 subsidiaries, SOFINDUS, incorporated in Lisbon.
Kristallnacht: anti-semitic excesses in Germany after murder by a
Jew of Ernst von Rath, a member of German embassy in Paris.
Anglo-Italian agreement: Mussolini withdraws 10,000 troops from
Spain.
Republican retreat from the Ebro; farewell parade for International
Brigades.
Ribbentrop in Paris concludes nonaggression pact with France.
Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet condemns communism in Spain.
Spanish Ambassador Antonio Magaz signs in Berlin a plywood
(Okume) protocol with ROWAK, providing for German airplane
































11 or 12 Apr.
14-17 Apr.
French-German Treaty of Friendship signed in Paris.
Nationalist offensive ovenuns Catalonia.
Luftwaffe sends seven members of Sonderstab W to Spain to survey
postwar needs.
Chamberlain and Halifax visit Mussolini in Rome.
Lt. Rolf Riiggeberg, Canaris's agent, arrives in Burgos by air to
satisfy Spanish request for naval instructor at San Fernando Naval
School at Cadiz. Remains into World War II era.
Franco enters Barcelona; German participation.
Hitler speech "recognizes" Legion Condor for first time.
In its last session on Spanish soil, Republican Cortes convenes at
Figueras.
Mass Loyalist flight over French frontier; Nationalists complete
occupation of Catalonja.
Republican President Azafia goes into exile in France.
Minorca transferred to Nationalists.
Azafia resigns.
French and British recognize Burgos.
Russia withdraws from NIC.
Anti-Communist coup of Col. Segismundo Casado. Appointment
of Communist military leaders by Negrin.
Juan Suanzes, Nationalist commerce minister, proposes ten-year
construction program that would include 4 battleships, 12 cruisers,
60 destroyers, and an unspecified number of submarines.
Communist revolt in Madrid.
German occupation of Prague by Hitler.
Admiral Francisco Bastarreche, commander at Cadiz, goes to Italy
to confer with Italian naval leaders about buying 8 Italian destroyers
already under contract. Talks break down over financial issues.
Spain joins Anti-Comintern Pact.
Madrid Offensive, German participation.
Nationalist entry into Madrid.
Spanish Foreign Minister Gomez Jordana signs, in Burgos, Ger-
man-Spanish Treaty of Friendship, which binds Spain to benevolent
neutrality.
Canaris presses Franco to publicize Spain's attachment to Axis and
Anti-Comintern Pact.
Chamberlain speech in House of Commons guarantees Poland.
Surrender of Republican armies. Franco proclaims, "The war has
ended." Pope Pius XII congratulates Franco.
Gen. Keitel, head of OKW, meets with Pariani, Italian under state
secretary for war, at Innsbruck to discuss military alliance.
Mussolini invades Albania without giving Germans notice.
Mussolini decides to withdraw troops from Spain.



























king. Discussions range over whole map of Europe. Goring and
duce agree to joint German-Italian economic aid to Spain to stave
off Anglo-French influence.
OKM sends German training flotilla, consisting of practically all of
Germany's warships, to Spanish waters.
Hitler speech reviews German foreign policy since Versailles treaty;
makes verbal attacks on Britain, France, and U.S.; denounces
Anglo-German naval arms limitation treaty of 1935; reiterates his
claim to Danzig; and repudiates German-Polish, Non-Aggression
Pact of 1934.
Spanish naval officers arrive in Rome to discuss battleship con-
struction project.
German-Italian military alliance, Pact of Steel, signed in Rome.
Ribbentrop tells Ciano that Germans are satisfied with attitude of
Franco.
Italy sends twenty naval officers to Spain to study joint construction.
Victory parade in Madrid; Legion Condor and CTV participate.
Pact of Steel affirmed as Hitler visits Rome.
Legion Condor departs from Vigo, accompanied by Spanish officer
delegation.
CTV leaves Cadiz, accompanied by Spanish delegation headed by
Serrano Sufier and Gen. Alfredo Kindelan.
Victory celebrations in Italy.
Victory parade of Legion Condor in Berlin.
Goring sends another exploratory fishing vessel to Canary Islands.
German Foreign Ministry objects.
Canaris goes to Spain to prepare for intelligence and supply ac-
tivities needed for wider war with West.
Spanish cabinet reshuffled.
Hitler-Stalin Pact; Ribbentrop and Molotov sign Non-Aggression
Pact in Moscow.
Germany invades Poland.
Outbreak of World War II. Britain and France declare war on
Germany.
Spain proclaims neutrality.
Seat of government returns to Madrid.
Serrano Sufier appointed foreign minister (lasts until 3 Sept. 1942).
Hitler and Franco meet at Hendaye.
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first-hand observer at the time, U.S. Ambassador Claude Bowers, My Mission to
Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II (New York, 1954); Whealey,
"Foreign Intervention"; Whealey, "Economic Influence," n 1; Frank elaborated it
most systematically in "The,Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World
War," IHR (Aug. 1987).
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Unpublished Documentary Sources Used
GERMAN DOCUMENTS
The millions of German documents now available in the United States on
microfilm are a great boon to historical scholarship. The guides to these
materials are many; see Robert Wolfe, ed., Captured German and Related
Records: A National Archives Conference (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University
Press, 1974). Christopher M. Kimmich has edited a series of five volumes,
the first of which was his own German Foreign Policy, 1981-1945: A Guide
to Research and Research Materials (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Re-
sources, 1981). Others in the same series are on France by Robert 1. Young,
Britain by Sidney Aster, Italy by Alan Cassels, and a fifth, by George Baer,
on international organizations.
For new materials, recent articles in the Vierteljahreshefte fur
Zeitgeschichte and the American Historical Association's Recently Pub-
lished Articles are the best way to keep up to date. For general directories of
archives and reference works, consult current issues of the American
Committee on the History of the Second World War, "Newsletter," ed.
Donald S. Detwiler (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ.).
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
For specific information on the use of the ministry's records, A Catalog of
Files and Microfilms ofthe German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1920-1945,
4 vols., ed. George Kent (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1961-) is
indispensable. This catalogue lists the rolls of microfilm with cross-refer-
ences to the original German file titles.
One of the more interesting files from the Foreign Ministry for my work
was 269. This serial was the file on Spain of Reichsleiter Bohle, containing
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435 frames. Bohle, head of the Nazi Party Abroad (AO), was made an under
state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, and the file was filmed in its entirety.
It covered the period from late 1937 to early 1940. The importance of the file
is that it demolishes a myth. Bohle was contacted by Bernhardt in July 1936
when intervention in the Spanish Civil War began. In July 1936 the Spanish
Anarchists and Communists captured the files of the AO office in Bar-
celona, and many excerpts from these documents were distorted and sensa-
tionalized by Otto Katz, "Editor of the Brown Book of the Hitler Terror," in
The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain, trans. Emile Bums (London: Victor Gol-
lancz, 1937).
Bohle was interrogated by the Niirnberg investigators in 1945 and 1946
on the supposition that he was the head of a major international espionage-
sabotage network. Serial 269 shows that he was not primarily the sponsor of
Fifth Column activities but was mostly interested in private German citizens
abroad. His main function was to see that these people were good Nazis,
ideologically, and his influence on the determination of foreign policy has
been overdrawn. The file contains many papers originating with the party
and dealing with such routine matters as seeing that seamen had enough
money to get home. The party papers were important for the damages
question that bore on Bernhardt's power in Spain. But the significant Nazi
was Bernhardt because of his connections with Goring and Franco--not
because he was "an agent of Bohle."
More revealing in this file are those papers Bohle received as a Foreign
Ministry official. Thus, copies of Stohrer's, Schwendemann's, and Woer-
mann's memoranda are ample. They were given to Bohle for informational
purposes. Donald M. McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany (Kent, Ohio:
Kent State Univ. Press, 1977) is a broad study of the AO and Bohle's
activities.
The only other file that, because of its unusual source, needs special
comment is serial 1809. This file of Czech Foreign Office materials was
captured by the Germans when they took Prague in March 1939 and was
'translated into German by a team headed by Fritz von Berber. Part· of the
collection was published as Fritz von Berber, ed., Veroffentlichungen des
Deutschen Instituts fur Aussenpolitische Forschung.· Europiiische Politik
1933-1938 im Spiegel der Prager Akten, vol. 8 (Essen: Essener Verlags-
anstalt, 1941). It was only used marginally in this study.
GERMAN NAVAL RECORDS
Next to the Foreign Ministry Records, the records of the Oberkommando der
Kriegsmarine (OKM) were most important. In some respects they were even
more important because of their completeness, but substantively they are
secondary because this book is not primarily a military history. The OKM
documents contain virtually all the reports of Attache Meyer-Dohner, plus
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occasional copies of reports from other German observers in Spain. There-
fore, unlike the other German records used, there are no embarrassing gaps
of information.
In 1945, sixty thousand naval files were taken to Tambach Castle. The
British navy then catalogued the records, giving them a number preceded by
the prefix P.G. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence obtained microfilmed
versions of 60 percent of the total collection. They are now at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C. Regarding Spain, almost 100 percent were
filmed and are available. The originals remain in Freiburg, West Germany, at
the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Some files are still retained in
London. London, Washington, Koblenz, Freiburg, and the University of
Michigan all have catalogues. In addition to Robert Wolfe's guide (p. 219),
there is the important work by Keith W. Bird, German Naval History: A
Guide to the Literature (New York: Garland Reference Library of Social
Science, 1985). He has a section on unpublished sources (pp. 57-64) and
one on the Spanish Civil War (pp. 566-70).
OTHER GERMAN AGENCY RECORDS
The AHA Committee for the Study of War Documents began in 1956 to
microfilm tons of records that had been held by the United States Army in
Alexandria, Virginia, since the end of World War II. The project came to a
close in August 1961, but not all of the records held by the army were
declassified. The prefaces to the various guides to this material are indispen-
sable. There are eighty-four mimeographed guides, and additional ones are
expected. Copies of these "Guides to German Records Microfilmed at
Alexandria, Va." can be obtained from the National Archives. The scope of
topics covered in these documents is vast, but their value is mainly for the
study of domestic German developments from 1933 to 1945.
For the study of German-Spanish relations in particular, it is significant
to note the groups ofGerman records not available to the Alexandria Project.
Most of the Reich Economics Ministry files were left in what is now East
Germany, so those records filmed at Alexandria (T-71, guide no. 1) are
fragmentary. They do not include the files of ROWAK, or the Mining
Section dealing with Spain, or the Foreign Trade Section, or correspondence
with Helmuth Wohlthafs Four-Year Plan office. Most of these were de-
stroyed, but some ROWAK material is at Koblenz.
The Military Records, OKW Documents T-77(guide no. 5,7,17, 18,
19, 80), OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) Documents T-78 (guide no. 12,
29, 30), and Miscellaneous German Records T-84 (part 2, guide no. 8)
proved to be the major records within the Alexandria group of significance
for this study. We have no Sonderstab W records and only a small fragment
of Legion Condor records concerned with engineering. Very few of the
German military attache reports (unlike the n~val reports) are available. We
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know very little about the German army talks with the Spaniards, for
virtually no reports from Attache Funck, San Sebastian, are in the filmed
OKW and OKH documents. Some copies of military attache reports are
found in the OKH records, particularly those sent to and from Rome.
The German air force records filmed at Alexandria concern production,
testing, and other matters not pertinent to this study. Most of the air force
records were destroyed in 1944 by bombing. Some of the General Staff
records are in East Germany; others are in Freiburg. The status of the
German air force records is described in Horst Boog, "Germanic Air Forces
and the Historiography of the Air War," Aerospace Historian 31 (March
1984): 38-42. David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of
Luftwaffe Marshal Erhard Milch (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972),
discusses the German air force records in the British Museum.
These critical remarks about the content of the Alexandria records are
not to imply that they had no value to the study of German-Spanish
relations, 1936-1939. In the course of skimming hundreds of serials I found
significant documents. The guides are indispensable~ but titles of files are
misleading, and there is no substitute for actual examination. Light is shed
on the nature of the Four-Year Plan and Goring's role in it within certain files
of the Miscellaneous German Records Collection (T-84). This collection
also has a significant file on the "Canary Islands Expedition."
Chapter 4, with the precise economic data on the background for
German-Spanish economic relations, was built on German Economics
Ministry (T-71) files and other economic agencies filmed in the Mis-
cellaneous Collection (T-84). Also, the Economic Warfare Section, Wi. Ru.
Amt (Wirtschaft Riistungs Amt), of the OKW (T-77) built up vast files of
economic data that were very helpful throughout.
The SS Records T-175 on Marxism and communism were helpful for
chapters 2 and 3.
The Berlin Document Center records were also filmed by the AHA, but
unfortunately without frame numbers. Roll 999 of its collection T-580 gives
a complete list.
THE MILITARY INSTITUTE AT FREIBURG (MFA)
The most valuable part of the MFA collection for this topic, from the point of
view of an American, is for the air force records not available on microfilm
in the United States. Some additional naval materials also not filmed can be
found there. From the European point of view, the original OKW, OKH,
OKM, and RLM (Reichsluftministerium) records can all be seen there. My
citations (e.g., MFA! L, Militargeschichtliches ForschungsamtiLuftminis-
terium) have been changed to RL/BA MA, Reichsluftministerium/Bun-
desarchiv Militarische Amt.
The so-called Milch diary is really an appointments calendar, and from
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the context many of the entries seem to have been one day behind. He may
have written about the previous day's experience early in the morning.
SPANISH DOCUMENTS
In general, Spain's archives are in a state of underdevelopment when
compared to Great Britain's or even West Germany's. Four different Spanish
archives are important:
(1) Servicio Hist6rico Militar,Madrid, houses the official operational
records of General Franco.By Spanish standards they have a well..organized
index, but there is no substitute for looking at entire bundles. The index
looks good in theory, and the archivists would like to give the researcher
only a specific file. But the files for Germany contain only the most routine
formal correspondence, while the real German story is buried throughout all
the bundles-which are indexed under aviation, trucks, cannon, et. There-
fore, the researcher has to go through the four major sections-Administra-
tion, Intelligence, Operations, and Supply-to see the picture as a whole.
Unfortunately, because of time restrictions, I worked in only 72 bundles out
of a possible 682 just for the Headquarters (eGG). There are also field units
and captured Republican army records in the military archive. A history and
guide to the archive has been published by anonymous editors, "Archivos
del Servicio Hist6rico Militar: EI de la Guerra de Liberaci6n," Revista de
Historia Militar 24 (1968): 161-70.
(2) Jefatura Nacional de Adquisiciones is a second group of most
important military and economic records, consisting of about 100 bundles
out of a total of 222 bundles of documents, mostly individual bills of sale
and requests kept by the Nationalist army's office of supply. They became
the property of the Direcci6n General de Adquisiciones, also called during
the civil war the Jefatura Nacional de Adquisiciones (JNA). The 222
bundles cover the period 1936 to 1950. The records are found in the Archivo
Hist6rico National, Madrid. Catalogue no. 66 gives a brief, inadequate
description. Franco created the Jefatura on 26 February 1938 as a subsection
ofthe vice presidency, then under General Count Francisco G6mez-Jordana.
Although the basic collection begins in the spring of 1938, the Jefatura
inherited some scattered files that cover the period from the fall of 1936 to
February 1938 from Nicolas Franco, general secretary to the chief of state
and older brother of the generalissimo.
For purposes of this book, the bundles may be classified into nine
sections:
1. Pedidos de Alemania (HISMA-ROWAK) (labeled A):











3. Pedidos de la Intendencia M) bills:
4. Pedidos del Ministerio del Aire (MA) bills:
5. Pedidos de Marina (MB):
6. Pedidos de Italia (I):
7. Pedidos de Portugal (P) bills:
8. Other military operational sections, such
as transport, health, and tires:
9. Other correspondence, bills, budgets, and charts,
mostly with private manufacturers: 50 bundles
The Franco regime accumulated the rest of the hundred-odd bundles of
documents in the period 1940-1950.
The system of labeling all bills apparently began with the German
section in March 1937 (see bundle 1, file A869), but only after June and July
1937 are the records systematic. The basis of the numbering system is by
delivery date rather than by order date.
Bundle 167 shows the origin of the Germn bills A section. It is doubtful
that archivists will ever discover all the records from July 1936 to July 1937.
Beginning with bill A709 on 29 July 1937 (see also bundle 186), the
numbers of the list of purchases from Germany are complete to the end of
the war. Another key document explaining the system can be found in
bundle 204, file 1.
One year later, Franco's supply office organized the other sections on a
systematic basis. For example, the first two orders received for the navy were
given the numbers MB 200 and MB 201. Numbers 1 to 200 seem to have
been left blank in each subsection of the Jefatura-artillery, tires, etc.-for
the records of order from the period July 1936 to July 1938 that they hoped
would tum up.
Unfortunately, the archivists' labeling of the bundles from 1 to 222 does
not reflect an entirely chronological or topical ordering of the documents.
The bundle numbers used in my endnotes are the archival numbers in
catalogue 66. Bundles 202, 203, and 204 consist of important index
materials to the whole recoragroup and should be looked at first by future
researchers.
(3) The Ministerio Asuntos Exteriores records are officially open
through 1945. The records for the period 1914 to 1931 seem to be complete
but are not well organized, despite the fact that the files show evidence of
being reorganized three times. For guides see James W. Cortada, "Spanish
Foreign Office Archives," Society for Historians of American Foreign
Relations Newsletter 4 (Sept. 1973): 2-4; Cortada, "Libraries and Archives
of Madrid," Journal ofLibrary History 9 (Apr. 1974): 176-88; and Robert
H. Whealey, "Opportunities and Disappointments in the Spanish Foreign
Ministry Archives," Archives 12 (Autumn 1975): 68-73. More comprehen-
sive guides are needed.
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As of 1977-1978 (the last time I was in Spain), the records up to 1945
were available but did not seem complete. Rather they appear to have been
the political director's most routine files. During 1937, the day-to-day head
for foreign relations was Miguel Angel de Muguiro, secretary of exterior
relations. His office forwarded economic questions raised by the Germans
to the relevant authorities in the Junta Tecnica within a day or two of receipt.
There the delay might be considerable. The Germans would send inquiries
about every two months reminding the Spaniards of the original inquiry.
The reorganization of the Spanish government in the spring of 1938 did
away with the Junta Tecnica in favor of traditional ministries. The work done
by de Muguiro was taken over by E.E. de Monteros, subsecretary of the
foreign ministry. He handled most routine business rather than Count
Jordana, who was also second in command to Franco for nonmilitary
administrative matters. In 1939 de Muguiro was serving as Nationalist
minister to Hungary.
The 1938 reorganization resulted in the misplacement of some files and
delays in handling inquiries. Also in 1938 the German embassy moved to
San Sebastian, where the other diplomatic representatives to the Nation-
alists were located. This meant a delay of up to a week between the date
letters were dispatched and the time they were received by the Foreign
Ministry in Burgos.
(4) The Archivo General Alcala de Henares is a relatively new archive,
eventually to be centralized to accept documents from all the major minis-
tries. The archive was begun in the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry section has
deposited twelve boxes of records from the Spanish Republic's procurement
agency, CAMPSA-Gentibus, which shed light on aid by the Soviets and
others to the Republic. There are also two additional bundles of Gentibus
records in the JNA documents (see above, point 2.)
SPANISH· NEWSPAPERS
The Hemeroteca Muncipal in Madrid is excellent for newspapers and
magazines of the 1930s.
UNPUBLISHED ITALIAN DOCUMENTS
The National Archives has a fragmentary collection of Italian documents on
microfilm, T-586. RollI gives the complete list. They were captured by the
U. S. army when invading Italy and were filmed by a joint American-British
military intelligence unit during World War II. A published catalogue is
available. These records are extremely diverse in nature, including frag-
ments from several Italian ministries for the years 1920-1943. Only two
groups of documents shed light on Spain: the files of the Duce's secretary
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and the minister of popular culture. They contain some interesting material
on Italian-French-Spanish relations in 1939. There is nothing on Spain in
the unpublished "Lisbon Papers" that has not been published in Ciano's
Diplomatic Papers. The "Akten Sammelstelle Sud," in the World War II
Branch of the National Archives, is good for the Italian army's campaigns in
the 1940s, but of little interest for Spain in the 1930s. The complex story of
Italian archives is explained in great detail in Howard McCaw Smyth,
Secrets ofthe Fascist Era: How Uncle Sam Obtained Some ofthe Top-Level
Documents ofMussolini's Period (Carbondale, Ill. : Southern Illinois Univ.
Press, 1975), and also in a chapter in Robert Wolfe's Captured German
Records. The Fascist Era contains a valuable appendix and a comment (p.
17) that lists by document certain entries in Ciano's Diplomatic Papers
(L' Europa verso la catastrofe) which are incomplete or inaccurate and
should be checked with archives. None of these documents was used in this
book.
Ismael Saz and Javier Tusell edited a collection of 402 Italian Foreign
Ministry documents: Fascistas en Espana: La intervencion en la Guerra
Civil a traves de los telegramas de Ie missione militare Italiana en Spagna
15 Diciembre 1936-31 Marzo 1937 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Inves-
tigaci6nes Cientificas Escuela Espana de. Hist6ria y Arqueologia en Roma,
1981). These include mostly military reports to Rome from General Roatta.
OMGUS RECORDS
Records from the U. S. military occupation of Germany are in the National
Archives at the branch in Suitland, Maryland. They were partially released
in 1972, and the screening was completed in 1979. I used most of the
records in 1977 when shipping lists were available. By 1981 many were
reboxed. The researcher must hunt in Spanish style through many boxes,
although the shipping list (SL) serves as a rough guide. Some minor files
were still classified as of 1981. .
In 1945, at the end ofWorld War II, the U. S. government was interested
in Operation Safehaven, rounding up German assets in Spain. Important
interrogations were held in Germany and Madrid in 1944-1948. The collec-
tion reveals much about economics and ties in with U. S. State Department
records on Operation Safehaven. See memo, n. s., Madrid, to U.S. State
Department, 4 Oct. 1945, shipping list,. box 64, part 2/3, file "External
Assets Spain," for a description of the Safehaven project and its personnel.
For the origin of Safehaven, stemming from the Bretton Woods conference
of February 1944, see Herron Adams, Foreign Exchange Control, London,
to Allan Fischer, Foreign Exchange & Blockade Branch, U. S. Control
Committee, Financial Division, Frankfurt, 24 July 1945, shipping list, box
66, part 3/3, file "Safehaven Negotiations"; alsoFRUS, 1944,2: 213-51,
(1945), 2: 852-925.
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The Foreign Office papers and cabinet records at the Public Record Office
are so well organized in contrast to German, Spanish, and Italian that little
comment is necessary. FO/371 stands for the complete documents with
minutes by Foreign Office officials. Copies of the most important docu-
ments can be seen in the series of "Confidential Prints." A specific fact or
question can be traced through the register books (index books) to an exact
telegram within minutes. U.S. State Department records from before World
War II are also well catalogued and easy to work with.
INTERVIEWS
Some interviews are of little value because researchers have not done
enough basic homework. I had the opportunity to interview three Germans
involved in this story: Commander Helmuth Heye of the OKM; Erhard
Milch, state secretary for the Luftwaffe; and Helmuth Wohlthat, ministerial
director. I did not learn much from my interview with then Admiral Heye
because my research was still in a formative stage in 1960. Heye was on the
NATO staff and none too eager to discuss the Spanish Civil War with me.
My interviews with Wohlthat in 1970 and 1971 were of an entirely dif-
ferent character. I talked with him three times, about four hours each time.
By then I had done sufficient research to have well formulated questions.
Wohlthat was entirely removed from politics and was wi~ling to talk histo~
I met Milch through Wohlthat in 1971 for another four-hour session.
Minutes of these interviews have been turned over to the Southworth
Collection of the University of California, San Diego, to Ohio University,
and to the Oral History Collection of Columbia University. Both Wohlthat
and Milch reveal incidental details about German policy that have nothing to
do with this book but that other scholars may find interesting.
Published Historiography of Germano-Spanish Relations
There are no comprehensive works in English dealing with the German
intervention, but there are six accounts of the German role in the Spanish
Civil War and all were written by Germans. None of them use any Spanish
or U. S. documents. Only one has used the Foreign Office records. Manfred
Merkes, Die deutsche Politik gegeniiber dem spanischen Biirgerkrieg,
1936-1939, Bonner Historische Forschungen, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Ludwig
Rohrscheid Verlag, 1967), has an excellent summary of the military aspects
of German intervention and a good bibliography: His account is judicious
and technically competent, but he presents a conservative case most favor-
able for German intervention without justifying Hitler or nazism. He sticks
so close to the documentary record that his work at times becomes ~
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justification for the German bureaucracy, making it seem independent of the
Fuhrer, whom in fact it loyally served. Unlike Anglo-American writers,
Merkes does not regret the demise of the Second Spanish Republic, nor is he
concerned with the relationship of the Spanish Civil War to the outbreak of
World War II. His goal is to ensure that Anglo-American writers do not
exaggerate the extent of Germany's military intervention in a limited, side-
show war.
Military historian Merkes is correct about the "sideshow war," but, in
terms of diplomatic history, my work disagrees in pointing out the impor-
tance of the Spanish Civil War to the balance of power. His interpretation of
Hitler and communism differs markedly from mine. In the first place, on
social grounds he has a conservative bias that he identifies as "anti-commu-
nism." He uses the term "communism" as a label both for social unrest in
Spain and for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This makes his entire
work unclear. Despite his ample use of footnotes and exhaustive lists of
sources, his encyclopedic approach to footnoting does not help pinpoint for
the reader exactly who was saying what. In short, he set out on an ambitious
project in which the text is too short for the quantity of materials available.
A second account of German-Spanish diplomatic relations during the
civil war has been written by the East German scholar Marion Einhorn, Die
okonomischen Hintergriinde der faschistischen deutschen Intervention in
Spanien, 1936-1939, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin,
Schriften des Instituts fur Geschichte Reihe 1: Allgemeine und Deutsche
Geschichte, Band 15 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1962). Despite its Commu-
nist bias, it is well documented, particularly on the economic questions.
Some of these documents are unavailable in the West.
One collection used from the Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut in East
Berlin contains corporate files from a vast variety of private German firms.
A detailed examination of Einhorn's footnotes shows that many Foreign
Ministry documents available in Washington on microfilm can also be found
in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam. In fact, it would appear that all but
a small percentage of the Foreign Ministry documents at Potsdam are
duplicated in the U.S. National Archives. Einhorn's material about the
conspiracy before July 1936 (see above chap. 1, pp. 00-00) can be dismissed
as propaganda. Both Einhorn and Merkes have deficiencies, yet taken
together their strengths complement each other.
Hans-Henning Abendroth, Hitler in det spanischen Arena: Die
deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen im Spannungsfeld der europiiischen In-
teressenpolitik vom Ausbruch des Burgerkrieges bis zum Ausbruch des
Weltkrieges, 1936-1939 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1973), is much
closer to my theme than either Merkes or Einhorn. But when the reader
compares the tables of contents of our works, the differences become clear.
My emphasis is more on Hitler's policy toward Spain in relation to his
general European policy, whereas Abendroth emphasizes more the arena,
i.e. , events in Spain. His chapters 2, 6, and 12 cover themes similar to mine~
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but he has more to say about the Non-Intervention Committee and the other
Great Powers and is, therefore, closer to Dante Puzzo (1962) and Patricia
Van der Esch (1951). Both of these general diplomatic accounts are ob-
solete.
Abendroth differs from Merkes in that he uses considerable records
from the British Foreign Office. Unlike Einhorn and myself, Abendroth
plays down the role of economic factors. Like Merkes, Abendroth is a social
conservative who partly justifies German intervention as serving the "cause
of anti-communism," but he is less conservative and more critical of the
German bureaucracy than is Merkes.
Abendroth has kept up with the literature by adding two more articles:
"Die deutsche Intervention im spanischen Biirgerkrieg," Vierteljahreshefte
fur Zeitgeschichte 30 (Jan. 1982): 117-29; and "Deutschland, Frankreich
und d~r spanische Biirgerkrieg, 1936-1939," in Klaus Hilderbrand, Ferdi-
nand Werner, and Klaus Manfrass, eds., Deutschland und Frankreich,
1936-1939 [Francia Beihefte] 10 (Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1981): 453-74
The first article stresses the importance of anti-communism in the mentality
of Hitler, but Abendroth does not define the term. The second, written on the
occasion of a conference, devotes half its space to Germany. That side of the
article basically reconfirms his earlier book. Hitler's antipathy toward and
fear of communism are discussed on pp. 461-63, and Abendroth concludes,
"Behind the defensive fa~ade hid the aggressor." A weak France was
essential for Hitler's planned conquest in the East, Abendroth also claims (p.
464). In short, he reconfirms the liberalism of Bullock and Weinberg.
Abendroth, Mittelmann zwischen Franco und Hitler: Johannes
Bernhardt erinnert 1936 (Marktheidenfeld: Willy Schleunung GmbH,
1978), is a booklet written in cooperation with Johannes Bernhardt and his
wife, who read the text in 1976. It supplements and complements Angel
Vinas, La Alemania nazi y ell8 de Julio: Antecedentes de la intervencion
alemana en la guerra espanola (Madrid, 1974, 1977), although Abendroth
did not consult Vinas (see 2nd ed., p. 321).
In Der spanische Biirgerkrieg in der Internationalen Politik, 1936-
1939 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1976), Wolfgang Schie-
der and Christof Dipper edit thirteen essays, most of which are reprints of
authors such as Einhorn. Schieder writes an introduction and an essay on
German intervention. Half the book focuses on German-Italian relations,
the other half on the USSR. What is notable about Schieder's introduction
and essay is that he is a West German who finally escapes from the "anti-
communist" viewpoint. The civil war is not communism vs. fascism, but
rather anarchism vs. militarism (p. 12). Schieder and I disagree, however, as
to Hitler's motives. He sees improvisation and nihilism (pp. 19, 168); I see
the clever propagandist during the civil war and the shrewd diplomat who,
until 1939, had a keen sense of timing and insight into the fears of his rivals:
Baldwin, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Franco, Stalin, Blum, Bonnet, Delbos,
and Daladier.
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Otfried Dankelmann, Franco zwischen Hitler und den Westmiichten
(Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1970), and WHfried
von Oven, Hitler und der spanische Burgerkrieg: Mission undSchicksal der
Legion Condor (Tubingen: Grabert Verlag, 1978), are both popular, broad
accounts.
The only scholarly work in Spanish that comes close to the theme of this
book is Vinas, La Alemania nazi y el18 de julio, first and second editions.
The scholarship of this Spaniard meets the best of the British, American,
and German writers. Vinas writes about the same subject I have covered in
chapter 1 and the second section of chapter 2. He also includes a chapter
about German economic policy from 1931 to 25 July 1936. Basically his
book ends where mine begins-on 25 July. His title is somewhat mislead-
ing, but the eighteenth of July-the date of the uprising-makes sense for a
Spanish audience. This is one of those few books in which scholars will want
to check both editions. The first edition (1974) has 558 pages, and the
second (1977) has 476 pages. The bibliographies are very different. The
second is more readable, but much valuable material was also cut.
Two monographs in English handle specialized aspects of the topic:
Glenn T. Harper, German Economic Policy in Spain during the Spanish
Civil Wa~ 1936-1939 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); and Raymond Proctor (a
former u.S. Air Force officer), Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983). Proctor consulted an outstand-
ing list of German official Legion Condor histories and war diaries located
in Freiburg. This book is good tactical military history, although it is too
much of an apology for the German Luftwaffe and shows too little concern
for its victims. It takes the view of history that technocrats have common
sense and politicians are foolish.
There are three books that take up where this study ends and concentrate
on Hitler's futile attempt to get Franco to enter the war against Britain in
1940. Donald S. Detwiler, Hitle~ Franco and Gibraltar: Die Frage des
spanischen Eintritts in den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1962), concentrates on the diplomatic side. Charles B. Burdick,
Military Strategy and Spain in World War II (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse
Univ. Press, 1968), concentrates on the military side and has an excellent
bibliograph~ Klaus-Jorg Ruhl, Spanien im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Franco, die
Falange und das 'Dritte Reich' (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1975), is the
most comprehensive of these books. Denis Smyth, "Reflex Reaction: Ger-
many and the Onset of the Spanish Civil War," in Paul Preston, ed.,
Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939 (New York: Harper, 1984),
243-65, is an essay of interpretation. Here, "onset" means to December
1936. He handles well Hitler's use of "communism" to influence British
conservative opinion. Insofar as he uses German sources, he follows Aben-
droth and ignores Merkes entirel~ He also plays down the Italian factor.
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